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Trade remedy measures (TRMs) in international economic law refer to anti-
dumping measures, countervailing duties and safeguard measures. They are designed 
to respond to unfair trade practices or to compensate the negative impact on domestic 
industries resulting from tariff concessions made under the trade liberalization 
arrangements. Due to the importance of these instruments, the rules on TRMs are 
strengthened in the WTO legal framework and established on non-discriminatory 
basis towards all WTO Members. However, with the proliferation of regional trade 
agreements (RTA) in recent decades, it was noticed that, most RTAs adopted 
innovative approaches on TRMs among their regional partners. Such incoherence has 
brought a series of trade disputes and arguments concerning the conflicts between the 
WTO and RTA. Current central issues in this area are whether those innovative 
TRMs are consistent with WTO law and what is the appropriate approach to examine 
the legality of those measures. 
Against the canvas of WTO trade remedy rules, this research first investigates 
the diversified trade remedy approaches in RTAs and their impact on international 
trade. It then clarifies the ambiguous legal criteria against which TRMs in RTAs 
should be judged in order to be WTO-consistent. Thereafter, a methodology through 
which a RTA-specific TRM could be tested against the WTO’s criteria is also 
developed.  It is argued that facilitating TRMs in RTAs must always adhere to the 
criteria laid down by the WTO, e.g. GATT Article XXIV. In particular, a “necessity 
test” should be applied when examining the legality of a special TRM in RTAs, in the 
case where a dispute arises between the RTA members and third countries on the 
issue. 
In order to bring the RTA-specific TRMs into compliance with WTO law, this 
research also looks at the WTO surveillance mechanism on RTAs. Considering a 
number of difficulties that have arisen in the GATT/WTO’s surveillance of RTAs in 
the past, the thesis addresses what positive measures can be taken in the future and 
whether TRMs in RTAs should be scrutinized by WTO political organs or through 






































List of Abbreviations 
 
AD:  Anti-dumping 
ADA:  WTO Anti-dumping Agreement 
ANZCERTA:  Australian-New Zealand Closer Economic Relationship Trade 
Agreement 
CACM:  Central American Common Market 
CAFTA-DR FTA:  Dominican Republic-Central America and the United States Free-trade 
Agreement 
CARICOM:  Caribbean Community and Common Market 
CEP:  Closer Economic Partnership 
CBERA: US – Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 
CCFTA:  Canada-Chile Free-Trade Agreement 
COTED:  Council for Trade and Economic Development  
CRTA:  Committee of Regional Trade Agreement 
CTG:  Council for Trade in Goods 
CUFTA:  Canada-United States Free-trade Agreement 
CU:  Customs Union 
CVD:  Countervailing Duty 
DDA:  Doha Development Agenda 
DSU Dispute Settlement Understanding 
EC:  European Community 
EEA:  European Economic Area 
EEC:  European Economic Community 
EFTA:  European Free-trade Agreement 
EU:  European Union 
FTA:  Free-trade Agreement 
GATS:  General Agreement on Trade in Service 
GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council 
ICJ:  International Court of Justice 
ITC:  US International Trade Commission 
JSEPA:  Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement 
MERCOSUR: Mercado Común del Sur (Common Market of the South) 
MFN:  Most-Favoured-Nation 
8 
 
MOU:  Memorandum of understanding 
MTS:  Multilateral Trading System 
NAFTA:  North American Free-trade Agreement 
NGR:  Negotiation Group on Rules (WTO) 
OECD:  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
ORC:  “other regulations of commerce” 
ORRC:  “other restrictive regulations of commerce” 
RTA:  Regional Trade Agreement 
SA:  WTO Agreement on Safeguards  
SAT:   “substantially all the trade” 
SG: Safeguard 
TRMs:  Trade Remedy Measures 
UN:  United Nation 
VERs:  Voluntary Export Restrictions/Restrains 
VCLT:  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969   
WTO:  World Trade Organization 
1994 Understanding:  “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General 




















In recent decades, the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) as well as 
the share of world trade covered by them has been steadily increasing and this trend 
will be further strengthened by many RTAs being proposed and those currently 
under negotiation. The stalemate in the Doha Round drives more and more WTO 
Members to pursue preferential trade liberalization rather than the MFN path. The 
proliferation of RTAs presents WTO Members with both challenges and 
opportunities: the promotion of free trade through preferential agreements can foster 
trade liberalization and benefit economic development by deepening the market 
integration across the borders; however the development of complex networks of 
non-MFN trade relations will increase discrimination and may well undermine 
transparency and predictability in international trade relations. Therefore, it is of 
systemic importance for the multilateral trading system that the WTO addresses this 
dichotomy and ensures that RTAs are designed and implemented so to complement 
and not undermine the multilateral process.
1
 Against this background, this research 
discusses the trade remedy measures adopted in existing regional trade agreements, 
which deviate from WTO general rules and incur increasing disputes between WTO 
Members.  
Under the GATT, particularly in the decade before the completion of the 
Uruguay Round, trade remedy measures, including anti-dumping, countervailing 
duty measures and safeguards, became a powerful weapon of choice against 
competitive imports, largely as a result of successful tariff reduction. TRMs have 
thus been highly active ever since being legislated in GATT/WTO. According to 
statistics, twenty-four percent of the panels in the GATT years were involved in 
TRMs
2
; from 1995 to the mid of 2011, 3922 anti-dumping actions were initiated by 
the WTO Members and 2543 anti-dumping measures were imposed.
3
   
                                                     
1 R V Fiorentino, L Verdeja and C Toqueboeuf, “The Changing Landscape of RTAs: 2006 Update”, Discussion 
Paper No 12, Regional Trade Agreements Section, Trade Policies Review Division (WTO 2007), abstract. 
2 See “Adopted panel reports within the framework of GATT1947”, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm 
3 See “Anti-dumping Initiations: By Exporting Country From: 01/01/1995 To: 30/06/2011”, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_init_exp_country_e.pdf; “Anti-dumping Measures: By Exporting 




 The trade restrictive effect of TRMs has invited strict rules under WTO legal 
framework for Member States to follow. Importantly, TRMs must be imposed non-
discriminatively in accord with the Most-Favoured-Nation principle of the WTO. 
However, in the development of RTAs, it has been noticed that the adoption of the 
TRMs in RTAs has significantly deviated from WTO basic rules. Making use of 
opportunities of regional integration, abolishing or tightening the imposition 
requirements of TRMs has been made available in increasing numbers of RTAs. 
According to recent WTO reports, in 74 RTAs under investigation, 56 either 
abolished or lesser use anti-dumping; 65 RTAs contains specific rules on safeguards, 
18 RTAs have provisions on global safeguards with 14 taking exceptions to the 
WTO Safeguards Agreement.
4
 In all disputes brought forward to WTO panels 
regarding regional trade rules, it has been noticed that a large percentage of the cases 
are involved with the trade remedy measures due to the preferential treatment 
between RTA partners. The centre of the arguments is whether those preferential 
treatments are consistent with WTO law and whether they are fair to non-RTA 
member countries. Due to the fact that the WTO provisions regulating RTAs (e.g. the 
GATT Article XXIV) never clearly address the trade remedy issues, no firm 
conclusion has been drawn on this question.  
Consequently, academic concerns are raised. Typically as Bhagwati, who saw 
the potential trade diversion effect of the preferential trade remedy rules in RTAs, 
stated:   
 “… even the modification of Article XXIV, to ensure that the external 
(implicit and explicit) tariff barriers come down as a price for CUs to be allowed 
under GATT rules, will leave open a gaping hole that would be tantamount to an 
open invitation to trade diversion by these preferential arrangements. In fact, 
trade creation can degenerate rapidly into trade diversion, when AD actions and 
VERs
5
 are freely used. 
                                                     
4 R Teh, T J Prusa, and M Budetta, “Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements”, Staff Working 
Paper ERSD-2007-03 (WTO 2007). 
5 “Voluntary” export restraint or “voluntary” export restriction is a type of imports restriction coerced upon the 
exporters by importing country, when the import-competing industries seek protection from a surge of imports 
from particular exporting countries. VERs are often offered by the exporter to appease the importing country and 
to deter the other party from imposing even more explicit (and less flexible) trade barriers compared with TRMs. 
The word voluntary in quotes is to indicate it’s rarely completely voluntary. They represent a “Beggar-thy-
Neighbor” policy that seeks to shift economic activities (or preserve it) for the importing country, and has the 
effect of increasing costs for consumers there. More importantly, the VERs are out of the discipline of the GATT 
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Imagine that the United States begins to eliminate (by outcompeting) an 
inefficient Mexican industry once the FTA goes into effect. Even though the 
most efficient producer is Taiwan, if the next efficient United States 
outcompetes the least efficient Mexico, that would be desirable trade creation 
(through the best course would be free trade so that Taiwan would take more of 
the Mexican market instead). 
But what would the Mexicans be likely to do? They would probably start 
AD actions against Taiwan, which would lead to reduced imports from Taiwan 
as the imports from the United States increased, leaving the Mexican production 
relatively unaffected: trade diversion from Taiwan to the United States would 
have occurred. Similarly, the effect of Mexican competition against the United 
States could well be that the United States would start AD actions and even 
VERs against Taiwan. 
My belief that FTAs will lead to considerable trade diversion (because of 
modern methods of protection, which are inherently selective and can be 
captured readily for protectionist purposes) is one that may have been borne out 
in the European Community. It is well known that the European Community has 
used AD actions and VERs profusely to erect “Fortress Europe” against the Far 
East. Cannot much of this be a trade-diverting policy on response to the 




Others assert that the elastic and selective nature of trade remedies may lead to 
more discrimination, with reduced trade remedy actions against RTA partners, but a 
greater frequency of trade remedy actions against non-members. To them, the 
adoption of RTA specific trade remedy rules increases this risk of discrimination, 
with trade remedies against RTA members being abolished outright or being subject 
to greater discipline. Therefore, the need to be vigilant about increased 
discrimination arising from trade remedy rules in RTAs is imminently suggested.
7
   
                                                                                                                                                      
and have severe trade-distortive effect to the free trade. Due to above factors, as a result of the Uruguay round of 
the GATT, VERs were formally prohibited by all WTO members.   
6 J N Bhagwatti, “Regionalism and Multilateralism: an Overview”, in J De Melo and A Panagariya (eds), New 
Dimensions in Regional Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993), pp 36-37. 
7 R Teh, T J Prusa, and M Budetta, “Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements”, Staff Working 
Paper ERSD-2007-03 (WTO 2007), p 2.   
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The question of whether the preferential TRMs in RTAs are WTO-consistent 
and welfare-enhancing has been complicated due to the controversial arguments on 
the rationale and the frequent use of TRMs in the last two decades. The rationales of 
the existing trade remedy measures in international trade are believed as the political 
demands, and such demands grew with the evolution of open trade in recent decades. 
One explanation for the near universal presence of trade remedy provisions in trade 
agreements is the political economy of protectionism.
8
 The long-term process of 
tariff liberalization in the post-world war II era has successfully reduced tariff rates 
to very low levels worldwide. However, import competing sectors continue to have 
an incentive to secure protection through whatever means they can find. Although 
TRMs are typically administered by bureaucracies which appear to be insulated from 
political pressure, influence can be brought to bear on them indirectly “through the 
shaping of the laws and regulations” which govern their work. One of the advantages 
offered by administered protection to import competing sectors is that it is inherently 
biased in their favour since it is a channel for complaints about an excess of import 
competition and not of its lack. By design, the trade remedy bureaucracy can only 
impose protection and not remove it (other than that which it imposes itself).
9
  
The second explanation sees trade remedy measures as a “pragmatic tool” to 
deal with the political demands for protection that trade liberalization provokes.
10
 
Trade liberalization may lead to costs of adjustment. If nothing is done to manage 
those costs, political pressure may build up to a point where protectionist forces 
would be able to engineer a permanent reversal of trade liberalization. The 
introduction of TRMs in a trade agreement may be thought of as anticipating the 
possibility of such difficult adjustment and the political pressure for protectionism 
that they give rise to and providing a means to deflate this pressure with a temporary 
reversal of liberalization. This implies that the depth of liberalization that can be 
achieved by a trade agreement ex-ante may depend on whether there are built-in 
mechanisms that allow governments to depart temporarily from their liberalization 
commitments under well-defined and circumscribed conditions. TRMs address this 
                                                     
8  P K M Tharakan, “Political Economy and Contigent Protection” (1995) 105 The Economic Journal 1550. 
9  J M Finger, H K Hall and D R Nelson, “The Political Economy of Administered Protection” (1982) 72 (3) 
American Economic Review 452, at 454. 
10 J H Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (2nd ed.) (the 
MIT Press 1997), pp 176-177. 
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need. While the use of TRMs may result in ex-post welfare losses during periods 
when the level of protection is temporarily increased, the deeper liberalization that is 
allowed ex-ante means that this could be outweighed by the long-term welfare gains. 
Therefore, on one hand, TRMs are essential leverage instruments that balance 
the structural reform of all trading countries in the international trade liberalization 
process. Anti-dumping and countervailing duties measures counteract the unfair 
trade behavior in the international trade market, while safeguards could release the 
economic and social pressure that result from the imports surges during the pace of 
trade liberalization – all of them play a vital role in achieving further liberalization of 
trade. However, due to the frequent use of TRMs in recent years, to some people, 
TRMs tend to be resorts of protectionism. They actually defeat the comparative 
advantages of the exporting countries and hamper the efforts toward trade 
liberalization. According to this view, preferential TRMs could reduce trade remedy 
actions and hence create a more competition-friendly environment of cross-border 
trade. Especially in the setting of RTAs, phasing out TRMs is an important step to 
achieve the market integration; in the meantime, it posed a good sign to reduce the 
restrictions from trade remedies amongst all WTO Members.  
So far, WTO negotiators have not worked out a good solution to all the above 
arguments. Nevertheless, new RTA negotiations and litigations keep following the 
existing fashion adopting TRMs deviating from WTO basic rules, which may not be 
consistent with WTO rules and cause further disruption in international trade 
relations.  
Target on this problem, this thesis looks at a broad range of RTAs coming right 
up to date, including those newly established RTAs, e.g. the EU-Korea FTA, EU-
Columbia-Peru FTA. It summarizes the different types of the diversity of the TRMs 
in those RTAs and examines their impact on international trade. Thereafter, it tries to 
clarify the ambiguous and controversial legal criteria against which TRMs in RTAs 
should be judged in order to be WTO-consistent. In order to bring the RTA-specific 
TRMs into compliance with WTO law, this thesis also looks at the WTO 
surveillance mechanism on RTAs. Considering a number of difficulties that have 
arisen in the GATT/WTO’s surveillance of RTAs in the past, the thesis attempts to 
address what positive measures can be taken in the future and whether TRMs in 
14 
 
RTAs should be scrutinized by WTO political organs or through the dispute 
settlement mechanism. 
The structure of this thesis is established on the main research questions as 
follows:  
1) What is the relationship between RTAs and the WTO? Should RTA trade policies 
be compliant with the WTO rules?  
In Chapter one, this author tries to articulate a fundamental assumption 
underlying the thesis that RTAs, taken as a regional trade liberalization process, 
should facilitate the efforts of global trade integration, represented by WTO practice. 
Innovative approaches in RTAs, even if deviating from current WTO regulations, 
should aim to enhance the WTO system, not undermine it. Current deviations of 
RTA approaches from WTO practice have created great legal uncertainty to non-
RTA members that seem to undermine the transparency and predictability of the 
international trade environment. In recent years, increasing number of trade disputes 
have been witnessed between RTA members and non-member countries regarding 
the preferential trade remedy measures adopted in RTAs. To reduce or prevent 
further confusion and conflicts in trade practice, clear disciplines under the 
multilateral trade framework regarding RTA-specific trade remedy rules, as well as 
further improvement on these rules, are indispensable. 
2) What are the differences between TRMs in RTAs and WTO? 
By reviewing and summarizing the regulations of TRMs in GATT/WTO and 
RTAs, Chapters 2 and 3 present a round picture on the deviations of TRMs in RTAs 
from WTO regulations. 
In chapter 2, this author examines GATT/WTO regulations on trade remedy 
measures, and also reviews the controversial academic ideas over the rationale and 
function of anti-dumping, countervailing duty measures and safeguards in 
international trade, which is believed to be necessary due to the fact that different 
views on TRMs lead to different approaches on how to adopt TRMs in RTAs. This 
context is the background for further analyses of TRMs in RTAs. It also gives 
references to the comparative study of TRMs in WTO and RTAs in Chapter 3.  
In chapter 3, TRMs in RTAs, summarized in a number of strategic approaches, 
are introduced through a comparative method against WTO regulations. It mainly 
15 
 
discusses the deviation of TRMs in RTAs from WTO regulations, which reveals the 
innovation that has been occurring in this sector, with a focus on the influence of 
those innovative measures on the regional trade and the imports from third-countries.   
3) Whether TRMs in RTAs can deviate from WTO general rules and what are the 
legal conditions they must adhere to? 
Based on the observation in Chapter 3 that, at present, many RTAs provide 
differential TRMs to their regional partners compared to the WTO rules, Chapter 4 
attempts to address the WTO legal criteria on TRMs in RTAs with the aim of 
clarifying 1) whether RTA-specific TRMs are allowed to deviate from the WTO 
general rules; and 2) if the answer is “yes”, in what conditions they are allowed to 
deviate. It then turns to work out a methodology, through which a RTA-specific 
TRM could be tested against the WTO’s criteria.  
The analysis will be based primarily on: (i) a “parallelism” requirement 
developed by WTO dispute settlement panels in case law; (ii) the legal relationship 
between Article XXIV and the GATT/WTO provisions that refer to TRMs (i.e., 
GATT Article VI, Article XIX and WTO agreements on anti-dumping, 
countervailing duties measures and safeguards); and (iii) relevant benchmarks in the 
provisions of GATT Article XXIV and the 1994 Understanding. Relevant findings 
and approaches provided by WTO dispute settlement panels in RTA-related disputes 
will also be addressed. 
4) How to enforce the WTO-consistency test on RTA-specific TRMs and bring them 
back onto the right track? 
To find out a feasible platform to enforce the WTO-consistency test on TRMs in 
RTAs proposed in this thesis, Chapter 5 is designed to look at the WTO surveillance 
mechanism on RTAs. Considering the GATT/WTO’s unsuccessful experience with 
RTA surveillance, this chapter examines the difficulties which have arisen from the 
RTA reviewing procedures in the past. Through this analysis, some ideas will be 
presented on the key questions surrounding the WTO’s surveillance on RTAs, for 
instance, whether the role of overseeing compatibility of TRMs in RTAs is best 
performed by the political organs of the WTO or through dispute settlement, how the 
judicial organ should manage its jurisdiction with the purpose to examine TRMs in 
RTAs, and how to reconcile the recommendations and decisions of these two organs.  
16 
 
By answering all above questions in this thesis, the author wishes to give her 
own comments and suggestions on how to improve TRM policies in both RTAs and 
the WTO. It is intended this work be taken as part of academic effort aiming to guide 








To give a start to the discussion of TRMs in the WTO and RTAs, this chapter 
introduces the background of the multilateral trading system and the regional trade 
agreements. Section 1.2 aims to construct a good understanding on the 
interrelationship between multilateralism and regionalism. It takes historical and 
theoretical perspective to assess the roles and functions of the multilateral trading 
system and RTAs. After comparing the advantages and disadvantages of each 
arrangement, it will be proposed that for a healthy and sustainable international trade 
environment, regionalism should complement multilateralism, not provide an 
alternative. Section 1.3 presents the recent proliferation of RTAs and their trend to 
develop complex networks of non-MFN trade relation, which not only challenges the 
dominance of the WTO but also creates more and more confusion on the WTO-RTA 
relationship. Section 1.4 and 1.5 gives a brief introduction to the WTO rules on RTAs 
and their surveillance in history to expose that, to date, the WTO’s supervision of 
RTAs is inadequate. Based on above discussions, Section 1.6 will emphasize that to 
reduce or prevent further confusion and conflicts in trade practice, clear disciplines 
under the multilateral trade framework regarding the RTAs are indispensable. 
 
1.2 Multilateralism and Regionalism 
The fundamental theory of international trade holds that each country has a 
“comparative advantage” over the others in some products. Trade translates the 
individual advantage of many countries into maximum productivity for all
11
 and the 
result is greater wealth for the world economy as well as the participants. Trade 
arrangements between sovereignties on the treatment of each other’s’ merchants and 
shipping can be traced back centuries. With the growth of commercial ability and 
                                                     




consumer demands, trade liberalization has become an irreversible trend of the world 
economy. In the meantime, how to manage trade liberalization turned out to be a 
prominent subject in international studies. 
Regionalism and multilateralism are two major paths towards the trade 
liberalization among the participating countries. Although it has no single definition, 
“multilateralism” in this context refers to trade liberalization concluded without 
discrimination throughout the world trade system, such as the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
12
 
Multilateralism trade liberalization basically includes the majority countries in the 
world and adopts the “single undertaking” principle in tariff reduction and market 
access across all participating countries. Regionalism, defined broadly as preferential 
trade agreements among a sub-set of nations, provides trade priorities to other 
members at the exclusion and discrimination of non-members who should be 
protected from such discrimination under the multilateral rules.
13
  
In contemporary international economic study, the concept of regionalism is no 
longer limited as an ideal to liberalize trade in self-contained blocs only, simply 
because the world economy has become irreversibly interdependent. For many 
scholars and policy-makers, regionalism shares the same purpose with multilateral 
trade liberalization. It is rather a strategy instrument to liberalize the trade in group of 
countries that may extend worldwide.
14
 However, the substantial differences between 
these two philosophies have incurred long-standing debate that basically asks “which 
arrangement is more conductive to trade liberalization?” Discussions mainly pertain 
to the following two broad issues: (i) relative welfare effects of non-preferential 
across-the-board (MFN) liberalization versus preferential liberalization; and (ii) the 
political economy implications of RTAs for the multilateral trading system, as well as 
those of the multilateral trading system for RTAs. While the first question asks which 
approach to trade liberalization is superior in terms of trade and welfare gains for the 
                                                     
12 WTO, Trading into the Future (2nd edition), (WTO 2001), p 4.   
13 WTO, Annual Report 2002, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep02_e.pdf, p 40.  
14 For example, since the European Economic Community (the predecessor of the European Union) was 
established in 1958, it has been expanded several times and actively seeking bilateral trade agreements with other 
countries. As a consequence, more and more countries were included into its trade integration network. In 2006, 
the European Commission set out a new Global Europe strategy to reorient European bilateral trade agreements 
through a new generation of Free Trade Agreements with Asian markets, which would further expand EU’s trade 
integration network (see, European Commission, Global Europe – Competing in the World, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf).   
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members of RTAs, third countries and the world as a whole, the second question 
seeks to ascertain the systemic implications of RTAs for the multilateral trading 
system in general and multilateral trade negotiations in particular, i.e. whether 
regional integration constitutes a building block or stumbling block to the 
multilateral trade liberalization and a more open and liberal multilateral trading 
system.
15
 As a matter of fact, not many people simply endorse one or the other 
strategy, since the answer depends on the circumstances. For instance, regional trade 
liberalization among a small number of countries normally goes quicker than that 
under multilateral negotiations. However, regional agreements can lead to a cascade 
of other regional agreements and to a general opening of trade, or to retaliation 
against discrimination and to the fragmentation of trade. Similarly, multilateralism 
can reduce negotiation costs through economies of scale, or they can divert attention 
away from potentially beneficial regional deals. Both multilateralism and 
regionalism are two-folded. 
Multilateralism and regionalism have actually always co-existed in the history of 
the international trade, one perhaps prevailing over the other in different eras. The 
drive for an open trade regime in the late 19 century came from the bilateral Anglo-
French commercial treaty of 1860. Britain adopted the unconditional MFN clause so 
that its tariff reductions to France became automatically available to all its trading 
partners. France adopted the conditional MFN whereby its tariff reductions were 
available to any country willing to sign a treaty similar to the Anglo-French treaty 
with it while the higher tariffs applied to all other nations. Other European states 
quickly followed suit. To seek lower tariffs of their goods, they concluded 
agreements with France, Britain, and each other. Thus, a bilateral agreement led to 
dozens of other agreements culminating in the creation of a free multilateral trading 
system. By 1908, France had MFN agreements with 20 countries, Britain with 46, 
and Germany with 30.
16
  
The regime brought into existence by bilateral treaties ended abruptly in August 
1914 with the outbreak of World War I. In the interwar period, by contrast, 
                                                     
15 M Mashayekhi and T Ito (eds), Multilateralism and Regionalism: The New Interface (United Nations 2005), p 
5. 
16 A I Douglas, “Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies in the World Trading System: an Historical 
Perspective”, in J De Melo and A Panagariya (eds), New Dimensions in Regional Integration (Cambridge 
University Press 1993), pp 90-119. 
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discriminatory trade blocs and protectionist bilateral arrangements contributed to the 
severe contraction of world trade that accompanied the Great Depression. The 
disaster of the interwar period strengthened the resolve of policymakers during 
World War II to construct a sound multilateral trading system that would prevent any 
return to discriminatory bilateralism in trade policy. 
The architects of the postwar world trading system, who lived through both 
periods, concluded that 19th century history exemplified the virtues of non-
discriminatory multilateralism, while the interwar experience demonstrated the vices 
of preferential bilateralism.
17
 As a consequence, the international trading system after 
World War II, represented by GATT/WTO, is virtually based on the multilateral 
approach. At the heart of the GATT/WTO system is the rule that WTO members may 
not discriminate against each other’s members (i.e. GATT Article I “the most-
favoured-nation clause”). In other words, if a WTO member lowers a duty for one 
member, it must do the same for all other members.  
Compared with a fragmented bilateral or plurilateral trading network, a non-
discriminatory multilateral system is deemed as having undeniable advantages. In 
this context, one of the leading authors on international economic law, Prof. John H 
Jackson, has stated that:   
“The MFN clause has the salutary effect of minimizing distortions of the 
‘market’ principles that motivate many arguments in favour of liberal trade. 
When governments apply trade restrictions uniformly without regard for the 
origin of goods, the market system of goods allocation and production will have 
maximum effect. ... MFN often causes a generalization of liberalizing trade 
policies, so that overall more trade liberalization occurs (the multiplier effect of 
the MFN clause). ... MFN concepts stress general rules applicable to all 
participating nations, which can minimize the costs of rule formation (such as 
the difficulty of negotiating a multitude of bilateral agreements). ... MFN helps 
minimize transaction costs, since customs officials at the border may not need to 
ascertain the ‘origin of goods’ to carry out their tasks with respect to goods 
controlled by MFN.  
[Of political concern]... without MFN, governments may be tempted to form 




particular discriminatory international groupings. These special groupings can 
cause rancor, misunderstanding and disputes, because those countries which are 
‘left out’ resent their exclusion. Thus MFN can serve the functions of lessening 
tensions among nations and inhibiting temptations for short-term ad hoc 




Briefly speaking, it is the MFN clause that created global order out of an 
essentially mercantilist system. Most importantly, perhaps, from the standpoint of 
lesser nations with little bargaining power, through the application of the MFN clause, 
purely bilateral bargains negotiated under the auspices of the GATT/WTO become 
available to all. It provides for a “level-playing field” for all members to trade goods 
and services with one another. This principle of non-discrimination is one of the 
main reasons that countries join the GATT/WTO.  
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1994, 
and the establishment of the WTO in 1995 to provide institutional support to the 
multilateral trade agreements, constituted a significant milestone in the evolution of 
the multilateral trading system. The principle of “single undertaking” bound all WTO 
members to all the results of the Uruguay Round negotiations (with the exception of 
some particular plurilateral agreements protected by the so-called “grandfathering 
clause” of the GATT that their rights and obligations remain intact
19
), thereby 
reinforcing the fundamental principle of MFN treatment. Over half century, 
enormous progress towards global free trade has been made under this non-
discriminatory approach to tariff reductions.  
                                                     
18 J H Jackson, The World Trading System (The MIT Press 1989), pp 134-35.   
19 A “grandfathering clause” is an exception which allows something pre-existing to remain as it is, despite a 
change to the contrary in the rules applied to newer situations. Often, such a provision is used as a compromise, 
to effect new rules without upsetting a well-established physical or political situation. During the course of work 
on tariff-cuts and trade rules from 1946-1947 in the framework of the drafting of the charter of the International 
Trade Organization (ITO), it was recognized that a number of the founding GATT contracting parties operated 
preferential trading schemes. These schemes were in clear violation of the MFN principle of the non-
discrimination (GATT Article I) that was being promulgated. It thus became apparent that some provision was 
required to cater for this anomaly, establishing the basis for the GATT Article I:2.  
GATT Article I:2 explicitly exempts in perpetuity (grandfathers) from the MFN requirement certain preferential 
arrangements existing at the time the GATT came into force. These include the British Imperial Preferences, 
preferences granted by the Benelux customs union and the United States, preferences granted by the Lebanon-
Syrian Customs Union to Palestine and Transjordan. The grandfathering preferences were limited by a 
requirement that they could not be raised above existing levels (those in force in 1947). Moreover, their 
significance has been steadily eroded over the past few decades by successive rounds of GATT tariff negotiations 
and reductions, and some of them have since ceased to exist. See M Mashayekhi and T Ito (eds), Multilateralism 
and Regionalism: The New Interface (United Nations 2005), p 34. 
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Nevertheless, preferential and regional trade arrangements have never been 
abandoned by GATT/WTO Members during the multilateral processes. When the 
GATT was established in 1947, the framers recognized the “free-rider” or “foot-
dragger” disadvantages that may arise from the MFN principle. Therefore, the GATT 
includes provisions allowing particular departures from MFN to facilitate trade 
liberalization, if such liberalization goes far enough to provide substantial advantages 
to the world.  
In the field of goods, the main exceptions to MFN are set forth in the GATT 
Article XXIV. In the field of services, a largely parallel provision is contained in the 
GATS Article V and Article V bis GATS for Labour Market Integration Agreements. 
Special provisions were also provided in respect of preferential trade arrangements in 
trade in goods concluded between developing country Members, i.e. the 1979 
Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries (the so-called “Enabling Clause”)
20
. The 
criteria set up in above provisions are fundamentally three: transparency, 
commitment to deep intra-region trade liberalization, and neutrality vis-à-vis non-
parties trade. In practice, a limited degree of transparency is the only requirement 
attached to RTAs concluded under the Enabling Clause.
21
  
Therefore, although GATT Article XXIV is based partly on the historical 
precedent of special regimes of frontier traffic between adjacent countries, from the 
inception of the GATT, the prevailing perception was that genuine regional initiatives 
promoting extensive trade liberalization among sub-sets of the Members could be 
congruent with multilaterally-agreed trade liberalization, and could contribute to the 
development of global trade and of the multilateral trading system. Total world 
welfare can be enhanced by collective elimination of restrictions on trade among 
those countries who further the market access they have bound in the GATT by 
concluding RTAs, albeit subject to a certain number of criteria. The coexistence of 
regional and multilateral (i.e. GATT MFN) tracks to trade liberalization thus was 
viewed as ultimately positive in international trade relations.  
With the exception of GATT Article XXIV, three waves of regional deals 
                                                     
20 Differential and more favourable treatment reciprocity and fuller participation of developing countries – 
Decision of 28 November 1979, L/4903. 
21 R V Fiorentino, L Verdeja and C Toqueboeuf, “The Changing Landscape of RTAs: 2006 Update”, Discussion 
Paper No 12, Regional Trade Agreements Section, Trade Policies Review Division (WTO 2007), p 27. 
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emerged soon after. The first came during the early 1960s, the second started in 
middle 1980s and the latest started in the mid-1990s.
22
  
As a persistent dedicator of regionalism, the European Community was 
established in 1958 and marked a partial watershed of many countries attitude 
towards regionalism after establishment of the GATT. Under the impetus of the 
European Common Market, while motivated by the altogether different economic 







regionalism spread throughout Africa, Latin America and other parts of the 
developing world. The United States was then a hegemonic power and a staunch 
supporter of multilateralism. The so-called “First Regionalism” then came to a halt 
during much of the 1970s. 
However, in the 1980s, the chief proponent of multilateralism and non-
discrimination, United States, became disappointed by a lack of progress at the 
GATT negotiations and decided to switch course and went on to conclude first the 
Canada-US Free-Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 1989 (i.e. now the North American 
Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA)). The United States also announced its intention to 
negotiate free-trade agreements with groups of other Latin American countries. 
Alongside this, the European Community has continued to widen and deepen its 
integration. These developments have, in turn, led other countries to reconsider the 
regional option. East Asia, in particular, is beginning to fear that a regional bloc may 
be the only way to meet the challenge posed by developments in the Americas and 
Europe. Even developing countries are beginning to fear that their access to world 
markets may be curtailed considerably if trading blocs become a reality and they are 




A key reason for the United States’ conversion to regionalism was the slow 
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progress at the GATT. In particular, the GATT negotiations had less success in later 
years. The difficulties encountered by the United States in multilateral trade 
negotiation were noticed by some scholars. For instance, Paul Krugman offered four 
reasons for this stalemate: first, the number of players participating in the process 
had grown larger which makes negotiations difficult and free-rider problem harder to 
handle. Second, the decline in US dominance has made it more difficult to run the 
system. Third, institutional differences among major countries make negotiations 
complicated in further liberalization at multilateral level. Finally, the character of 
protection has changed. The presence of voluntary export restrains (VERs), anti-
dumping (AD) mechanisms, and other forms of administered protection make the 
negotiating space vastly more complicated than it was in the past.
27
  
For other countries, there are even more reasons for the attractiveness of regional 
agreements as compared to multilateral negotiations. Interesting explanations have 
been offered in much of the related literature. The Director-General of the WTO, 
Pascal Lamy succinctly explained the motivations on constitution of the RTAs:  
“First, they seem quicker to conclude. Fewer parties means that preferential 
trade agreements can be wrapped-up within a shorter period of time. This is 
usually very attractive to both politicians and business communities who are 
looking for quicker results. 
Secondly, they can enter into new territories. Because of similarities in interests 
and often more common values, bilateral trade agreements can go into new areas 
such as investment, competition, technical standards, labour standards or 
environment provisions, where there is no consensus among WTO Members.  
Thirdly, many of the recent FTAs contain political or geopolitical considerations. 
For developing countries negotiating with more powerful developed countries, 
there is usually the expectation of exclusive preferential benefits, as well as 
expectations of development assistance and other non-trade rewards. They are 
also viewed as an instrument to get “brownie points” and gain an advantage over 
other WTO Members. Bilateral trade agreements are also useful for negotiators 
to learn how to negotiate thus contributing to reinforcing a country’s trade 
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Dimension in Regional Integration (Cambridge University Press 1993), pp 58-75.  
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institutions. Many regional trade agreements have been the bedrock for peace 
and greater political stability.  
Finally, they are often used as instruments for domestic reform in areas where 
the multilateral system offers a weaker leverage.”
28
 
Under such circumstance, it is not a surprise that many WTO Members are 
pursuing regional agreements. However, this does not mean that regionalism is better 
than multilateralism either now or in the future. Prominently, the welfare effects 
stemming from the formation of a RTA are ambiguous. To borrow the early 
theoretical and empirical work on RTAs started in the 1950s with Viner’s seminal 
work, in a simple partial equilibrium model under perfect competition, a RTA may 
increase the level of trade between members at the expense of less efficient domestic 
producers (trade creation) but also to the detriment of more efficient third countries 
(trade diversion). The net effect of a RTA on trade and economic welfare thus 
depends on the relative size of these two effects. On the other hand, the dynamic 
effect of regionalism is still unknown.
29 
 
Again, according to Lamy, multilateralism should remain as the virtues of 
international trade relation and the regional agreements cannot replace the 
multilateral trade rules. To support this opinion, he emphasized four crucial 
limitations of regional agreements from an empirical perspective: 
“First, the conclusion of preferential trade agreements can create an incentive for 
even further discrimination, which eventually will hurt all trading partners. 
Countries outside an agreement will try to conclude agreements with one of 
those that are inside to avoid exclusion. This has been called the “domino” or 
“bandwagon effect” and is the reason for much of the regional trade agreement 
activity seen in Asia recently. In other words, the consequence is that the 
preferences obtained through forming a preferential agreement against 
competitors tend to be short-lived. The more agreements you have, the less 
meaningful the preferences would be.  
Secondly, bilateral agreements cannot solve systemic issues such as rules of 
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origin, anti-dumping, agricultural and fisheries subsidies. These issues simply 
cannot be handled at the bilateral level. Take for instance, negotiations to 
eliminate or reduce trade distorting agriculture subsidies, or fisheries subsidies. 
There is no such thing as a “bilateral” farmer or fisherman, or a “bilateral” 
chicken and a “multilateral” farmer or chicken or fish. Subsidies are given to 
farmers for all their poultry production. The same is true for rules of anti-
dumping. 
Thirdly, the proliferation of regional trade agreements can greatly complicate the 
trading environment, creating a web of incoherent rules. Take rules of origin: an 
increasing number of WTO Members are party to ten or more regional trade 
agreements, most of which for a given Member contain agreement-specific rules 
of origin which are necessary to ensure that the preferences go to your partner 
and not to others. This complicates the production processes of business who 
may be obliged to tailor their products for different preferential markets in order 
to satisfy rules of origin. It also complicates life for customs officials who are 
obliged to assess the transparency of the trading regime. Borrowing the 
expression used by Professor Bhagwati – this is where we begin to have a real 
“spaghetti bowl” of twisted rules of origin. 
Finally, to many small and weak developing countries, entering into a bilateral 
agreement with a powerful big country means less leverage and a weaker 
negotiating position as compared that in the multilateral talks. It might not be the 
case for India, China, Brazil, the US and the EC, it will be true for Mauritius, Sri 
Lanka, Cambodia or Ghana.”
30
 
In line with above views, RTAs may result in inward-looking, discriminatory and 
protectionist trading entities competing for spheres of influence and becoming self-
contained fortresses. In particular, large RTAs – those whose membership covers a 
large share of global trade – can potentially have harmful effects for non-members 
leading to net trade diversion rather than net trade creation. By enabling faster and 
deeper integration, new-generation RTAs may reduce incentives for countries to 
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favour a multilateral approach to trade liberalization. The proliferation of RTAs, with 
more and more countries being members of several RTAs at the same time, can act as 
negotiating forums virtually substituting for the WTO, thereby leading to “forum 
shopping”, and posing a systemic risk to the viability of the multilateral trading 
system. Such overlapping membership would also pose tremendous administrative 
burdens for small countries with limited negotiating and institutional capacities. 
Furthermore, the developments on standard-setting in new issues (i.e. investment or 
competition policy) in RTAs representing the potential risk of increased 
fragmentation of trade rules at regional levels, making it difficult to agree 
multilaterally on new issues.
31
 On the other hand, regional arrangements, by their 
nature cannot solve the systemic issues that involve world-wide trade relations.  
 
1.3 Proliferation of RTAs and its Challenges to the Multilateral 
Trading System 
Since the mid-1990s, the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
unprecedentedly has increased, with today virtually all countries being part of one or 
more RTAs (the exception being Mongolia). Regionalism, characterised as both an 
increase in the number of RTAs and in intra-regional trade flows, has progressed 
rapidly in many regions, having started in Europe and the Western Hemisphere, it 
now extends to more and more Asian-Pacific and Africa countries. In the period 
1948-1994, the GATT received 124 notifications of RTAs (relating to trade in goods), 
and since the creation of the WTO in 1995, almost 300 additional arrangements 








                                                     










Source: WTO Secretariat   
(The above chart shows all RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO during 1948-2011, including 
inactive RTAs, by year of entry into force) 
Taking account of the RTAs that are operational although not yet notified, 
almost 300 RTAs were in force in 2010.
32
 The expansion, widening and deepening of 
RTAs has resulted in a situation whereby intra-RTA trade has been steadily 
increasing (see Table 2). The share of intra-RTA trade in world merchandise exports 
accounted for 17.8 per cent (excluding the EC/EU) in 1990 and doubled in 2008 (see 
Table 3). Thus, international trade flows are increasingly concentrated within 




                                                     





Evolution of intraregional merchandise exports against world statistic, selected RTAs (2001-2010, in Billions of dollars) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
World Total 6169.3 6492.4 7585.6 9218.0 10488.7 12112.7 14002.6 16120.5 12516.4 15236.8 
EFTA 143.4 153.6 175.5 208.2 237.8 273.5 313.2 377.9 291.5 331.4 
NAFTA 1147.5 1106.2 1162.9 1319.6 1475.8 1664.1 1840.7 2035.2 1602.3 1964.6 
MERCOSUR 87.8 88.8 106.1 135.8 164.0 190.1 223.8 278.4 217.2 281.3 
CACM 14.4 16.7 18.0 19.9 21.7 24.3 27.3 29.6 26.1 29.9 
CARICOM 7.8 7.3 9.0 11.0 14.9 20.2 20.1 26.3 14.9 17.3 
GCC 160.2 167.9 212.7 285.2 397.6 480.7 555.0 751.8 509.8 649.0 








Source: WTO, World Trade Report 2011: Figure B.6 (original from UN: Comtrade, database) 
Along with the dramatic increase in the number of RTAs, the new regionalism is 
also characterized by more ambitious levels of integration. To facilitate this, rules 
and policies adopted in RTAs are noted going beyond multilateral disciplines and 
liberalization commitments with two exceptional trends: 1) based on the current 
multilateral disciplines bounded under the GATT/WTO, many RTAs altered the 
trading rules by offering their regional partners priorities; 2) the qualitative 
dimension of RTAs in respect of coverage of policy areas evolved. Recent “new-
generation” RTAs increasingly cover not only the traditional trading issues, but also 
other “behind the border” regulatory areas, including investment, intellectual 
property rights, competition policy, labour, environment and development 
cooperation. 
A typical example is the trade remedy measures in RTAs that will be discussed in 
detail in this thesis. Against the WTO provisions in the areas of anti-dumping, 
countervailing duties and safeguard measures, the approaches taken by RTAs are 
31 
 
quite diverse. Some have gone beyond the WTO framework by strengthening WTO 
rules to minimise the opportunity to use such measures in a protectionist manner, 
while other RTAs have completely eliminated the possibility of using them among 
participating countries. Yet in the area of safeguards, some RTAs add new 
opportunities to use such measures. Some RTAs are also facilitated with regional 
bodies to investigate and/or review the final determination of TRMs applied by 
national authorities. An OECD report concluded that, “in RTAs, provisions in these 
areas reflect two tendencies: on the one hand, border trade barriers between members 
have been reduced below MFN levels, which could give rise to fears of an increased 
resort to contingency measures; yet at the same time the objective of deeper 
integration may obviate the need or lead the members to forgo (or limit the scope of) 
contingency measures [i.e. the trade remedy measures], and in the case of customs 
unions to implement common external policies in these areas.”   
 The constitution of RTAs is under the auspices of the GATT/WTO and is based 
on the perception that regionalism can be a useful vehicle to promote global trade 
integration and maximize the welfare of all participating countries. However, the 
proliferation of RTAs and the rules diversification of the RTAs not only complicate 
the international trading environment, but also bring significant challenges to the 
existing multilateral trading system. The central concern of the evolving RTAs is the 
conflict with one of the cornerstones of the WTO – the non-discrimination principle. 
The parties to an RTA liberalize trade solely among themselves, which exactly 
contradicts with the non-discrimination concept. This key difference in approach 
makes the relationship between the WTO and RTAs both complicated and 
controversial. Concern was voiced by several WTO Members that the MFN principle 
could be increasingly bypassed by the conclusion of agreements among RTAs and 
the development of regional trade policy disciplines differing from those under the 
WTO Agreements could lead to Members forgoing some of their WTO rights when 
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1.4 WTO Rules on RTAs  
In order to regulate the development of RTAs, as previously mentioned, 
GATT/WTO allows its Member States to enter into regional trade arrangements 
under specific conditions, which are spelled out in three sets of rules:  
i) GATT Article XXIV, which provides for the formation and operation of 
customs unions and free-trade areas covering trade in goods;  
ii) Article V of GATS, which governs the conclusion of RTAs in the area of trade 
in services, for both developed and developing countries; and 
iii) the so-called Enabling Clause (i.e., the 1979 Decision on Differential and 
More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries), which refers to preferential trade arrangements in trade in goods 
between developing country Members. 
All the above provisions allow WTO Members to depart from the cornerstone 
principle of the MFN under certain criteria, and establish the requirements to be 
fulfilled by members of RTAs in order to be compatible with the WTO.
34
 This 
research is limited on discussing the TRMs in those RTAs notified under GATT 
Article XXIV.  
Comprised of 12 paragraphs altogether, GATT Article XXIV covers four aspects 
regarding the constitution of a RTA: the general objective of the RTA, the coverage 
and level of the trade liberalization within the RTA, the transitional period of the RTA 
and the procedural requirements which refers to notification and transparency issues. 
In the WTO era, it was further elaborated by the Understanding on the Interpretation 
of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the “1994 
Understanding”) concluded in the Uruguay Round and a Draft Decision on a 
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including “regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed counties for the mutual reduction 
of tariff reduction or elimination of tariffs” (paragraph 2c). Thus, it can be argued that the Enabling Clause sets 
out less stringent requirements than those contained in GATT Article XXIV. Indeed, a number of South-South 
RTAs have been notified under the Enabling Clause. Other non-generalized preferential schemes, for example 
non-reciprocal preferential agreements involving developing and developed countries, require Members to seek a 
waiver from WTO rules. Such waivers require the approval of three quarters of WTO Members. Examples of 
such agreements which are currently in force include the US - Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 
(CBERA), the CARIBCAN agreement whereby Canada offers duty-free non-reciprocal access to most Caribbean 
countries, Turkey-Preferential treatment for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the EC-ACP Partnership Agreement. See 
“Regional Trade Agreements: Rules” at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regrul_e.htm.  
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Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements  (the “Transparency 
Mechanism”) reached in the Doha Round in 2006 on provisional basis. 
The objective of GATT Article XXIV is to assume the role of overriding, 
constitutional disciplines which structure the shape and contents of preferential 
agreements – all with a view to support regional integration, as building blocks to 
trade regulation and liberalization, while at the same time avoiding unnecessary trade 
distortions. GATT Article XXIV:4 clearly provides that “the purpose of a customs 
union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent 
territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such 
territories.” The preamble of the 1994 Understanding reaffirmed this objective and 
further stated that, in RTA formation or enlargement, the parties to them “should to 
the greatest possible extent avoid creating adverse effects on the trade of other 
Members”.  
  The heart of GATT Article XXIV is three basic obligations to be followed by 
WTO Members who wishing to enter into an RTA covering trade in goods – the first 
one is of procedural nature, and the latter two are of substantive nature: 
 
a) an obligation to notify the RTA  
Since regional integration essentially amount to an exception from the basic 
obligation to treat international trade in a non-discriminatory manner, the resulting 
legal consequence is that WTO Members wishing to enter into a RTA, and 
consequently deviate from the obligation to treat trade from all other WTO Members 
in a non-discriminatory manner, will have the burden of proof to state that they have 
complied with the relevant multilateral rules.
35
 Thus, the first step towards meeting 
this obligation comes with the notification of the scheme.  
The procedural obligation on the constitution of RTAs emphasizes the duty of 
prompt notification and transparency. Pursuant to GATT Article XXIV:7 and 
paragraph 11 of the 1994 Understanding, “any contracting party deciding to enter 
into a customs union or free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the 
formation of such area, shall promptly notify the WTO Members and shall make 
                                                     
35 With regard to the “exception” status of GATT Article XXIV, see WTO Appellate Body Report, Turkey – 
Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products (“Turkey – Textiles”), WT/DS34/AB/R, dated 22 
October 1999, para 45 and footnote 13. 
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available to them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will 
enable them to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they 
may deem appropriate”. In addition, the Members of RTAs are required report 
periodically to the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) on the operation of the relevant 
agreement. Any significant changes and/or developments in the agreements should 
be reported as they occur. The recently concluded Transparency Mechanism further 
clarified the procedure for the early announcement of RTAs, the timeframe for 
notification, the spectrum of information to be submitted by the parties, consideration 
on the notified RTAs and streamlined procedures for RTAs’ subsequent notification 
and reporting. 
 
b) an obligation to liberalize among constituents of the RTA substantially all trade  
The MFN departures are in theory allowed only for CUs and FTAs that are 
defined to require liberalization on “substantially all” the trade involved (the so-
called “internal trade requirement”). GATT Article XXIV:8(a) provides that, either in 
a customs union (CU) or in a free trade area (FTA), “duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, 
XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade 
between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially 
all the trade in products originating in such territories”.  
 
c) an obligation not to raise the overall level of protection and make access of 
products of third parties not participating in the RTA more onerous  
GATT Article XXIV:5(a) provides that “with respect to a customs union, or an 
interim agreement leading to a formation of a customs union, the duties and other 
regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of any such union or interim 
agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or 
agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general 
incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent 
territories prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such interim 
agreement”. Similar requirements are imposed on the constitution of free trade area 
in paragraph (b). But the assessment on the constituent of a FTA is to ensure that 
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each and every individual trade instrument will not become more restrictive, post-
establishment of the FTA.  
According to Article XXIV:8(a)(ii), on the constitution of a customs union, WTO 
Members are required to adjust their external protection (e.g. tariffs) so that all of 
them provide substantially the same level of protection. Therefore, some members of 
a customs union may need to increase or reduce their tariff rates and customs duties 
towards non-members. In order not to impede the fulfilment of Article XXIV:5(a), 
according to Article XXIV:6 of GATT (compensatory adjustment), CU members 
wishing to raise tariffs beyond the rate bound under Article II of GATT had to 
renegotiate them under the procedure for the modification of tariff concessions in 
Article XXVIII of GATT. However, in providing for compensatory adjustment, due 
account should be taken of the compensation already afforded by the reduction 
brought about in the corresponding duty of the other constituents of the union. The 
1994 Understanding, paragraph 5, further provides that these negotiations should be 
entered into in good faith with a view to achieving mutually satisfactory 
compensatory adjustment. In the event that no agreement can be reached within a 
reasonable period of time, the customs union will, nevertheless, be free to modify or 
withdraw the concessions; affected Members will also be free to withdraw 
substantially equivalent concessions in accordance with Article XXVIII. 
In some occasions the constitution of either a CU or FTA may not be completed 
at once, where a transition period is needed towards full integration. Therefore, WTO 
Members can also enter into “interim agreements” to form a CU or an FTA. GATT 
Article XXIV:5(c) stipulates that, any interim agreement for the transition period 
shall include a plan and schedule for the formation of the RTA within a reasonable 
length of time. Since there is no clear indication regarding this time span, paragraph 
3 of the1994 Understanding adds that the “reasonable length of time” should not 
exceed 10 years apart from some exceptional cases. In cases where WTO Members 
to an interim agreement believe that 10 years would be insufficient they shall provide 





1.5 GATT/WTO’s Surveillance on RTAs in History 
In order to look over the constitutions of RTAs, during the GATT years, a 
working party was typically formed to review the consistency of a notified RTA with 
the GATT rules. Now, the task is entrusted to the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreement (CRTA). However, both the WTO and its predecessor, the GATT, have 
not been successful in clarifying this test. This situation is largely owing to the 
ambiguous languages of GATT Article XXIV, which led the participators of the 
CRTA constantly failure to establish clear understanding on the provisions. In the 
meantime, the surveillance mechanism for reviewing the RTAs is also deemed 
problematic.   
GATT Article XXIV provisions confronted their first real test with the 
notification of the Treaty of Rome which established the EEC in 1957. The working 
party, however, concluded that “no agreement was reached on the compatibility of 
the Treaty of Rome with Article XXIV, and the contracting parties agreed that 
because ‘there were a number of important matters on which there was not at this 
time sufficient information … to complete the examination of the Rome Treaty’ … 
this examination and the discussion of the legal questions involved in to could not be 
usefully pursued at the present time”.
36
 The examination of the EEC was never taken 
up again in the GATT. The examination of CUs and FTAs subsequently notified to 
the GATT also did not lead to any clear assessments of full consistency with the rules. 
Frictions arising between GATT Members in these areas were dealt with 
pragmatically. Legal concepts contained in GATT Article XXIV were noticed to be 
difficult to apply and have caused much controversy in the GATT. For example, the 
GATT exception allows an “interim agreement” – one that leads to a CU or FTA 
within a reasonable time – to depart from MFN. This has opened a loophole of 
considerable size, since almost any type of preferential agreement can be claimed to 
fall within the exception for “interim agreement”, and “reasonable time” is 
exceedingly imprecise. 
Accordingly, the Uruguay Round concluded the 1994 Understanding, which was 
designed by the negotiators to address some of these problems. While not changing 
                                                     
36 GATT Working Party, The Rome Treaties – Statement of Conclusions for Approval by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES, GATT doc. W/13/49, 18 November 1958.  
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the actual language of GATT Article XXIV, the 1994 Understanding sets forth certain 
guidelines for handling some of the ambiguities in Article XXIV. However, the 
supplement is of a rather procedural nature; very little substantive clarification or 
interpretation was provided of the essential requirements contained in the Article.  
At the time of the launch of the Doha Round in November 2001, the CRTA again 
had made no further progress on its mandate of consistency assessment due to the 
endemic questions of interpretation of the provisions contained in Article XXIV of 
the GATT 1994. Members had not been able to reach consensus on the format nor the 
substance of the reports on any of the examinations entrusted to the CRTA.  
Concerns over the developmental aspects of RTAs and a malfunctioning 
multilateral surveillance mechanism prompted Ministers meeting at the Fourth 
Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001 to include RTA rules under the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA). In the Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO 
Members recognize that RTA can play an important role in promoting trade 
liberalization and in fostering economic development, and stress the need for a 
harmonious relationship between the multilateral and regional processes. On this 
basis, Ministers agreed to launch negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving the 
relevant disciplines and procedures under existing WTO provisions with a view to 
resolving the impasse in the CRTA, exercising better control of RTAs dynamics, and 
minimizing the risks related to the proliferation of RTAs.  
Again, achievement was only made on procedural issues, with Members 
reaching a formal agreement on the Transparency Mechanism in July 2006; 
negotiations on the substantive issues have made little progress as the scope of issues 
under consideration is wide, complex and relates to several other regulatory areas.  
In the end, the substantive components of the legal test contained in GATT 
Article XXIV and the 1994 Understanding for a qualifying RTA are still considered 
inadequate, especially for today’s developing international economic practice. A 
number of issues have been raised in CRTA meetings and the academia. For instance, 
neither the GATT generally, nor the language of Article XXIV, deals with the 
important question of “rule of origin” in RTAs, by which preferential parties 
determines whether goods are entitled to receive the preference of their arrangement. 
Similarly, certain other non-tariff trade policy laws are not clearly addressed in the 
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GATT language with regard to the RTAs. A typical example is the trade remedy 
measures discussed in this thesis. Furthermore, there are a number of issues 
regarding the institutional structure of preferential arrangements, particularly those 
relating to dispute settlement. The dispute settlement provisions contained in “new 
generation” RTAs could build jurisprudence conflicting with that of the WTO. In the 
meantime, there is no guideline for those newly generated issues that are not covered 
in the multilateral trading system, such as environmental, investment and 
competition issues in RTAs. 
To date, the CRTA has not been able to adopt final reports on its examination. 
Some believe that this is in large part due to the very limited progress made by WTO 
Members in resolving “systemic issues” concerning WTO rules on RTAs.
37
 Systemic 
issues pertain to the interpretation of some of the terms and benchmarks in the 
provisions. For instance, there has been no agreement among WTO Members as to 
the exact meaning and measurement of key terms such as “substantially all the trade”, 
“not on the whole higher or more restrictive”, and “other regulations of commerce 
(ORC)”; and with respect to the treatment of preferential rules of origin, “other 
restrictive regulations of commerce (ORRC)” and obligations during transitional 
periods.
38
 The reviewing procedure convened by the GATT working parties and the 
CRTA adds more difficulties to achieve a result because both organs operate by 
consensus – all decisions need consensus of the participants (usually the 
representatives of all GATT/WTO Members).
39
 As the participants usually held 
divergent views on the substantive criteria on RTAs, consensus was hardly ever 
reached on specific issues. 
Review of the consistency of RTAs can also take place through submission of 
RTA-related disputes to WTO adjudicating bodies, which is known as “Track II” 
review, in contrast with the reviews under GATT working parties or CRTA. In 
practice, RTA-related disputes have rarely been submitted to adjudicating bodies for 
                                                     
37 See P De Lombaerde (ed), Multilateralism, Regionalism and Bilateralism in Trade and Investment: 2006 
World Report on Regional Integration (Springer 2007), p 10. 
38 Ibid. The relationship between RTAs notified under the Enabling Clause and GATT Article XXIV has also 
been raised. Systemic issues with regard to GATS include the interpretation of “substantial sectoral coverage” 
and “absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination”. 
39 M Matsushita, T J Schoenbaum and P C Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy 
(Oxford University Press 2003), p 344.  
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review. As a result, RTAs have been left largely unchallenged.
40
 Although this does 
not mean that all RTAs are problematic, unchallenged RTAs essentially implies that 





Regional trade agreement, since its inception, has been a major route to 
liberalize trade between the participating countries parallel to the multilateral trade 
agreement presented by the GATT and WTO. Nonetheless, the welfare effect of 
regionalism to the world economy is not confirmed in economic theory. The 
historical experience of the open trade regime shows that, the healthy development of 
an international trading environment needs supportive and complementary RTAs to 
the greatest extent possible with the multilateral trading system in a way which 
strengthens its credibility.  
When the GATT was established in 1947, the coexistence of preferential and 
multilateral arrangements to trade liberalization was viewed as ultimately positive in 
international relations. The then prevailing perception was that genuine regional 
initiatives promoting extensive trade liberalization among sub-set of the Members 
could be congruent with multilaterally-agreed trade liberalization and could 
contribute to the development of global trade and of the multilateral trading system. 
Thus, from the inception of the GATT, Members have been allowed to further the 
market access they have bound in the GATT by concluding RTAs, albeit subject to a 
certain number of criteria. For agreements in trade in goods, the criteria are contained 
in GATT Article XXIV, including fundamentally three elements: (a) transparency, (b) 
commitment to deep intra-regional trade liberalization, and (c) neutrality vis-à-vis 
non-parties trade.  
Although the criteria were further elaborated in the WTO era by the 1994 
Understanding and the Transparency Mechanism on RTAs, such exceptions and 
limits so far have not effectively resolved the inconsistencies and conflicts between 
RTA and WTO rules. The fact is, legally, WTO Members have different 
                                                     
40 For detail discussion, see section 5.3.2 of this thesis. 
41 M Matsushita, T J Schoenbaum and P C Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy 
(Oxford University Press 2003), p 344.   
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understandings on the WTO disciplines when shaping RTAs policies; politically, 
WTO Members consistently fail to examine regional agreements; in dispute 
settlement, very limited interpretation has been put forward on the WTO’s disciplines 
on RTAs. Moreover, Members often refrain from notifying agreements to the WTO, 
thus defeating WTO-consistency examination and discussion.
42
 Thus, the 
improvement and clarification of WTO disciplines affecting RTAs are critical in 
disciplining RTAs in a manner supportive of a multilateral trading system – one 
which minimizes the harmful effects of RTAs on third countries and the multilateral 
trading system. 
Unlike the RTAs campaigns in 1960’s and1980’s, the recent wave of regionalism 
shows many signs of strength to enduring and expanding. Today, virtually all 
members of WTO are party to, or are in the process of, negotiating a regional trade 
agreement. For most countries, RTAs have become the centrepiece of their 
commercial policy implying in many cases a shift of resources from multilateral 
trade objectives to the pursuance of preferential agreements. Moreover, RTAs show 
an increasing level of sophistication; and their outreach in terms of partners is 
becoming both innovative and geographically unbound. As Crawford and Fiorentino 
in their work claimed that, “the significance of the phenomenon should not be 
overlooked since it will ultimately influence the nature of international trade relations 
and the policy choices and behavior of the operating actors.”
43
  
In respect to the supremacy of the WTO over RTAs, the constituent treaties of 
many new-generation RTAs clearly state that these need to be consistent with WTO 
rules. To many advocators of the multilateral trading system, this indicates that future 
RTAs could be built on the WTO, seeking to maintain compatibility with its 
disciplines. For them, this points to a positive, dynamic interface between regional 
trade liberalization and disciplines on the one hand, and multilateral liberalization 
and disciplines on the other. But of course, in order for these intentions to become 
reality, all RTA provisions need to be WTO-compatible.
44
 Nevertheless, the facts is 
that the RTA coverage and evolution of trade disciplines has already posed some 
incompatibility with multilateral rules and generated increasing disputes between 
                                                     
42 See the listing of agreements relating to the Eastern Europe in M Godel and J Gage (eds) Multilateralism and 
Bilateralism after Cancun: Challenges and Opportunities of Regionalism (Seco Publikation Welthandel 2004). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid.  
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WTO Members. This highlights the urgent need for coherence between the 
multilateral and regional processes if the potential benefits are to be maximized. The 
challenge may not simply be the issue of whether the RTA constituent countries 
would like to follow the multilateral rules but will be to ensure the effectiveness of 
WTO’s discipline on RTA and its RTA surveillance mechanism as an interface 

































































Chapter 2 Trade Remedy Rules in the GATT/WTO 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to conduct a review over the trade remedy rules of 
GATT/WTO to form a background for further analyses of TRMs in RTAs and also 
provides a reference point for the comparative study of TRMs in WTO and RTAs in 
Chapter 3.  
Therefore, the task of this chapter is to discuss: 1) the general background of anti-
dumping, subsidy and countervailing duty measures and safeguards, which includes 
an overview of the definition, scope, economic and political justification; 2) the 
historical development of TRMs at the multilateral level that explains why states 
have chosen to strengthen the rules on TRMs; 3) the current legal framework of anti-
dumping, subsidy and countervailing duty measures and safeguards under the WTO; 
and 4) the latest academic arguments on trade remedy measures.   
 
2.1 Anti-Dumping Measures in the GATT/WTO 
2.1.1 Introduction to Anti-Dumping Measures 
The concept of “dumping” that first appears in economics was described as a 
form of “price-discrimination between national markets.”
45
 In international settings, 
enterprises may sell the same commodity at different prices for reasons not 
associated with differences in costs or at the same price where costs are different. 
The classic definition of “dumping” refers to a situation where prices are lower in the 
importing market than in the domestic market of the exporter.
46
  
The initiative that an enterprise wants to maintain, for a certain period of time, 
two different prices in two different markets may vary.
47
 However, dumped imports 
are normally undesirable to importing nations because the low priced products rob 
the market share from domestic competitor industries and they could interfere with 
or distort the market of the importing country. For almost 100 years, international 
                                                     
45 J Viner, Dumping: A Problem in International Trade (University of Chicago Press 1923). 
46 See G Marceau, Anti-Dumping and Anti-Trust Issues in Free Trade Areas (Clarendon Press 1994), p 11, cf. 
Clements, E., “Price Discrimination and the Multi-Product Firm” (1951) 19 Review of Economic Studies 1.  
47 See Ibid, p 12 and J H Jackson, The World Trading System (2nd ed) (MIT Press 1997), pp 218-223 for different 
possibilities of an enterprise may dump.  
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trade policy rules have generally recognized dumping as an “unfair” practice to be 
condemned, against which the importing country is legitimately to take certain 
countermeasures, i.e. anti-dumping measures, when the dumped goods cause injury 
to competing industries in the importing country.    
Anti-dumping was integrated early into economic theory as an international 
counterpart of domestic competition policy.
48
 In historical context, anti-dumping first 
made its appearance at the beginning of the 20
th
 century – an era that was a high 
season of globalization, with labour and capital able to move internationally as never 
before or since, but also an era marked by an awakening of economic nationalism in 
newly industrializing countries, and by growing concern over the power of large 
corporations that were emerging to exploit the economies of scale allowed by mass 
production, which itself was facilitated by the growth of international trade.
49
 It then 
received some official ratification in international treaties.  
National anti-dumping laws were enacted first in Canada (1904), then New 
Zealand (1905), Australia (1906), Japan (1910), South Africa (1914), the USA (1916-
21), and Britain (1921).
50
 The Canadian Anti-dumping Act of 1904 provided for an 
automatic imposition of anti-dumping duty equal to the difference between the 
Canadian price and the price of similar goods in the exporting country. There was no 
investigation into the exporter’s intent or the injury caused to the importing country. 
Until 1969 Canada’s anti-dumping provisions contained no injury test.
51
 
The first specific US anti-dumping law, the Revenue Act of 1916, was of criminal 
nature, was enforced in ordinary courts, and required proof of the predatory intent of 
the exporter-importer. It was a form of legislative extraterritorial application of the 
Sherman Act’s principles at the time when the Sherman Act was considered not to 
apply outside the US territory.  
The difficulties of establishing intent required by the 1916 Act led to the adoption 
                                                     
48 Besides the fact of essentially being a trade tool, the origins of anti-dumping laws in the early twentieth century 
show that the first provisions related to the subject mainly followed concern expressed in antitrust laws. This 
view has been gradually changed, and nowadays, the concept of dumping as defined in article VI of the GATT 
shows slight correlations with antitrust provisions. See P Florêncio, “What kind of interaction between anti-
dumping and competition policies is desirable within Mercosur”, Latin American and Caribbean Law and 
Economics Association (ALACDE) Annual Papers (University of California 2007), p 17, cf. G Niels, “What is 
Anti-dumping Policy Really About” (2000) 14 (4) Journal of Economic Surveys 467, pp 468-469.    
49 A V Deardorff and R M Stern, “A Centennial of Anti-dumping Legislation and Implementation: Introduction 
and Overview” (2005) 28(5) The World Economy 633, at 634. 
50 J Viner, Dumping: A Problem in International Trade (University of Chicago Press 1923). 
51 P A Magnus, “The Canadian Antidumping System” in J H Jackson and E A Vermulst, Antidumping Law and 
Practice, A Comparative Study (University of Michigan Press 1989), p 174.  
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of the 1921 US Anti-dumping Act, which provided an administrative procedure for 
the imposition of anti-dumping duties equal to the margin of dumping. Unlike the 
then Canadian statute, it incorporated a condition that dumped imports should be 
shown to actually or potentially injure the domestic injury. Consequently, the US 
used their Anti-dumping Act of 1921 as a model when drafting the section on 
dumping in the Havana Charter and the GATT.  
Concerning the long history of national and international concerns with dumping, 
although the GATT is in favour of free trade and non-discrimination/National 
Treatment, anti-dumping eventually became a legitimate measure available for 
GATT contracting parties to temporarily restrain the affected products into the 
importing markets in appropriate circumstances. As a result, individual nations and 
trade blocs followed the GATT rules and developed extensive national anti-dumping 
laws and regulations for their own application.  
As time passed, some Members of GATT began to feel that other countries, in 
applying their anti-dumping laws, were doing so in such a way as to raise a new 
protectionism barrier to trade. Some believed that anti-dumping procedures, such as 
delay, dumping margin calculations and the injury test, were causing restrictions and 
distortions on international trade flows, therefore creating risks and uncertainties to 
traders. Consequently, during the Kennedy Round of GATT trade negotiations (1962-
1967), the contracting parties of GATT negotiated the first international Anti-
Dumping Code
52
, which set forth a series of procedural and substantive rules 
regarding the application of anti-dumping duties. The Code was intended to limit 
problematic anti-dumping practices damaging to international trade.
53
 In 1979, the 
Tokyo Round developed a new AD Code replacing the 1967 GATT AD Code. The 
Uruguay Round, building on the prior AD Codes, further modified the anti-dumping 
rules,
54
 and created the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 
(the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement). The Uruguay Round text became a mandatory 
agreement in the WTO. The Anti-Dumping Agreement provides further elaboration 
on the basic principles set forth in Article VI itself, to govern the investigation, 
                                                     
52 GATT, Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI (the “1967 Code”). 
53 The 1967 Code entered into force in 1967 as a result of the Kennedy Round. However, the United States never 
signed the Kennedy Round Code, and as a result the Code had little practical significance. See Technical 
Information on Anti-Dumping, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm 
54 WTO Agreement on Anti-Dumping.  
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determination, and application of anti-dumping duties. 
In accordance with the provisions in GATT Article VI and the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, anti-dumping measures are unilateral remedies which may be applied by 
a WTO Member after an investigation and determination by that Member that an 
imported product is “dumped” and that the dumped imports are causing material 
injury to a domestic industry producing the like product.  
To be noted here, unlike the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not establish any disciplines on 
dumping itself, primarily because dumping is a pricing practice engaged in by 
business enterprises, and thus not within the direct reach of multilateral disciplines. 
On the contrary, considering the anti-dumping measure having impact on the trade 
flow, the Anti-Dumping Agreement is regarded as an attempt to restrain national anti-
dumping actions. In line with this perspective, the Anti-Dumping Agreement sets 
forth certain substantive requirements that must be fulfilled in order to impose an 
anti-dumping measure, as well as detailed procedural requirements regarding the 
conduct of anti-dumping investigations and the imposition and maintenance in place 
of anti-dumping measures. A failure to respect either the substantive or procedural 
requirements can be taken to dispute settlement and may be the basis for invalidation 
of the measure.   
 
2.1.2 Basic Rules of WTO Anti-Dumping Law 
As established in Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Anti-Dumping 
Agreement [hereafter: ADA], before an anti-dumping duty can be applied, three 
elements need to be satisfied: 1) there is dumping; 2) there is “material injury” (or 
threat) to the domestic industry of the importing country (or retarding the 
establishment of such an injury) and the causation between the dumping and the 
material injury must be shown; and 3) the importing country has carried out its 
investigation in accordance with WTO rules.  
 
1. Dumping Determination 
Dumping occurs when the imported goods are sold below the comparable price at 
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which they are sold in the home market. Therefore, the identification and comparison 
of the prices in the two different markets as well as the calculation method of the 
dumping margin are vital in dumping determination. The criteria for examining the 
existence of a dumping action are prescribed in Article 2 of the ADA, and consists of 
the definition of normal value, export price, method of comparison and calculation of 
the dumping margin. 
 
A. “Like products” and “Domestic Industry” 
Two notions should be mentioned prior to anti-dumping investigation, “like 
products” and “domestic industry”. An examination has to be confined to the imports 
which are the like products of the concerned domestic industry.   
A “like product” is defined in Article 2.6 ADA as “a product, which is identical, 
i.e. alike in all respects, to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such 
product, another product, which has characteristics closely resembling those of the 
product under consideration”. In the context of the ADA, the term is relevant for both 
the dumping and injury determination. Noteworthy, this definition is clearly narrower 
than the term “like or directly competitive products” in the Safeguards Agreement.
55
  
Article 4 ADA defines the definition of the “domestic industry” as “the domestic 
producers as a whole of the like products or those of them whose collective output of 
the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those 
products” except those producers which related to the exporters or importers or are 
themselves importers of the alleged dumping product. Such producers may benefit 
from the dumping and therefore may distort the injury analysis.  
In exceptional circumstances, the producers within each subdivided competitive 
market of the importing country can be regarded as a separate industry.
56
 There is 
also a special concern where two or more countries constitute regional trade 
agreement that have reached a level of integration with the characteristics of a single, 




                                                     
55 See Safeguards Agreement, Article 4.1(c) and Section 2.3.3(2)(B) of this thesis.  
56 Agreement on Anti-Dumping, Article 4.1(ii). 
57 Ibid, Article 4.3. 
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A regional industry comprising of only producers in a certain market of a 
Member’s territory may be found to exist under Article 4.1(ii) if these producers sell 
all or almost all of their production in that market and the demand within that market 
is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the product located 
elsewhere in the territory. Injury may then be found even where a major portion of 
the total domestic industry is not injured, provided that there is a concentration of 
dumped imports into the isolated market and the dumped imports are causing injury 
to the producers of all or almost all of the production in that market. If the regional 
industry exception is used, anti-dumping duties shall be levied only on imports 
consigned for final consumption to that area. Where this is not allowed under the 
constitutional law of the importing Member, exporters should be given the 
opportunity to cease exporting to the area concerned or to give undertakings. 
Last, it is noted that definition of the domestic industry is closely linked to the 





B. Normal Value 
The normal value is a product’s price in the home market, which is charged “in 
ordinary courses of trade” in market economy condition.
59
 Different calculating 
measures of normal value have been laid down for different circumstances.  
 
a. Standard Calculation Method 
Basically, the normal value shall be based on the prices paid or payable, in the 
ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country. 
However, on some occasions, the home market price may not be available or may be 
unrepresentative. For example, there are no or insufficient domestic sales (less than 5 
per cent of the export sales) of the like product in the ordinary course of trade, or 
prices which appeared to be affected by any arrangement may not be used to 
establish normal value.
60
 Hence, two alternative measures are provided for 
                                                     
58 See Section 2.1.2(3) of this thesis. 
59 Ibid, Article 2.1. 
60 Ibid, Article 2.2. 
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establishing the normal value: 1) the price of sales to third country. In the same 
condition as before, the normal value may also be based on the representative export 
price, in ordinary course of trade, to an appropriate third country. 2) Constructed 
value. The normal value of the like product shall be established on the basis of the 
cost of the production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for selling, 
general and administrative cost and profits.  
Where domestic sales of the like product and comparable models are 
representative, it often happens that some domestic sales are sold below cost of 
production. Article 2.2.1 ADA provides that such sales below cost may be treated as 
not being “in the ordinary course of trade” and may be disregarded, i.e. excluded 
from the normal value calculation, unless the investigating authorities determine that 
such sales are made within an extended period of time in substantial quantities at 
prices which do not provide for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable period 
of time. In practice, sales below cost are often excluded where the weighted average 
selling prices is below the weighted average per unit costs or where they represent 
more than 20 per cent of the quantity of total domestic sales of the models 
concerned.
61
 Exclusion of sales below cost will increase the normal value and 
thereby makes the finding of dumping more likely.  
It may also happen that domestic producers and distributors are related. Some 
WTO Members will then ignore the prices charged by the producer to the distributor 
on the ground that they are not arms’ length transactions. Instead, they base normal 
value on the sales made by the distributor to the first independent customer. This 
price will be higher and is therefore more likely to lead to the finding of dumping.  
In the typical situation, a product is exported from country A to country B. 
However, it is possible that more than two countries are involved in the product flow. 
Article 2.5 ADA deals with this situation. The basic rule is that where products are 
not imported directly from the country of origin but are exported from an 
intermediate country, the export price shall normally be compared with the 
comparable price in the country of transshipment. However Article 2.5, by way of 
exception, nevertheless allows a comparison with the price in the country of origin, if, 
for example, the products are merely transshipped through the country of export, 
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such products are not produced in the country of export, or there is no comparable 
price for them in the country of export.  
 
b. Normal value for non-market economy country 
In calculation of the normal value of the imported products from those non-
market economy countries, WTO law offered special measures, so-called “analogue 
country or surrogate country” method.
 62
 GATT/WTO Members have the right not to 
accept prices or costs in non-market economies as an appropriate basis for the 
calculation of normal value on the grounds that such prices and costs are controlled 
by the government and therefore not subject to market forces. The investigating 
authorities will then use prices or costs in a third market economy country as the 
basis for normal value. This means that export prices from the non-market economy 
to the importing Member will be compared with prices or costs in the 
surrogate/analogue country. 
The selection of an analogue country can be of crucial importance in establishing 
whether or not there is dumping and the margin of dumping. It may be noted that for 
several reasons the surrogate country concept tends to lead to findings of high 
dumping. For example, the producers in the surrogate country are or will be 
competing in the market place with the investigated exports and therefore it is not in 
their interest to minimize a possible finding of dumping for their competitors or 
competitors-to-be.  
WTO law, however, does not lay down specific guidance as to the choice of 
analogue country, except that the national authorities must act in an appropriate and 
not unreasonable manner. Establishing the normal value on the basis of the analogue 
country’s price is, currently, the only method which could be applied to the imports 
from non-market economy countries in WTO law. Nevertheless, it almost excludes 
the comparative economic advantages of the concerned products from the non-
market economy countries, if such comparative economic advantages do exist. 
Therefore, it has been a point of argument and is opposed by exporters from non-
                                                     
62 See Second Supplementary Provision to Paragraph 1.2 of GATT Article VI : “It is recognized that, in the case 
of imports from a country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all 
domestic prices are fixed by the State, special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability of the 
purpose of paragraph 1, and in such cases importing contracting parties may find it necessary to take into account 
the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country may not always be appropriate.” 
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market economy countries.  
 
C. Export Price 
According to Article 2.1 ADA, the export price is the price at which the product 
is exported from one country to another. In other words, it is the transaction price at 
which the product is sold by a producer/exporter in the exporting country to an 
importer in the importing country. This price is normally indicated in export 
documentation, such as the commercial invoice, the bill of lading and the letter of 
credit. The export price is potentially the dumped price. The extent to which the 
export price is lower than the normal value constitutes the dumping margin. 
According to Article 2.3 ADA, where there is no export price or where it appears 
to the authorities concerned that the export price is unreliable because of association 
or a compensatory arrangement between the exporter and the importer or a third 
party, the export price may be constructed on the basis of the price at which the 
imported products are first resold to an independent buyer. If the products are not 
resold to an independent buyer, or are not resold in the condition in which they were 
imported, the investigating authorities may construct the export price on any 
reasonable basis. In such cases, allowances for costs, duties and taxes, incurred 
between importation and resale, and for profits accruing, should be made in 
accordance with Article 2.4 ADA. 
 
D. Calculation of the Dumping Margin 
Dumping margin is the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export 
price. Article 2.4 ADA, in the first place, requires the investigating authorities to take 
a “fair comparison” between the export price and the normal value. The price 
comparison should be made at the same level of trade, normally the ex-factory level, 
and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. To ensure the 
compatibility between the prices, due allowance may be made in each case.   
Since dumping margin establishes a ceiling for the total amount of anti-dumping 
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duties that can be levied on the entries of the subject product,
63
 Article 2.4.2 ADA 
establishes three important methodologies that investigating authorities may use to 
calculate the margin of dumping during the investigation phase: 
“Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the 
existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall 
normally be established on the basis of [i] a comparison of a weighted 
average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all 
comparable export transactions or [ii] by a comparison of normal value 
and export prices on a transaction-transaction basis. A normal value 
established on a weighted average basis may be compared to prices of 
individual export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export 
prices which differ significantly among different purchases, regions or 
time periods, and if an explanation is provided as to why” 
The first sentence sets out two comparison methodologies, weighted average-to-
weighted average (“W-W”) and transaction-to-transaction (“T-T”), involving 
symmetrical comparisons of normal value and export prices. These two 
methodologies “shall normally” be used by investigating authorities to establish 
margins of dumping. The second sentence of Article 2.4.2 sets out a third 
methodology, weighted average-to-transaction (“W-T”), which involves an 
asymmetrical comparison and may be used only in exceptional circumstances, 
providing that: (i) “the authorities find a pattern of export prices which differ 
significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods”; and (ii) “an 
explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into account 
appropriately by the use of a weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-
to-transaction comparison”. 
In practice, anti-dumping investigation normally involves a few different types 
of products. Thus, when using the “W-W” method, the investigating authorities 
typically break down the product at issue into a number of different sub-categories or 
models. For each model, the authorities subtract the weighted average export price 
from the weighted average normal value, and then aggregate the results to establish 
                                                     
63 Agreement on Anti-Dumping, Article 9.3. See also the Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, 
Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”) (“US – Zeroing (EC”)), 
WT/DS294/AB/R, dated 18 April 2006, at para 130. 
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the overall dumping margin, expressed as a percentage of the total value of all export 
transactions. Dividing a product into models and engaging in this kind of “multiple 
comparison” is now generally accepted as permitted under the ADA.
64
 
However, it was noticed that, at the stage of aggregation of the results of the sub-
groups in order to establish an overall margin of dumping for the product, some 
authorities disregarded the results of the models of which the export price is higher 
than the normal value. In other words, the negative dumping margin under those 
models was “zeroed”; only the models with positive dumping margin was taken into 
consideration when establishing the overall dumping margin.
65
 Such practice is the 
so-called “model zeroing”.  
A similar approach could also happen under the “T-T” method (the “simple 
zeroing”). In US – Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 - Canada), the US Department 
of Commerce started the dumping margin calculation with a comparison of normal 
value and export prices on transaction-specific basis, but only aggregated the results 
of those transaction-specific comparisons in which export price was less than normal 




Although it is difficult to evaluate the economic merits of zeroing, because there 
is no consensus on the economic rationale of anti-dumping in the first place,
67
 
zeroing method not only increases the likelihood of a dumping determination but 
also the magnitude of the dumping margin. Over the years, the practice of “zeroing” 
has become a contentious issue in anti-dumping disputes and it has been turned down 
by WTO adjudicating bodies several times, who claim that it is inconsistent with the 
text of the ADA and GATT Article VI. 
                                                     
64 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada (“US 
– Softwood Lumber V”), WT/DS264/AB/R, dated 11 August 2004, paras 81 and 97; cf Panel Report, United 
States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea 
(“US – Stainless Steel”), WT/DS179/R, dated 1 February 2001, paras 6.114 and 6.125 (multiple averaging not 
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65 This was illustrated by the European Communities’ approach in EC – Bed Linen case. See Appellate Body 
Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India (“EC – 
Bed Linen”), WT/DS141/AB/R, adopted 1 March 2001, para 47.  
66 Panel Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada (“US – Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 - Canada)”), WT/DS264/RW, dated 
3 April 2006, para 5.16. 
67 M Janow and R Staiger, “EC-Bed Linen: European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of 
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India” in H Horn and P Mavroidis (eds), The WTO Case Law of 2001: The 
American Law Institute Reporters’ Studies (Cambridge University Press 2003) 115, 135. 
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In EC – Bed Linen, the Appellate Body read the words “all comparable export 
transactions” in Article 2.4.2 as precluding model zeroing, because the expression 
prohibits investigating authorities to ignore some export transactions. Meanwhile, the 
Appellate Body indicated that model zeroing is inconsistent with the “fair 
comparison” requirement in Article 2.4 as it inflates the overall dumping margin.
68
 It 
also emphasized that authorities must establish the dumping margin for the “product” 
under investigation. Such requirements of Article 2.4 and 2.4.2 could not be said to 
apply only at the stage of comparing normal value and export price for each “model” 
and not at the second stage of aggregating the results of those comparisons.
69
   
In US – Lumber V, the Appellate Body further clarified its position that, under 
the  ADA and GATT Article VI, “‘margins of dumping’ can be found only for the 
product under investigation as a whole, and cannot be found to exist for a product 
type, model, or category of that product”.
70
 In other words, an overall dumping 
margin cannot be determined on part of the results obtained at the intermediate stage 
when investigating authorities choose to undertake multiple comparisons. This view 
soon became a primary reasoning to decline the zeroing pursuant to the “T-T” 
method in subsequent cases, for example, US – Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 – 
Canada)
71
, US – Zeroing (Japan)
72
 and US – Continued Zeroing
73
, where the “all 
comparable export transactions” requirement is not applicable according to the text 
of Article 2.4.2. 
As will be discussed later, the ADA offers three types of review of anti-dumping 
measures – the newcomers requested review, interim review and expiry review (also 
called the “sunset review”) – to determine the continuation, termination or change of 
the duty amount, where the original measures are no longer appropriate or 
necessary.
74
 These reviews are regulated respectively in Article 9.5, Article 11.2 and 
Article 11.3 of the ADA, which may involve zeroing in addition to the dumping 
                                                     
68 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, para.55. 
69 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, paras 51, 53. 
70 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V, para 96 (emphasis added). 
71 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 - Canada)), WT/DS264/AB/RW, dated 15 
August 2006, para 89. 
72 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews (“US – Zeroing 
(Japan)”), WT/DS322/AB/R, dated 9 January 2007, para 115. 
73 Panel Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology (“US – Continued 
Zeroing”), WT/DS350/R, dated 1 October 2008, para 7.183; Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, 
WT/DS350/AB/R, dated 4 February 2009, para 395(d). 
74 See section 2.1.2(5) of this thesis. 
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margin calculation in the original investigation. 
In US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, the Appellate Body stated, in 
the context of sunset reviews under Article 11.3 of the ADA, that, “should 
investigating authorities choose to rely upon dumping margins in making their ... 
determination, the calculation of these margins must conform to the disciplines of 
Article 2.4”
75
, because, according to the Appellate Body, there are “no other 
provisions in the Anti-Dumping Agreement according to which Members may 
calculate dumping margins”.
76
 The Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (Japan) further 
considered, without explanation, that Article 2.4 applies to both interim and 
newcomer requested reviews.
77
 As a consequence, the practice of zeroing was 
prohibited in the interim and newcomer requested reviews as well. 
 
2. Injury Determination 
According to the ADA, anti-dumping duties may be imposed only if the dumped 
imports cause or threaten material injury to an established domestic industry of the 
importing country or materially retard the establishment of such industry. Therefore, 
the investigating authorities also need to examine the existence and degree of the 
injury caused by the dumped imports. It is worth noting, the standard for “material 
injury” test is generally thought to be less stringent than the “serious injury” test 
applicable to safeguard action under GATT Article XIX and the SA.
78
 
The determination of material injury must be based on positive evidence and 
involve an objective examination of the volume of the dumped imports, their effect 
on the domestic prices in the importing country’s market and their consequent impact 
on the domestic industry. In Thailand – H-Beams, the Appellate Body held that this 
determination may be based on the confidential case file and overruled a panel 
finding that it follows from the words “positive” and “objective” that the injury 
determination should be based on reasoning or facts disclosed to, or discernible by, 
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As provided in ADA, the injury examination focuses on: 
(1) the performance of the dumped imports, which reflects on the volume of the 
dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the 
domestic market for like products. (Article 3.2) 
(2) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such 
products. (Article 3.4) 
(3) the causal link between dumped imports and injury. (Article 3.5)  
Considering the ADA does not establish any specific period of investigation, nor 
does it establish guidelines for determining an appropriate period of investigation, for 
the examination of either dumping or injury, a non-obligatory recommendation of the 
WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices provides that injury should preferably 
be analyzed over a period of at least 3 years.
80
 
With regard to the first point, the investigating authorities must examine whether 
there is a significant increase in dumped imports – either absolute or relative to 
production or consumption in the importing Member, and whether there has been a 
significant price undercutting by the dumped imports, or whether the effect of the 
imports has been to significantly depress prices or prevent price increases, which 
otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree.  
In the event that imports from several countries are simultaneously subject to 
anti-dumping investigations, their effects may be assessed cumulatively for injury 
purposes, as long as they do not qualify the de minimis or negligibility thresholds
81
 
and a cumulative assessment is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition 
among the imports and between imports and the like domestic products. This is the 
so-called “principle of cumulation”. In practice, WTO Members apply cumulation 
                                                     
79 WTO Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or 
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80 WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Recommendation Concerning the Periods of Data Collection for 
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almost as a matter of course so long as the thresholds are not reached. 
It should be noted that in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India) the Appellate 
Body emphasized that, according to the text of Article 3.2, the imports from those 




The second point to be estimated in the injury analysis is the consequent impact 
of the dumped imports to the domestic industries. When examining the dumping 
related injury, the investigating authorities shall evaluate all relevant economic 
factors and indices which influence the state of the industry, rather than focusing on 
the impact of concerned dumped imports. Article 3.4 ADA mentions 15 specific 
factors to be examined by the investigating authorities, however, this list is not 
exhaustive and none of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance. The 
scope of this obligation has already been examined in panel proceedings several 
times. Those Panels, strongly supported by the Appellate Body in Thailand – H-
Beams, held that the evaluation of the 15 factors is mandatory in each case and must 
be clear from the published documents.
83
 To be stressed, the determination of injury 
cannot be established unless the impact of the dumped imports was classified as 
“material”. 
In some instances, a domestic industry may allege that it is not yet suffering 
material injury, but is threatened with material injury, which will develop into 
material injury unless anti-dumping measures are taken. However, because such 
statements are easy to make and any investigation based on threat of material injury 
will necessarily be speculative because it involves analysis of events that have not 
yet happened, the ADA requires special care for a threat case. According to Article 
3.7 ADA, a determination of threat must be based on facts and not merely on 
allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. The change in circumstances which 
would create a situation, in which the dumping would cause injury, must be clearly 
foreseen and imminent. 
In making a threat determination, the importing Member authorities should 
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from India – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by India (“EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India)”), 
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83 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, para 125 (footnote omitted); Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen, 
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consider, inter alia, four special factors: 
i) a significant rate of increase of dumped imports into the domestic market 
indicating the likelihood of substantially increased importation; 
ii) sufficiently freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, 
capacity of the exporter indicating the likelihood of substantially increased 
dumped exports to the importing Member’s market, taking into account the 
availability of other export markets to absorb any additional exports; 
iii) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing 
or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and would likely increase demand 
for further imports; and 
iv) inventories of the product being investigated. 
No single factor will necessarily be decisive, but the totality of the factors 
considered must lead to the conclusion that further dumped exports are imminent and 
that, unless protective action is taken, material injury would occur. The Mexico – 




Furthermore, the demonstration of the causal link must be based on an 
examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities, which must also examine 
any known factors other than the dumped imports which are also injuring the 
domestic industry, and the injury as a result of such other known factors must not be 
attributed to the dumped imports. Article 3.5 then provides a non-exhaustive list of 
other factors which may be relevant depending on the facts of the case.   
The evaluation of import volumes and prices, and their impact on the domestic 
industry is relevant not only for determining whether the domestic industry has in 
fact suffered material injury, but often will also be indicative of whether the injury 
has been caused by the dumped imports or by other factors. Thus Article 3.5 ADA, 
first sentence, refers back to Article 3.2 and 3.4 ADA. Nonetheless, the Panel in 
Thailand – H-Beams held that, contrary to the Article 3.4 factors, the Article 3.5 
factors need not be examined as a matter of course in each administrative 
determination. Rather, such examination will depend on the arguments made by 
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interested parties in the course of the administrative investigation.
85
   
 
3. Requirements on the National Procedures 
Despite the substantive elements that the importing Member authorities must 
scrutinize, WTO law also lays out various procedural obligations on how to handle 
the anti-dumping investigation. Those requirements include the notification of the 
investigation, sufficiency of the evidence, legal standing of the interested parties, 
time-span of the investigation and imposition of an anti-dumping measure, etc. These 
thresholds in procedures are also closely related to the result of an anti-dumping case.  
An anti-dumping case normally starts with the official submission of a written 
complaint by the domestic industry to the importing Member authorities that 
injurious dumping is taking place. The requirements for the contents of this 
application are contained in Article 5.2 ADA – it must include evidence of dumping, 
injury and causal link between the two; simple assertion is not sufficient. Hence, the 
importing Member authorities are obligated to examine, before initiation, the 
accuracy and the adequacy of the evidence in the application.  
It should be stressed that the importing Member authorities must determine, 
again before initiation, on the basis of an examination of the degree of support for, or 
opposition to, the application expressed by domestic producers of the like product, 
that the application has been made by, or on behalf of, the domestic industry. 
According to Article 5.4 ADA, no investigation shall be initiated when domestic 
producers expressly supporting the application account for less than 25 per cent of 
total production of the like product produced by the domestic industry. 
In terms of legal standing of the interested parties, the parties most directly 
affected by an anti-dumping investigation are the domestic producers, foreign 
producers and exporters and their importers. However, the government of the 
exporting country and representative trade association also qualify. Article 6.11 ADA 
provides that other domestic or foreign parties may also be included as interested 
parties by the importing country Member. Obviously, selection of interested parties 
included in an investigation may well make a difference to the course and outcomes 
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of an investigation.  
Article 5.5 ADA expresses a preference for confidential treatment of applications 
prior to initiation of an investigation. On the other hand, before initiation, the 
importing Member authorities must notify the government of the exporting Member, 
although the ADA does not contain rules on the form of such notification. Article 12 
obligates importing Member authorities to publish public notices of initiation, and of 
preliminary and final determinations, with increasing degrees of specificity, as the 
investigation progresses. In addition, they must publish detailed explanations of their 
determinations.  
Finally, Article 5.10 ADA provides that, an investigation shall normally be 
concluded within one year and in no case more than 18 months, after initiation. The 
18 months’ deadline is absolute.  
 
4. Outcome of the Anti-Dumping Investigation 
A. Termination without protective action 
Anti-dumping proceedings may terminate without any protective action on the 
basis of many specific reasons or a combination of the reasons in number of cases, 
such as, no dumping; no injury; no sufficient domestic producers supporting the 
complaint; withdrawal of the complaint; etc.  
Article 5.8 ADA also provides two situations in which the proceeding should be 
terminated immediately, i.e. the dumping margin is de minimis or the volume of 
dumped imports is negligible.  
The margin of dumping is considered to be de minimis, where the authorities 
find that the margin is less than 2 per cent, expressed as a percentage of the export 
price. The volume of dumped imports shall normally be regarded as negligible where 
the volume of dumped imports from a particular country is found to account for less 
than 3 per cent of imports of the like products in the importing Member; unless 
countries which individually account for less than 3 per cent of the import of the like 
product in the importing Member collectively account for more than 7 per cent of the 




B. Acceptance of undertaking 
Pursuant to Article 8.1 ADA, anti-dumping investigations may also be 
suspended or terminated without anti-dumping duties where exporters offer 
undertakings to revise prices or cease exports to the area in question at dumped 
prices so that the authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the dumping is 
eliminated. Use of the word “may” indicates that authorities have complete 
discretion in this regard. Nevertheless, undertakings shall not be sought or accepted 
from foreign exporters unless a provisional affirmative determination of dumping 
and resulting injury has been made.
86
 
If an undertaking is accepted, the investigation of dumping and injury should be 
completed if the exporter so desires or the authorities so decide. In each case, if a 
negative determination of dumping or injury is made, the undertaking shall 
automatically lapse, except in cases where such a determination is due in large part to 
the existence of a price undertaking. In such cases, the authorities may require that an 
undertaking be maintained for a reasonable period consistent with the provisions of 
the ADA. In the event that an affirmative determination of dumping and injury is 
made, the undertaking shall continue consistent with its terms and the provisions of 
the ADA.  
Price undertakings may be suggested by the authorities of the importing 
Member, but no exporter shall be forced to enter into such undertakings. The fact that 
exporters do not offer such undertakings, or do not accept an invitation to do so, shall 
in no way prejudice the consideration of the case. However, the authorities are free to 





C. Imposition of anti-dumping measures 
If no undertakings are accepted, or they have been accepted but are then 
withdrawn or breached by non-compliance with the substantive or procedural 
requirement, a provisional measure or definitive anti-dumping duty may be applied 
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as a penalty.  
Once a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping and 
consequent injury to a domestic industry, provisional measures may be applied if 
necessary.
88
 Provisional measures should preferably take the form of a security (cash 
deposit or bond) being no greater than the dumping margin.
89
 It may not be applied 
earlier than 60 days from initiation of the proceedings, and may not last longer than 
four months, except on decision of the importing Member authorities, upon request 
by exporters representing a significant percentage of the trade involved, to a 
maximum of six months.
90
 Where authorities determine a lesser duty would be 
sufficient to remove injury, the period may be extended to nine months.
91
 In practice, 
provisional duties are normally paid by the importers, which will be secured by way 
of guarantee, as a condition for free circulation of the products in the importing 
country. 
Pursuant to Article 10.2 ADA, at the time that the importing Member decides to 
impose definitive duties, it may also retroactively levy provisional anti-dumping 
duties, recognizing that injury may have occurred during the period of investigation, 
or that exporters may have taken actions to avoid the imposition of an anti-dumping 
duty. 
It is worth noting that, the GATT/WTO does not obligate contracting parties to 
apply anti-dumping measures, even if all the requirements for imposition have been 
met.
92
 In addition, it encourages, but does not require, a duty less than the dumping 





5. Review of Anti-Dumping Measures 
The ADA offers three types of reviews of anti-dumping measures – the 
newcomers requested review, interim review and expiry review – to determine the 
continuation, termination or change of the duty amount where the original measures 
                                                     
88 Ibid, Article 7.1. 
89 Ibid, Article 7.2. 
90 Ibid, Article 7.3. 
91 Ibid, Article 7.4. 




are no longer appropriate or necessary. 
 First, Article 9.5 ADA requires importing Member authorities to promptly – and 
in accelerated manner – carry out reviews requested by newcomers, i.e. producers 
which did not export during the original investigation period and which will 
normally be subject to the residual duty (“all others” rate) that was imposed in the 
original investigation. During the course of the review, no anti-dumping duties shall 
be levied on the newcomers. However, the importing Member authorities may 
withhold appraisement and/or request guarantees to ensure that, should the 
newcomer review investigation result in a determination of dumping, anti-dumping 
duties can be levied retroactively to the date of initiation of the review.  
Second, Article 11 ADA provides for what could be called an interim and expiry 
reviews (“sunset review”). To start with the latter, definitive anti-dumping duties 
shall normally expire after 5 years from their imposition, unless the domestic 
industry asks for a review within a reasonable period of time preceding the expiry, 
arguing that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or 
recurrence of dumping and injury.  
During the five year period (hence the term interim review), interested parties 
may request the authorities to examine whether the continued imposition of the duty 
is necessary to offset dumping, whether the injury would be likely to continue or 
recur if the duty were removed or varied, or both. In both cases, the measures may 
stay in force pending the outcome of the review. 
Interim and expiry review investigations require prospective and counter-factual 
analysis. In this context, the fact that during the review investigation period, dumping 
and/or injury did not take place is not necessarily decisive because it might indicate 
that the measures in place are having effect. 
Article 13 ADA provides that Members, which do adopt anti-dumping legislation, 
must also maintain independent judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or 
procedures for the purpose of prompt review of administrative final and review 
determinations.  
 
6. MFN Principle in Respect of Anti-Dumping 
Since anti-dumping actions usually involve products from particular countries, 
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imposition of anti-dumping duties is optional and the importing country enjoys 
certain flexibilities on anti-dumping duty collection, it is easy to infer that anti-
dumping can be handled discriminatorily. As a matter of fact, Article 9.2 ADA 
explicitly provides that:  
“When an anti-dumping duty is imposed in respect of any product, such 
anti-dumping measures shall be collected in the appropriate amounts in 
each case, on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of such product from 
all sources found to be dumped and causing injury.” (emphases added)  
In other words, the importing country cannot discriminate against one WTO 
Member from another when imposing anti-dumping measures, in case the exports 
from all concerned countries are found to be dumped and causing injury. 
Nevertheless, the ADA neither expresses whether the non-discriminatory 
treatment also applies in other stages of an anti-dumping proceeding (e.g. in anti-
dumping legislation, initiation, notification, investigation and reviews, etc.), nor does 
it indicate whether Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 plays a role in an anti-dumping 
action. In practice, anti-dumping investigations can be arbitrarily established on a 
discriminatory basis and therefore particular exports could be picked out. Given its 
significant impact on exporters in reality, it is crucial to clarify such ambiguities. 
To date, no anti-dumping measure has been challenged in WTO dispute 
settlement proceeding for the reason of discriminatory treatment under Article 9.2 
ADA or GATT Article I:1.  However, the GATT case US – Non-Rubber Footwear 
II
94
 sheds some light and therefore it is worth discussion. 
In order to bring its legal regime in the countervailing duty area into conformity 
with Article VI:6(a), in 1979, the United States introduced the injury requirement 
into its national rules and started to conduct injury review on a number of pre-
existing countervailing duty [hereafter: CVD] orders levied upon the imports from 
certain GATT contracting parties. Pre-existing CVD orders could be revoked if the 
products in question were no longer causing injuries to US domestic industry. 
In backdating the effect of its negative injury determination, the United States 
automatically backdated the effect of revocation of pre-existing CVD orders, without 
                                                     
94 Panel Report, United States – Denial of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment as to Non-Rubber Footwear from 
Brazil, BISD 39S/128, adopted on 19 June 1992. 
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the necessity of the country subject to the order making a request for an injury review 
under the United States GSP programme. Nevertheless, the United States only 
backdated the revocation of the pre-existing countervailing duty order on non-rubber 
footwear from Brazil to the date of Brazil’s request for an injury determination (29 
October 1981), rather than to the date when the obligation for the United States to 
provide an injury determination under Article VI of the GATT 1947 entered into 
force (1 January 1980). Hence, Brazil claimed that the United States acted 
inconsistently with its obligation under Article I:1 of the GATT 1947; and, in the 
application of its Article VI obligation, the United States treated imports from Brazil 
less favourably than imports from other contracting parties. 
When examining whether Article I:1 of the GATT 1947 is applicable to 
revocation of countervailing duties, The Panel noted that Article I:1 of the GATT 
1947 provides in relevant part that: 
“With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importation …, and with respect to all rules and formalities in 
connection with importation …, … any advantage … granted by any contracting 
party to any product originating in … any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in … the 
territories of all other contracting parties”. 
The Panel held that “the rules and formalities applicable to countervailing duties, 
including those applicable to the revocation of countervailing duty orders, are rules 
and formalities imposed in connection with importation, within the meaning of 
Article I:1”.
95
 Therefore, the Panel considered the United States’ backdating rules 




In line with this view, Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 is also applicable to the 
national anti-dumping rules applied to the WTO Members within the WTO 
framework.  
                                                     
95 Ibid, para 6.8.  
96 Ibid, paras 6.9-6.13. On the other hand, the Panel noticed that, the grant of non-tariff advantage to products 
originating in a country beneficiary of the GSP programme is inconsistent with paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling 
Clause. Therefore, the United States’ preferential treatment on revocation of countervailing duties cannot be 
justified. In the end, the Panel held that the United States violated Article I:1 of the GATT 1947. See the same 
report, paras 6.15 and 7.2. 
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Although above ruling was made under the GATT 1947, this report was adopted 
by the GATT contracting parties and therefore its legal significance is considerable.   
Basically, anti-dumping is an exception to the MFN. It allows countries to act in 
a way that would normally break the GATT principles of binding a tariff and not 
discriminating between trading partners – typically anti-dumping action means 
charging extra import duty on the particular product from the particular exporting 
country in order to bring its price closer to the “normal value” or to remove the 
injury to domestic industry in the importing country.  
Nevertheless, such an “exception” only hinges to the condition that the product 
at stake is dumped and causing injury. Given the significant role of the MFN 
principle in the WTO,
97
 such an “exception” should be interpreted in a narrow way. 
Put differently, such a discriminatory “exception” should not arise unless the imports 
from certain countries are found problematic within the meaning of Article VI of the 
GATT 1994 and the ADA. MFN principle must be respected not only on imposition 
of anti-dumping measures, but also in other stages of an anti-dumping action, e.g. in 
the national legislation on anti-dumping, initiation, notification and investigation. In 
addition, the non-discriminatory requirement expressed in Article 9.2 ADA indicates 
that an equal treatment should be applied to the products from all sources that qualify 
for anti-dumping measures. Hence, it is reasonable to infer that the MFN principle 
applies to anti-dumping reviews as well.  
 
2.2 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in the GATT/WTO 
2.2.1 Introduction to the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
In addition to dumping, unfair trade practices taking the form of subsidies are 
also subject to the WTO law.  
Subsidies have a broad definition. They usually cover a spectrum from 
governmental budgetary outlays granted to specific economic operators to virtually 
                                                     
97 As the Appellate Body stated in EC – Tariff Preferences, it is well settled that the MFN treatment obligation set 
out in Article I;1 is a “cornerstone of the GATT” and “one of the pillars of the WTO trading system”. See 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries (“EC – Tariff Preferences”), WT/DS246/AB/R, dated on 7 April 2004, para 101. See also 
Appellate Body Report, United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (“US – Section 211 
Appropriations Act”), WT/DS176/AB/R, dated 2 January 2002, para 297; Appellate Body Report, Canada – 
Autos, para 69.  
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any government policy resulting in a change in conditions in the marketplace.
98
 They 
are trade policy instruments that are widely used by governments to pursue and 
promote important and legitimate economic and social objectives. According to a 
2006 WTO study, governments have many reasons for subsidization, which include 
the pursuit of industrial development, supporting the creation of new knowledge 
through research and development, attaining distributional objectives among 
members of society, protecting the environment, protection of national security or 
cultural diversity.
99
 On some occasions, where subsidies are applied for less 
defensible reasons, they may only reflect the response of elected officials to the 
demands of various interest groups, whose political support may be crucial for 
political success, or a purpose to give an artificial competitive advantage to exporters 
or import-competing industries, which is more likely to disturb economic relations 
among countries.
100
 Some reasons for subsidization have political and economic 
rationale (being either positively or negatively efficient to the domestic or 
international trade), but others may have a very remote link with economic 
considerations. Therefore, it has been notoriously famous that the economics is not 
so much useful here in judging the objective and identifying whether subsidies are 
the most efficient means of attaining it.
101
 One thing is for sure though: subsidies 
may have adverse effects on the interests of trading partners, whose industry may 
suffer, in its domestic or export market, from the unfair competition from subsidized 
products. Hence, subsidization became one of the subject matters regulated under the 
multilateral trading rules. 
Considering the social and political needs of subsidization and its surrounding 
economic controversies, multilateral subsidy rules were noticed, from the beginning, 
“focusing on the potential distortive effects of subsidies on trade flows, with any 
given subsidy disciplined or tolerated in direct relation to its trade-distortive 
potential”.
102
 In the GATT years, the multilateral subsidy discipline was contained in 
                                                     
98 WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2006: Exploring the Links between Subsidies, Trade and the WTO 
(WTO, 2006), (available at www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report06_e.pdf) xxiii. 
99 Ibid, xxiv to xxvi. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid, iv. See also J H Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic 
Relations (2nd ed.), (The MIT Press 1997), pp. 281-84 and M Matsushita, T J Schoenbaum and P C Mavroidis, 
World Trade Organization: law, practice, and policy (Oxford University Press 2006), pp. 332-34.  
102 WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2006: Exploring the Links between Subsidies, Trade and the WTO 
(WTO 2006), p 189. 
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Article XVI of the GATT 1947, which was taken from the Havana Charter. However, 
with merely 5 paragraphs, Article XVI neither provided clear definition for “subsidy”, 
nor did it include comprehensive rules on subsidies. All Paragraph 1 required was 
that signatories should notify “any subsidy, including any form of income or price 
support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, 
or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory…”. The notification was 
required to specify the extent and nature of the subsidization, its estimated effects on 
exports and imports, and the circumstances making the subsidization necessary. If the 
subsidization was deemed to cause serious prejudice to the interests of any other 
party, the subsidizing contracting party was only required to discuss the possibility of 
limiting the subsidization. Likewise, Article VI of the GATT 1947, which provides 
the countervailing duty measure to counteract any subsidy granted to an imported 
product, did not provide for clear and comprehensive rules. The brevity of those 
disciplines invited further negotiation in the following years and as a result 
undergone significant transformation, with changes generally in the direction of 
making the rules stricter and more precise.
103
 Eventually an Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures [hereafter: SCM Agreement] was reached in Uruguay 
Round as a part of the Annex 1 A to the WTO Agreement. The multilateral rules on 
subsidies are now set out in Articles VI and XVI of the GATT 1994 and, most 
importantly, in the SCM Agreement.  
The entire SCM Agreement is divided into five parts plus seven annexes. It 
takes an unambiguous stance against subsidies.
104
 Part I “General Provisions” 
(Articles 1 and 2) that provides the concepts of “subsidy” and “specificity” are the 
key to the entire Agreement. They define which measures are subject to the 
multilateral subsidy disciplines. Article 1 of the SCM Agreement states that subsidy 
is deemed to exist if a financial contribution or income or price support is provided 
by a government, and a benefit is thereby conferred, and that such subsidy is subject 
to the Agreement if it is “specific”. Article 2 defines the concept of specificity, which 
further limits the multilateral disciplines to the subsidies which, explicitly or in fact, 
                                                     
103 See detail discussion in A L Stoler, “The Evolution of Subsidies Disciplines in GATT and the WTO”, 
Symposium on WTO Litigation: Issues and Reforms, Law School, University of Sydney, Sydney Australia, 14 
August 2009 (available at: http://www.iit.adelaide.edu.au/conf/subsidies_usyd_0809.pdf) pp 2-10. 
104 M Matsushita, T J Schoenbaum and P C Mavroidis, World Trade Organization: law, practice, and policy 
(Oxford University Press 2006), p 334  
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address certain enterprises.  
Parts II, III and IV of SCM Agreement distinguish the “subsidies” in the terms 
of Article 1 and 2 into three categories: the prohibited subsidies, the actionable 
subsidies (permitted, but potentially subject to action) and non-actionable subsidies 
(permitted, and shielded from action). Prohibited subsidies, i.e. subsidies that apply 
to export performance and import substitutions, are presumed irrebuttably to be trade 
distortive. Therefore, they are pronounced illegal in the SCM Agreement. Non-
actionable subsidies were deemed to be non-specific within the meaning of Article 2 
or meet certain other specified requirements relating to their form and purpose. The 
latter encompassed certain research-related subsidies, regional subsidies and 
environment-related subsidies.
105
 This provision was of a transitional character
106
 and 
has not been renewed by the WTO Members so far. As a result, a scheme which 
qualifies as a subsidy can nowadays be counteracted is either prohibited subsidy or 
an actionable subsidy. Subsidies within the actionable category are not deemed 
illegal unless they cause defined kinds of adverse trade effects – namely serious 
prejudice, injury to the industry of an importing Member, or nullification or 
impairment of benefits.
107
 Correspondingly, actionable subsidies are subject to 
remedial actions only if the complaining party successfully demonstrates the 
existence of the injury and the causal link between the challenged subsidies and the 
injury.  
Both prohibited and actionable subsidies may be challenged either through 
multilateral dispute settlement or through the imposition of countervailing measures 
unilaterally. For multilateral challenges through dispute settlement, the complaining 
party must demonstrate either that the measure is a prohibited subsidy, in which case 
it must be withdrawn, or that the measure is an actionable subsidy that has caused 
adverse trade effect, in which case the measure must be withdrawn or its adverse 
effects removed. The substantive and procedural rules of the remedies to these 
different kinds of subsidies are regulated respectively in Article 4 and Article 7 of the 
SCM Agreement. For countervailing measures, the importing Member must conduct 
an investigation which demonstrates that the subsidized imports are causing injury to 
                                                     
105 SCM Agreement, Article 8.  
106 Ibid, Article 31. The initial category of non-actionable subsidy expired on 1 January 2000. 
107 Ibid, Articles 5 and 6. 
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its domestic industry. Importantly, they must follow the comprehensive rules which 
are set forth in Part V of the SCM Agreement.  
Subsidies on agricultural products are subject to certain rules set out in the 
Agreement on Agriculture, which are lex specialis to the SCM Agreement. These 
types of subsidies are not discussed by this thesis. 
 
2.2.2. Basic Rules of WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
1. Determination of Subsidization 
According to Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, a subsidy subject to the 
multilateral disciplines exists where there is a “financial contribution” “by a 
government or any public body” (or any form of income or price support in the sense 
of Article XVI of GATT 1994), and a “benefit is thereby conferred” to “specific” 
enterprises; and, a subsidy only exists when the quoted elements apply cumulatively. 
Hence, the major issues involved in a subsidization determination include: 
1) what constitutes the “financial contribution by government or public body”;  
2) how to justify a “benefit conferred”; and 
3) which subsidy falls into the scope of the “specificity” within the meaning of 
Article 2 of the SCM Agreement, other than those widely available to all 
economic operators?  
 
A. “financial contribution” 
To demonstrate the “financial contribution”, Article 1.1 provides for an 
exhaustive list of types of practices which includes: 
i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, 
loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or 
liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); 
ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected 
(e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits); 
iii) a government provides goods or services other than general 
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infrastructure, or purchases goods; 
iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or 
directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions 
illustrated in i) to iii) above which would normally be vested in the 
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices 
normally followed by governments. 
Pursuant to above list, financial contribution is deemed exist when financial 
support (i.e. funds, goods, service or forgiveness of any revenue due) other than 
general infrastructure were provided by government. Accordingly, identifying such 
requirement mainly depends on questioning: 
a) whether the support at issue is financial support; 
b) whether such financial support is a general scheme; and  
c) whether it was actually effectuated (regardless of how it occurred). 
 
B. “by government or public body” 
For a financial contribution to be a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1.1 of 
the SCM Agreement, it must be made by a government or a public body. Compared 
with the “government”, a term which is self-interpretive, the SCM Agreement does 
not explain what constitutes a “public body”. Hence, this issue has been discussed in 
dispute settlement several times. 
The early ruling on “public body” was set out by the Appellate Body in Canada 
– Dairy, a case which involves subsidies and countervailing measures under the 
Agreement on Agriculture. In Canada – Dairy, “government or their agencies”, a 
term which is parallel with the “public body” in the SCM Agreement, was defined as 
“an entity which exercises powers [or authority] vested in it by a ‘government’ for 
the purpose of performing functions of a ‘governmental’ character”.
108
 
The Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels, however, held that “an entity will 
constitute a ‘public body’ if it is controlled by the government (or other public 
bodies). If an entity is controlled by the government (or other public bodies), then 
                                                     
108 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy 
Products (“Canada – Dairy”), WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, dated 13 October 1999, para. 97.  
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any action by that entity is attributable to the government, and should therefore fall 
within the scope of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement.”
109
 
In the recent case of US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), the 
Appellate Body adopted the position in Canada – Dairy and overruled the 
“government control” argument, providing that: 
“A public body within the meaning of Article 1.1.(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement 




The latest interpretation clearly narrowed the ambit of meaning of the “public 
body”, especially when the challenged financial contribution was provided by State-
owned enterprises or State-owned commercial banks. The findings that an entity is 
“controlled by government” (e.g. owned by government or controlled by government 
in personnel) is no longer enough to identify the financial contribution at issue is 
subject to the SCM Agreement, unless there is positive evidence to demonstrate that 
the “governmental authority” was involved in the operation of the entity. 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) also envisages a situation that a financial contribution made 
by a private body, which might be entrusted or directed by a government to carry out 
one or more of the type of functions illustrated in Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) to (iii). The 
Appellate Body in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS indicated that, 
this provision “is intended to ensure that governments do not evade their obligations 
under the SCM Agreement by using private bodies to take actions that would 
otherwise fall within Article 1.1(a)(1), were they to be taken by the government itself. 




In US – Export Restraints, Canada challenged the United States’ position that an 
export restraint may be imposed by a government to limit certain producers’ ability 
to export and lead those producers to provide the restrained good to domestic 
                                                     
109 Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels (“Korea – Commercial Vessels”), 
WT/DS273/R, dated 7 March 2005, para 7.50 (emphasis added). 
110 Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China (“US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)”), WT/DS379/AB/R, dated 11 
March 2011, para 317. 
111 Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access 
Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea (“US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS”), 
WT/DS296/AB/R, dated 27 June 2005, para.113.  
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purchasers for less than adequate remuneration. Therefore, an export restraint 
constitutes subsidy in the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement.
112
 
In this dispute, the Panel first defined that the “private body” is a counterpoint 
to the terms “government” or “any public body” as used in Article 1.1.
113
 Therefore, 
“any entity that is neither a government nor a public body would be a private 
body”.
114
 With regard to the “entrustment” or “direction”, the Panel stated that this 
requirement refers “to the situation in which the government executes a particular 
policy by operating through a private body.”
115
 Following dictionary definitions of 
these terms, the Panel stated that the action of the government must contain a notion 
of “explicit and affirmative action of delegation or command”, which comprises 
these elements: “something is necessarily delegated, and it is necessarily delegated to 
someone; and, by the same token, someone is necessarily commanded, and he is 
necessarily commanded to do something…. either entrustment or direction could be 
said to have occurred until all of these three elements are present.”
116
   
To determine whether export restraint would constitute a financial contribution 
“entrusted or directed” by government, the Panel found that, the connection between 
the export restraints and the domestic producers to sell their product (in greater 
quantities or exclusively) to the domestic purchasers/users of that product cannot 
fulfil the “entrusts or directs” standard of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM 
Agreement.
117
 In the Panel’s view, the “existence of a financial contribution in the 
case of an export restraint depends entirely on the reaction thereto of the producers of 
the restrained good, and specifically on the extent to which they increase their 
domestic sales of the restrained product because of the restraint”
118
. On this issue, a 
distinguishment must be made between “government entrustment or direction” and 
“the situation in which the government intervenes in the market in some way, which 
may or may not have a particular result simply based on the given factual 
circumstances and the exercise of free choice by the actors in that market.”
119
  
                                                     
112 Panel Report, US – Measures Treating Exports Restrains as Subsidies (“US – Export Restraints”), 
WT/DS194/R, dated 29 June 2001, para 2.9.  
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In US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, the Appellate Body 
considered that the “delegate” or “command” is too narrow for interpreting the term 
“entrust or direct”, given the fact that some of government action “may be more 
subtle than a ‘command’ or may not involve the same degree of compulsion”.
120
 
Therefore, the Appellate Body provided that:  
“‘entrustment’ occurs where a government gives responsibility to a private body, 
and ‘direction’ refers to situations where the government exercises its authority 
over a private body. In both instance, the government uses a private body as 





C. “benefit conferred” 
Pursuant to Article 1.1(b), a financial contribution by a government or a public 
body is a subsidy within the meaning the SCM Agreement only if the financial 
contribution confers a benefit. Although no further explanations are provided in the 
SCM Agreement, three issues raised in case law are worthy of remark when 
examining the “benefit conferred” by a government or public body: 
1) making a financial contribution does not amount to conferring a benefit to a 
recipient;  
2) a “benefit” arises only if the recipient has received a financial contribution 




3) the “benefit conferred” by subsidies in the meaning of Article 1.1(b) may 
also happen when benefit is “passed through” when goods are sold by a 
subsidized upstream producer to a downstream producer. 
In Canada – Aircraft, Canada argued that “cost to government” is one way of 
conceiving of “benefit”. This view was rejected by the Appellate Body with the 
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“A ‘benefit’ does not exist in the abstract, but must be received and enjoyed by a 
beneficiary or a recipient. Logically, a ‘benefit’ can be said to arise only if a 
person, natural or legal, or a group of persons, has in fact received something. 
The term ‘benefit’, therefore, implies that there must be a recipient. …. ”
123
 
The Canada – Aircraft Appellate Body further held with regard to the term 
“benefit” that: 
“the word ‘benefit’, as used in Article 1.1(b), implies some kind of comparison. 
This must be so, for there can be no ‘benefit’ to the recipient unless the 
‘financial contribution’ makes the recipient ‘better off’ then it would otherwise 
have been, absent that contribution. In our view, the marketplace provides an 
appropriate basis for comparison in determining whether a ‘benefit’ has been 
‘conferred’, because the trade-distorting potential of a ‘financial contribution’ 
can be identified by determining whether the recipient has received a ‘financial 




This position was consistent with Article 14 of the SCM Agreement which lays 
down certain guidelines to investigating authorities on subsidy calculation in terms of 
benefit that the recipient has received as a benchmark for remedial action. 
It should be noted that the “benefit conferred” by subsidies in the meaning of 
Article 1.1(b) may also happen when benefit is “passed through” when goods are 
sold by a subsidized upstream producer to a downstream producer, or in the 
transaction of privatization of a State-owned producers. The case-law shows that, in 
the former situation, when the producers are not related and the goods are sold at an 
arm’s-length price, i.e. the fair market value, the benefit that the upstream producer 
has received is not assumed to be passed through to the downstream producers.
125
 In 
the like manner, “if ‘fair market value’ is paid in a privatization transaction, the 
subsidies previously provided to the State-owned producer may extinguish the 
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Another element in determination of subsidization is the “specificity”. The 
WTO rules on subsidies do not apply to “financial contributions by government that 
confer a benefit” unless the access to the subsidies in question were limited to 
specific enterprises.  
Article 2.1 to 2.3 of the SCM Agreement envisages four types of subsidies that 
fall into the category of the specificity and hence subject to the WTO rules: 
(a) Enterprise specificity, i.e. a situation in which a government targets a 
particular company or companies for subsidization;  
(b) Industry specificity, i.e. a situation in which a government targets a particular 
sector or sectors for subsidization; 
(c) Regional specificity, i.e. a situation in which a government targets producers 
in specified parts of its territory for subsidization; and 
(d) Prohibited subsidies, i.e. a situation in which a government targets export 
goods or goods using domestic inputs for subsidization.
127
 
The “specificity” requirement in the SCM Agreement is based on the rationale 
that “a subsidy is widely available within an economy is presumed not to distort the 
allocation of resources within that economy and therefore, does not require or justify 
any action.”
128
 Therefore, the main task here is to distinguish whether a subsidy 
scheme is available to all economic operators or to targeted enterprises as described 
above.  
Pursuant to Article 2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, if the criteria and conditions 
governing eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy are objective, the subsidy is 
not specific (provided that eligibility is automatic and the criteria and conditions are 
strictly applied). To enhance this requirement, footnote 2 to the SCM Agreement 
                                                     
126 Appellate Body Report, Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing Measures Concerning 
Certain Products from the European Communities (“US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products”), 
WT/DS212/AB/R, dated 9 December 2002, paras 103-105.  
127 P Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd edn) 
(Cambridge University Press 2008), p 568. 
128 Ibid, at p 568. 
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explains that the “objective criteria and conditions” mean: 
“criteria or conditions which are neutral, which do not favour certain enterprises 
over others, and which are economic in nature and horizontal in application, 
such as number of employees or size of enterprise.” 
Accordingly, authorities who granted subsidies must clearly spell out such 




With regard to the de facto subsidies which may not be specific, on its face, but, 
in fact, operates in a specific manner, pursuant to Article 2.1(c) of the SCM 
Agreement, other factors will be considered in the “specificity” determination, 
including:  
(a) the use of the subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises; 
(b) predominant use by certain enterprises; 
(c) the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain 
enterprises; and 
(d) the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority 
in the decision to grant a subsidy. 
When investigating authorities evaluate the above factors, the extent of 
diversification of economic activities within the jurisdiction of the granting authority 
and the length of time during which the subsidy programme has been in operation 
must also be taken into account to determine if the subsidy in question is not specific 




2. Classification of Subsidies  
A. Prohibited Subsidies 
Two types of subsidies are prohibited by the SCM Agreement: 1) export 
subsidies, and 2) import substitution subsidies (also known as local content 
subsidies). 
                                                     
129 SCM Agreement, Article 2.1(b). 
130 Ibid, Article 2.1(c). 
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Pursuant to Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, export subsidies are those that are 
contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several conditions, on export 
performance. The Annex I to the SCM Agreement provided an illustrative list of the 
export subsidies that are prohibited. In Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 - Canada), the 
challenged subsidy scheme was under the purview of the Illustrative List. 
Consequently, the Appellate Body did not question satisfaction of the threshold 
embedded in Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement.
131
 Therefore, it was considered that 




On the occasion that a subsidy is not included in the Illustrative List, the 
complaint will have to demonstrate that the subsidy at issue, “either in law or in fact”, 
is an export subsidy. In other words, the SCM Agreement captures not only de jure 
export subsidies but also de facto export subsidies, where WTO Members attempt to 
link benefit to exports without explicitly stating in the law that this has indeed been 
the case. De facto export contingency, as well as de facto specificity rules discussed 
above, are designed for the purpose of anti-circumvention.
133
 
Pursuant to footnote 4 to the SCM Agreement, a subsidy is contingent de facto 
upon export performance: 
“when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without having been 
made legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actually or 
anticipated exportation or export earnings. The mere fact that a subsidy is 
granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be considered 
to be an export subsidy within the meaning of this provision.” (emphasis added) 
In Canada – Aircraft, the Appellate Body stressed that the legal standard 
expressed by the word “contingent” is the same for both de jure and de facto 
contingencies. The difference is in what evidence may be employed to prove that a 
subsidy is export contingent.
134
 Since de facto export contingency is usually much 
more difficult to demonstrate than de jure export contingency, de facto export 
                                                     
131 WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft Recourse by Canada to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU (“Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 - Canada)”), WT/DS46/AB/RW, adopted 21 July 2000.  
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(Oxford University Press, 2006), at p 360. 
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contingency requires there to be a “close connection” between the granting of, or 
maintenance of, a subsidy and export performance.
135
 In addition, the decision must 
be established on the total configuration of the facts constituting and surrounding the 
granting of the subsidy and none of these facts on its own is likely to be decisive.
136
  
The other form of the prohibited subsidies, import substitution subsidies, are 
defined as subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods. The 
Appellate Body in Canada – Autos ruled that the prohibition of import substitution 
subsidies of Article 3.1(b) also covers both de jure and de facto contingency upon the 
use of domestic over imported goods,
137
 although this requirement is not clearly 
stated in the legal text. 
 
B. Actionable Subsidies 
Unlike prohibited subsidies, an actionable subsidy is countervailable only if it 
“causes injury to its domestic industry, or nullification or impairment of benefits 
accruing to it, or serious prejudice to its interests”.
138
 Therefore, an injury 
determination is involved in actionable subsidies investigation. 
 
a. Subsidies causing injury 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the SCM Agreement, the requirements on injury 
determination involved in a subsidy case largely mirror the correspondent contents in 
antidumping.  
The subsidy injury examination also focuses on the “volume of the subsidized 
imports”, the “effect of the subsidized imports on prices in the domestic market for 
like products”, and the “consequent impact of these imports on the domestic 
producers of such products”.
139
 When examining the quoted elements and the causal 
link between the subsidized imports and injury, investigating authorities must take all 
relevant factors into consideration.
140
 In the causation examination, a non-attribution 
                                                     
135 Panel Report, Australia – Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather (“Australia – 
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136 Ibid, paras 170-173 
137 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para 142. 
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test is also required.
141
 
As with the anti-dumping rules, a determination of threat of material injury must 
be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility; and 
the claimed threat of injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent.
142
 In the event 
that imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to 
the subsidy investigations, cumulative assessment is allowed when the imports from 




b. Subsidies causing nullification or impairment 
As mentioned in previous section, the “material injury” or threat thereof is the 
sole threshold in injury determination in anti-dumping investigation. Subsidies, 
however, are also subject to remedial actions when causing nullification or 
impairment of benefits that other Members could otherwise accrue under the GATT; 
or when the subsidies in question cause “serious prejudice” to other Members. 
Footnote 12 of the SCM Agreement, the term “nullification or impairment” used 
in the SCM Agreement is “in the same sense as it is used in the relevant provisions of 
GATT 1994, and the existence of such nullification or impairment shall be 
established in accordance with the practice of application of these provisions.” 
 
c. Subsidies causing serious prejudice 
According to Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement, “serious prejudice” may arise 
where a subsidy has one or more of the following effects: 
(1) the subsidy displaces or impedes imports of a like product of another 
Member into the market of the subsidizing Member; 
(2) the subsidy displaces or impedes the export of a like product of another 
Member from a third country market; 
(3) the subsidy results in a significant price undercutting by the subsidizing 
product in comparison to the like product of another Member in the same market, or 
significant price suppression, price depression, or lost sales in the same market; or 
                                                     
141 Ibid, Article 15.5. 
142 Ibid, Article 15.7. 
143 Ibid, Article 15.3. To be noticed, the de minimis and negligible threshold set forth for subsidies are different 
with those in anti-dumping rules (see section 2.1.2(4)(A) of this thesis).  
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(4) the subsidy leads to an increase in the world market share of the subsidizing 
Member in a particular primary product or commodity as compared to the average 
share it had during the previous period of three years and this increase follows a 
consistent trend over a period when subsidies have been granted. 
The “serious prejudice” threshold in the subsidy cases enables WTO Members 
whose producers were adversely affected by subsidized imports to claim their rights 
not only in domestic market, but also in the subsidizing country and the third 
countries’ market. This is significantly different from the anti-dumping measures. 
 
3. Permissible Actions against subsidization under the WTO 
A. Multilateral response 
Whenever a WTO Member has reason to believe that a prohibited subsidy is 
granted or maintained by another Member, or its producers are adversely affected by 
an existing actionable subsidy, the Member can respond to the subsidies in question 
through a multilateral approach. The multilateral response for prohibited subsidies 
and actionable subsidies are respectively regulated in Articles 4 and 7 of the SCM 
Agreement.   
If the case involves prohibited subsidies, consultations may be requested with 
any Member believed to be granting or maintaining a prohibited subsidy. If no 
mutual solution has been reached within 30 days, the dispute may be referred to the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body [hereafter: DSB] for adjudication. A panel 
established for a “prohibited subsidy” dispute may ask a Permanent Group of Experts 
(PGE) whether the measure at issue is a prohibited subsidy.
144
 If a panel finds a 
measure to be a prohibited subsidy, the panel shall recommend that the subsidizing 
Member withdraw the subsidy without delay with a specified time-period within 
which the measure must be withdrawn in its recommendation.
145
  
In the event the recommendation of the DSB is not followed within the time-
period specified by the panel, the DSB must grant authorization to the complaining 
Member to take appropriate countermeasures, upon the request of the original 
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complaining Member and by reverse consensus.
146
 
The rules and procedure of multilateral response in the actionable subsidy case 
are quite similar. However, the actionable subsidy case does not involve the PGE and 
some timeframes under Article 7 are longer than those under Article 4, due to the fact 
that actionable subsidy cases always involve injury examinations. 
 
B. Unilateral response - Countervailing Measures 
In addition to the multilateral response, the affected WTO Member may impose 
countervailing duties on the subsidized imports unilaterally to offset the 
subsidization. Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Articles 10 to 23 of the SCM 
Agreement govern the rules under which WTO Members may respond to subsidized 
trade which causes injury to the domestic industry.  
 
a. Countervailing Investigations 
Similar to the anti-dumping measures discussed above, countervailing duties 
may only be imposed when it is properly established that: 
(1) there are subsidized imports;  
(2) there is injury to a domestic industry producing the like product; and  
(3) there is a causal link between the subsidized imports and the injury.  
As with the conduct of anti-dumping investigations, the conduct of 
countervailing investigations is also subject to strict procedural requirements. In fact, 
the procedural requirements for countervailing investigation set out in the SCM 
Agreement largely mirror the procedural requirements for anti-dumping investigation 
set out in the Anti-dumping Agreement. For instance, a countervailing investigation 
also starts with a written request by (or on behalf of) the domestic industry alleged 
injured by the subsidized imports
147
 or, in special circumstances, can be initiated ex 
officio
148
; before the initiation of the investigation, the investigating authority must 
make sure the application contains sufficient evidence of the existence of the subsidy, 
the injury to the domestic industry and the causal link between the subsidized 
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imports and the alleged injury.
149
 At the same time, the investigating authorities must 
review the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application.
150
  
Once the application is accepted, a consultation is required before the initiation 
of any investigation. Members, the products of which may be subject to such 
investigation, must be invited for consultations with the aim of clarifying the 
situation as to the matters and arriving at a mutually agreed solution.
151
 As soon as an 
investigation has been initiated, interested parties must be given notice of the 





b. Application of countervailing measures 
The SCM Agreement provides for three types of countervailing measures: 
provisional countervailing measures, undertakings and definitive countervailing 
duties. 
The provisional countervailing measure usually applies when the investigating 
authorities have made a preliminary affirmative determination that a subsidy exists 
and that there is injury to a domestic industry caused by subsidized imports, and a 
provisional measure is considered necessary to prevent continuous injury during the 
investigation.
153
 Provisional measures can neither be applied sooner than 60 days 
from the date of initiation of the investigation nor longer than four months.
154
 
The definitive countervailing measures cannot be applied until the investigating 
authorities have made a final determination that the subsidies exist and the subsidies 
cause, or threaten to cause injury to domestic producers; and no mutual solution can 
be reached through consultation. 
Pursuant to Art 19.2 SCM, WTO Members can impose countervailing duties 
either:  
(a) at the level of the subsidy paid; or 
(b) adequate to remove the injury, provided that duties are at an amount lower 
                                                     
149 Ibid, Article 11.2. 
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than that under (a).  
As with anti-dumping measures, the lesser duty is encouraged, but not obliged. 
However, the investigation proceedings may be suspended or terminated 
without the imposition of provisional measures or countervailing duties upon receipt 
of satisfactory voluntary undertakings where the subsidizing government agrees to 
eliminate or limit the subsidy; or the exporters agree to revise its prices so that the 
injurious effect is eliminated.
155
 It is noteworthy that an undertaking must not be 
sought or accepted before a preliminary affirmative determination that the subsidy is 
causing injury is established.
156
 Moreover, the price increases under such undertaking 
cannot be higher than necessary to eliminate the amount of the subsidy.
157
 Again, a 
lesser duty is encouraged in an undertaking. 
 
c. Review of the countervailing measures 
As with anti-dumping measures, a countervailing duty may remain in force only 
as long as and to the extent necessary to counteract the injurious subsidization.
158
 
Therefore, a countervailing measure is also subject to midterm review and sunset 
review after being imposed. 
Pursuant to Article 21.2 SCM Agreement, a midterm review can be initiated 
upon request by interested parties, at any time following the original imposition, or 
ex officio, provided that a reasonable time since the imposition of the measures has 
lapsed. In contrast to the original investigation, the midterm investigation mainly 
examines: 
(a) whether the continuation of the countervailing measure is necessary to offset 
the injury/subsidization; and 
(b) whether the damage will recur if the measure in place were to be removed.159  
According to Art 21.3 SCM Agreement, all countervailing measures must be 
withdrawn five years after their imposition, unless the WTO Member concerned has 
conducted a review, i.e. sunset review. The sunset review is primarily concerned with 
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whether the damage will reoccur if the measure is removed.  
Remarkably, the five-year period is not necessarily counted from the date of the 
original imposition. Art 21.3 SCM Agreement makes it clear that the five-year period 
can be counted on the date that a midterm review has taken place, provided that this 
review covered both subsidization and damage. This method significantly increases 
the possibility of continuous imposition of countervailing measures. 
 
4. MFN Principle in respect of Countervailing Duty Measures 
As with the anti-dumping measures,
160
 countervailing duties must also be 
imposed on MFN base. Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement clearly provides that: 
 “When a countervailing duty is imposed in respect of any product, such 
countervailing duty shall be levied, in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a 
non-discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to 
be subsidized and causing injury, except as to imports from those sources which 
have renounced any subsidies in question or from which under takings under the 
terms of this Agreement have been accepted.” (emphases added) 
Like the ADA, the SCM Agreement neither expresses whether the non-
discriminatory treatment also applies at other stages of a countervailing proceeding 
(e.g. in countervailing duty measures legislation, initiation, notification, investigation 
and reviews, etc.), nor does it indicate whether Article 1:1 of the GATT 1994 plays a 
role in a countervailing action. However, the MFN analysis on anti-dumping also 
applies to the countervailing duty measures.
161
 It is expected that future negotiation 
on the CVD rules will clarify this issue. 
  
2.3 Safeguard Measures in the GATT/WTO   
2.3.1 Introduction to the Policies of Safeguard Measures 
The term “safeguards” is generally used to denote government actions 
responding to imports that are deemed to “harm” the importing country’s economy or 
                                                     




domestic competing industries. It usually takes the form of “import restriction” such 
as quantitative import restrictions or of duty increases to higher than bound rates or 
“voluntary” restrains coerced upon the exporting countries to protect the domestic 
market of the importing country.
162
  
Unlike the anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures that countervail the 
unfair advantages to exporters who sell below the normal price or receive certain 
trade-related subsidies from their governments and therefore enjoy unfair 
competitive advantages, safeguards can be invoked in absence of any unfair practice 
on the part of the exporter. Thus the question arises, why should there be this type of 
trade restriction measure?    
The justification of safeguards originates from the reduction of border barriers 
and market access developed under the free trade. In general, according to Prof. John 
Jackson, two arguments have been presented for this purpose – one seems to focus 
on an “economic adjustment” goal while the other bases itself on a more general 
“pragmatic” recognition of practical policies.
163
  
The core of the “economic adjustment” argument is to ease the pain of the 
adjustment process that the competing domestic firms are forced to take under the 
pressure/harm of imports, particularly recent increasing imports, even though they 
may in the long term and in the broader aggregate increase the welfare of their 
society. Globalization often results in increases in imports. Rapid increases in 
imports may well cause a significant strain on the competing domestic industry of the 
importing country, causing acute economic problems such as unemployment. The 
subsequent deterioration of a domestic industry may also invoke a series of adverse 
chain effects on other industries relating to the particular industry, magnifying the 
problem.
164
 Consequently, it is argued that a temporary period of time of some relief 
from imports will allow the domestic competing industry the opportunity to take the 
necessary adjustment measures. This “adjustment” process taken, either by 
improving domestic competitors’ competitiveness (productivity, price, quality, etc.) 
or by moving resources out of production of the competing products into production 
of other products, has often been viewed as “temporary” but costly.  
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Due to the fact that domestic interest groups are normally in a much stronger 
position than foreign producers/sellers to influence their governments, it is 
recognized the political forces for border protection against imports are often 
formidable and even those who favoring liberal trade (i.e. disfavoring import barriers) 
feel that to insist too rigidly on the fullest application of their principles could lead to 
general dismantling of the policies of the last several decades which have reduced 
import barriers. Consequently, some argue that “it is better pragmatically to give in to 
the idea of temporary and limited import barriers for specific (and hopefully not too 
significant) cases as a way not only to alleviate some of the burdens of adjustment, 
but also to diminish the pressure for a more drastic departure from the general 
approach to imports.”
165
 Therefore, prior to the GATT 1947, bilateral trade 
agreements normally provided a safeguard mechanism as a “safety valve” that is 
distinguished from anti-dumping and countervailing which attempt to set off the 
“unfair advantages” gained by exporters from price undercuts and subsidies.  
Nowadays, the safeguard mechanism still remains one of the limited exceptions 
which can be invoked to setup certain restrictions of an emergency nature on imports, 
irrespective of the importing Member’s obligation under its concessions.
166
 That 
means, WTO Members are allowed to temporarily suspend the bounded concessions 
or obligations to the negotiated agreements regarding certain imports on which 
safeguard measures are effective.  
 
2.3.2 “Escape Clause”, GATT Article XIX and Agreement on 
Safeguards 
The modern safeguard regime originated from the “escape clause” of United 
States Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1942 with Mexico
167
 which was also 
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accommodated in the subsequent international trade agreements including GATT. 
This clause established a basic framework introducing the notion of safeguard 
measures being an emergency action to prevent or remedy serious injury to domestic 
industry and three essential conditions for the application of safeguard measure, 
which include an increase in imports; serious injury or threat thereof to domestic 
competitive industries; and a causal link between the imports and injury. Both GATT 
Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards have adopted those important 
elements as general requirements for the application of a safeguard measure.   
Under the GATT 1947, safeguards were regulated only by Article XIX. Due to 
the brevity and lacks of detailed substantive and procedural requirements for 
application of a safeguard measure, GATT Article XIX is considered insufficient for 
the important and practical issues in the implementation of safeguard measures. The 
perceived problems included in Article XIX were pointed out by GATT Secretariat in 
1987 that: (i) there was no procedural requirement as to the investigation, causing 
lack of transparency in the process; (ii) there was no clear definition of serious injury, 
allowing governments to make arbitrary decisions; (iii) the notification and 
consultation process was inadequate; (iv) and there was no guideline for the duration 
of safeguard measures.
168
  The brevity of Article XIX makes it difficult for exporting 
countries to challenge safeguard measures which were considered being applied 
rather arbitrarily. Meanwhile, the deficiency of the discipline on safeguards also 
caused a growing dependency on “grey area measures” which arguably violated the 
prohibited quantity restrictions in GATT and nullification or impairment of the 
benefit accruing to a contracting party under the GATT.
169
 Therefore, with attempts 
to enact supplementary safeguard rules and bring the “outside practices” into 
conformity with the GATT rules, a series of multilateral negotiations on safeguards 
were launched and eventually achieved the Agreement on Safeguards in 1994.  
                                                                                                                                                      
such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers 
of like or similar articles, the Government of either country shall be free to withdraw the concession, in whole or 
in part, or to modify it to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent such injury.” See Agreement 
on Reciprocal Trade, December 23, 1942, US-Mexico, Article XI, 57 Stat. 833, 845-866.   
168 See GATT Secretariat, Work Already Undertaken in the GATT on Safeguards, (GATT Doc. No. MTN.GNG/ 
NG9/W/1, dated 8 April, 1987). Merely consists of five paragraphs, Article XIX only provide the general 
conditions for the application of safeguard measure. Many essential elements for application of the safeguard 
measures including assessment of serious injury to domestic industry, specific duration of the measure and 
investigation process have not been addressed in this provision.  
169 “Grey area measures” refers to the “voluntary” restrictions on trade agreed between the exporting and 
importing countries. See Y S Lee, Safeguard Measures in World Trade: The Legal Analysis (Kluwer Law 
International 2003), p 30.  
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Comprised of 14 Articles, the new Agreement on Safeguards [hereafter: SA] 
provides WTO Members with the right to take global safeguard actions against 
unforeseen surges of imports from all sources pursuant to Article XIX of GATT 1994. 
It clarifies and makes certain changes to the substantive and procedural requirements 
for the application of a safeguard measure regulated in Article XIX of GATT. 
Moreover, it declares the principle of non-discriminatory application of a safeguard 
measure and prohibits all grey-area measures. The guiding principles of the SA are 
that safeguard measures must be temporary; that they may be imposed only when 
imports are found to cause or threaten serious injury to a competing domestic 
industry; that they (generally) be applied on a non-selective (MFN) basis; that they 
be progressively liberalized while in effect; and that the Member imposing them 
(generally) must pay compensation to the Members whose trade is affected. The 
Preamble of the SA explicitly expresses that the aims of the agreement are to: (i) 
clarify and reinforce GATT disciplines, particularly those of Article XIX; (ii) re-
establish multilateral control over safeguards and eliminate measures that escape 
such control; and (iii) encourage structural adjustment on the part of the industries 
adversely affected by increased imports, thereby enhancing competition in 
international markets. This more complete agreement has effectively reinforced the 
old provisions of Article XIX. It has been acclaimed as a substantial achievement of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations.
170
   
 
2.3.3 Basic Rules on Safeguard Measures  
According to the general condition set out in Paragraph 1(a) of Article XIX, 
GATT and Article 2.1 of SA, a GATT/WTO Member may apply a safeguard measure 
only if: 
1) imports of a product are increasing either absolutely or relatively, and such 
increase must be a result of unforeseen development and of the effect of the 
GATT/WTO obligations (e.g. tariff concessions) ;  
2) it must also be shown that domestic producers of competitive products are 
seriously injured, or are threatened with serious injury, and that this injury is 
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caused by the increased imports; and 
3) the importing nation keeps its procedures consistent with GATT/WTO rules.  
Consequently, the importing nation is entitled to suspend “such” GATT/WTO 
obligations in respect of such products, but not exceed the time span as necessary to 
prevent or remedy the injury.   
 
1. Determination of the Increased Imports 
The basic prerequisite on application of a safeguard measure is “increased 
imports”. For a determination of “increased imports” under the WTO safeguard 
regime, not any import increase is sufficient. The provisions set out two main 
conditions, which must be met for the increase imports to justify the imposition of 
safeguard measures. Firstly, such increase must have occurred “as a result of 
unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by” a WTO 
Member.
171
 Secondly, imports should enter into the importing country “in such 
increased quantities and under such condition” as to cause or threaten to cause 
serious injury to the domestic industry. There are four questions that merit attention 
which include:
172
 1) what are “unforeseen developments”; 2) what is the time span 
for “increased imports”; 3) how is “product” to be defined – broadly or narrowly; 4) 
must the increase be “absolute,” or will a “relative” increase suffice? All of these 
questions shall be discussed in this section below.  
 
A. Unforeseen Development 
a. Existence of the “unforeseen development” requirement 
The first conditions is set out in Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994, providing that 
the increase in imports must result from “unforeseen developments”. This clause is 
not further defined or illustrated by examples in Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and 
importantly, it was not included in the SA. In Korea – Dairy and Argentina – 
Footwear (EC), one of the issues was the omission of this criteria. Many doubted if 
this criteria continues to have some legal effect after the SA coming into force. The 
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question aroused provided some chances for WTO panels in interpreting the 
requirement of “unforeseen development” in those cases.   
In Korea – Dairy, the Panel concluded that the “unforeseen development” 
requirement does not address the conditions for Article XIX measures to be applied 
but rather explains why a provision such as Article XIX may be needed…
173
 Also, the 
Panel on Argentina – Footwear found that, although Article XIX and the SA “legally 
co-exist” as part of the WTO Agreement, the “unforeseen development” was 
“expressly omitted” by the Uruguay Round negotiators and this “omitted” phrase has 
no meaning
174
. Both of the conclusions were reversed by the Appellate Body which 
ruled that the requirements of the WTO Safeguards Agreement and of GATT 
Article XIX apply on a cumulative basis.
175
 The precise nature of the relationship 
between Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the SA within the WTO Agreement is 
described in Article 1 and 11.1(a) of the SA as follows: 
 
Article 1 General Provision 
 
This Agreement established rules for the application of safeguard measures 
which shall be understood to mean those measures provided for in Article XIX 
of GATT 1994.  
 
Article 11 Prohibition and Elimination of Certain Measures 
 
1. (a) A Member shall not take or seek any emergency action on imports of 
particular products as set forth in Article XIX of GATT 1994 unless such 
action conforms with the provision of that Article applied in accordance with 
this Agreement.  
 
The text of Article 1 suggests that Article XIX continues in full force and effect, 
and, in fact, establishes certain prerequisites for the imposition of safeguard measures. 
Furthermore, in Article 11.1(a), the ordinary meaning of the language “unless such 
                                                     
173 Panel Report, Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (“Argentina-Footwear (EC)”), 
WT/DS121/R, adopted 25 June 1999, para 7.45.  
174 Panel Report, Argentina-Footwear, para 8.55.   
175 Appellate Body Report, Argentina-Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, para 89. 
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action conforms with the provisions of that Article applied in accordance with this 
Agreement” clearly is that any safeguard action must conform with the provisions of 
Article XIX of the GATT 1994 as well as with the provisions of the Agreement on 
Safeguards.
176
 Therefore, the Appellate Body concluded that the requirement of 
“unforeseen development” does have meaning; also, it must be satisfied in order for 




b. The meaning of the “unforeseen development” 
The clause of the “unforeseen development” demonstrates that safeguard 
measures were intended by the drafters of the GATT to be matters out of the ordinary, 
to be matters of urgency, to be, in short, “emergency actions.” And, such “emergency 
actions” are to be invoked only in situations when, as a result of obligations incurred 
under the GATT 1994, a Member finds itself confronted with developments it had 
not “foreseen” or “expected” when it incurred that obligation. The term was first 
defined in the US – Hatter’s Fur case, in which the GATT Working Party observed 
that:  
… the term ‘unforeseen development’ should be interpreted to mean 
developments occurring after the negotiation of the relevant tariff concession which 
it would not be reasonable to expect that the negotiators of the country making the 




In the case of Korea – Dairy, the Appellate Body stated: “… the ordinary 
meaning of the phrase ‘as a result of unforeseen developments’ requires that the 
developments which led to a product being imported in such increased quantities and 
under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic 
producers must have been ‘unexpected’”.
179
 In addition, in US – Lamb case, the 
Appellate Body clarified that the “demonstration” must be provided by the 
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competent domestic authorities before taking the measure.
180
 This means that the 
measure itself must contain an express finding to this effect; otherwise its legal basis 
is flawed. The US – Lamb Panel also found that the investigation report must 
specifically examine the “unforeseen developments.” The Panel stated, “it must be 
clear from the published report that the investigating authorities examined the 
existence of unforeseen developments and came to a reasoned conclusion in this 
regard.”
181
 The Appellate Body affirmed the Panel’s position that the demonstration 
of the existence of this circumstance must feature in the published report of the 
investigating authorities.
182
 If the published report does not discuss or offer any 
explanation as to why certain factors mentioned in it can be regarded as “unforeseen 
developments,” that report does not demonstrate that the safeguard measure has been 
applied as a result of “unforeseen developments.”
183
  
With respect to the phrase “of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member 
under this Agreement, including tariff concessions…”, it was stated by Appellate 
Body in Argentina – Footwear (EC) that it must be demonstrated, as a matter of fact, 





B. The Assessment of the Increase in Imports 
The relevant provisions of the assessment of an increase in imports are provided 
in both Article XIX of GATT and the SA. Article 2.1 of the SA reproduced and 
confirmed the language of Article XIX:1 of GATT 1994, meanwhile, Article 4.2 sets 
out the operational requirements for determining whether the conditions identified in 
Article 2.1 exist.  
Members contemplating a safeguard measure should first establish the requisite 
increase in imports under the provision of Article 2.1 of the SA that states “A 
member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has 
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determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product is being 
imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to 
domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause 
serious injury to the domestic industry that products like or directly competitive 
products…”.  
Article 4.2(a) further requires in relevant part, “[i]n the investigation to determine 
whether increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause serious injury to a 
domestic industry under the terms of its Agreement, the competent authorities shall 
evaluate (…) in particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of the 
product concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market 
taken by increased imports …”. 
Two requirements must be fulfilled under Article 2.1. The first one is a 
quantitative requirement, while the second is more generally related to the 
“conditions” under which foreign products come into the territory of the Member 
seeking to take a safeguard measure.
185
 Each of the requirements is discussed in 
following paragraph.  
 
a. The absolute or relative nature of the increase 
To determine whether imports have increased in sufficient quantities for purposes 
of applying a safeguard measure, Articles 2.1 and 4.2 require an analysis of the rate 
and amount of the increase in imports. Further, they also identify that such increase 
could be in absolute terms or in its magnitude relative to domestic production, which 
Article XIX:1 of GATT 1994 does not lay down.    
Under Article 2.1 of the SA, absolute imports and relative imports are alternative 
conditions. Accordingly, in order to meet the “increased imports” requirement it is 
sufficient that one form of increase has occurred. Members are allowed to apply a 
safeguard measure where the amounts of imports actually decrease but the ratio 
between imports and domestic production results in a higher figure because domestic 
production shrinks. In US – Line Pipe, the panel considered that even if it had found 
that imports of line pipe into the United States has not increased in absolute terms, its 
conclusion that there had been “increased imports” consistent with the SA would 
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have been supported by the fact that imports had increased relative to domestic 
production. Concerns were that the application of a safeguard measure based on the 
relative increase in imports would accelerate a decline in trade in the time of general 
recession.
186
 It was also considered to be difficult to prove causation between the 




It should be noted that while the presence of an absolute increase or a relative 
increase are equally relevant to meet Article 2.1, a difference in the application of 
Article 8.3 of the SA may result depending on the type of increase.  
In addition, in Argentina – Footwear (EC), the Panel considered that, since the 
wording of Article 2.1 of the SA refers to quantities, the analysis of domestic 
authorities and panel review must focus on quantities rather than value.  
 
b. Quantity and time span of the increase 
There are two main questions in connection with the requirement that imports 
have increased. The first is how much increase is necessary. The second question to 
be answered is over which time span or rather the duration of the increase. No 
method to assess the increase in imports is set out, neither under Article XIX, nor in 
the SA. The WTO panels so far have clarified that both the rate and the amount of 
the increase in imports (in absolute and relative terms) must be evaluated. 
A first general response to both questions was provided by the Appellate Body in 
Argentina – Footwear (EC). It ruled that the increase in imports “must have been 
recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough and significant enough, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten to cause serious injury.”
188
 
Accordingly, the increase volume must be “sharp” and “significant” enough in 
confirming the magnitude of an “increased imports” determination. In addition, the 
term “recent” and “sudden” suggests that the relevant increase must take place over a 
relatively short time span. This entails that the competent authorities are required to 
consider the trends in imports over the period of investigation, rather than just 
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comparing the situation of imports at the beginning and at the end of the reference 
period (the so-called “end points” of the period).
189
 
As a practical example, the panel in US – Wheat Gluten found that the “recent, 
sudden and sharp” increase requirement was met in a case where (1) imports had 
risen (in absolute terms) from 124 to 177 million pounds, with the highest increase 
occurring towards the end of the reference period, and (2) the ratio of imports to 




2. Determination of “serious injury” 
The presence of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry as a 
result of the increased imports is a major substantive requirement for the imposition 
of a safeguard measure.  
 
A. Definition of “Serious Injury” or “Threat of Serious Injury” 
Article 4.1 provides the definitions for the term relevant to the injury 
determination. “Serious injury” is defined as “a significant overall impairment in the 
position of a domestic industry” (Article 4.1(a)). “Threat of serious injury” is defined 
as “serious injury that is clearly imminent, in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 2” (Article 4.1(b)). As a general matter, the standard of “serious injury” 
built in the SA has been recognized by the Appellate Body to be “very high” 
(“exacting”)
191





B. Definition of the “Domestic Industry” 
According to the general conditions of Article 2.1, an assessment of the serious 
injury or the threat thereof should be directed to the relevant domestic industry. 
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Therefore, the identification of the “domestic industry” is a prerequisite to the injury 
assessment. Article 4.1(c) provides the definition “the producers as a whole of the 
like or directly competitive products, operating within the territory of a Member, or 
those whose collective output of the like or directly competitive products constitute a 
major proportion of the total domestic production of those products”. There are two 
criteria to identify the scope of “domestic industry”. Firstly, the relevant domestic 
industry is defined as producers making products, which are “like or directly 
competitive” to the imports targeted by the investigation.  
The methodology to determine the scope of “like or directly competitive 
products” is not provided in the SA. However, this term has been interpreted by 
Appellate Body. The notion of “likeness” is mainly focused on the physical and 
functional similarities between the relevant domestic products and imports.
193
 In US 
– Lamb, the Appellate Body stated several exclusions to the “like” products. It ruled 
out certain domestic products which are simply in a “continuous line of production” 
to the like products of the targeted imports
194
, those products manufactured by 
producers who have a “substantial coincidence of economic interests” with that of 
the domestic producers of the genuine “like” domestic products,
195
 or that production 
structures may have an impact on deciding whether two products are “like” or 
“directly competitive”.
196
 The rational of the Appellate Body’s findings is that the 
focus of the SA is on products, not on production processes.
197
   
With regard to the “direct competitiveness”, the Appellate Body stressed that it 
focuses on “marketplace”, that is on the competitive conditions on the importing 
country, starting from elasticity of substitution between the imports and the allegedly 
directly competitive domestic products.
198
 The national authorities are obligated to 
provide reasoned conclusions or findings as regards the likeness or direct 
competitiveness between domestic products and the imported products subject to the 
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The second criteria laid down in Article 4.1(c) to define the “domestic industry” 
requires the  injury assessment must be based on either the whole of such domestic 
industry, or on the part thereof which constitutes a “major proportion” of the total 
amount. A serious injury finding can also be based on data collected for a part of the 




C. The Determination of Serious Injury or Threat of Serious Injury  
Article 4.2(a) provides that the injury assessment must be based on “the 
evaluation of all the relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a 
bearing on the situation of that industry…” Eight injury factors to be evaluated by 
domestic competent authorities are enlisted in this Article as objective criteria for an 
assessment of the injury: i) the rate and amount of the increase in imports of the 
product concerned in absolute and relative terms; ii) the share of the domestic market 
taken by increased imports; changes in the level of iii) sales; iv) production; v) 
productivity; vi) capacity utilization; vii) profits and losses; viii) employment.  
 The examination of the injury factors by the domestic authorities involves a 
formal aspect and a substantive aspect. The formal aspect requires the domestic 
authorities to evaluate “all relevant factors”
201
 and possibly relevant “other 
factors”
202
. Failure to account, in full or in part, for the trend in one of the relevant 
factors automatically results in a violation of Article 4.2(a).
203
 The substantive aspect 
entails a reasoned and adequate explanation for their determination by domestic 
authorities of how the facts support their determination of the “serious injury” to the 
domestic industry.
204
 The domestic authorities are not required to show that each 
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listed injury factor is declining but rather, they must reach a determination in light of 
the evidence as a whole.
205
  
A determination of the existence of a threat of serious injury refers to Article 4.2, 
regulating determinations of actual “serious injury”.
206
 In making a “threat” 
determination, the domestic authorities must find that serious injury is “clearly 
imminent”.
207
 This requires a high degree of likelihood that the anticipated serious 
injury will materialize in the very near future.
208
 It needs to be stressed that a “threat” 






Pursuant to Article 4.2(a), a determination of the injury not only includes the 
examination of the “serious injury or threat thereof” having a bearing on the 
domestic industry, but also needs an examination of whether the injury has been 
caused by the increased imports or by the “other factors”, that is, the “causal link” 
between the increased imports and the injurious effects. Article 4.2(b) lays down the 
causation requirement, which is twofold. On the one hand, a demonstration of the 
casual link between increased imports and serious injury is required. On the other 
hand, it is also required that any injury caused by factors other than the increased 
imports must not be attributed to such imports.
210
  
An examination of causation often requires the test of whether an upward trend in 
imports coincides with downward trends in the injury factors; whether the condition 
of competition in the domestic market between imported and domestic products 
demonstrates a causal link of the imports to the injury, and if not, whether a reasoned 
explanation is provided as to why the data nevertheless shows causation; whether 
other relevant factors have been analyzed and whether it is established that the injury 
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caused by factors other than the imports has not been attributed to the imports.
211
 
However, the Appellate Body has indicated that to establish causation pursuant to 
Article 4.2(b), it is not necessary to show that increased imports alone – on their own 
– must be capable of causing serious injury.
212
 Article 4.2(b) provides that the 
causation examinations should be demonstrated on the basis of objective evidence.  
With respect to the “non attribution” test, the Appellate Body required the 
domestic authorities to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of the other 
causal factors in the assessment of the injury ascribed to increased imports, in a 
situation where several factors are causing injury at the same time.
213
 Therefore, the 
domestic authorities are required to identify “the nature and extend of the injurious 
effects of the known factors” as well as “a satisfactory explanation of the nature and 
extent of the injurious effects of the other factors, as distinguished from the injurious 




3. Application of Safeguard Measures 
A. Definitive Safeguard Measures 
Safeguard measures shall be applied after an injury determination has been 
affirmed. Unlike in the case of anti-dumping or countervailing measures, safeguard 
measures are not limited to particular types or forms. Article XIX:1 of the GATT 
1994 very generally refers to the possibility of suspending obligations, or 
withdrawing or modifying tariff concessions granted under its provisions to the 
extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the serious injury 
or threat thereof by the imports under investigation. In practice, safeguard measures 
take a form of increased tariffs, quotas, surcharges, quantitative restrictions, import 
authorizations or a combination.
215
 However, “voluntary” restrictions on trade agreed 
between the exporting and importing countries, so-called “grey-area” measures are 
strictly prohibited in the SA in Article 11.1(b).  
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Article 5.1 of the SA provides that a Member shall apply safeguard measures 
“only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate 
adjustment”. However, the domestic authorities are not required to prove the 
adequacy of the measure unless the measure takes a form of quantitative restriction 
and the quantity of the imports was reduced below the level of a recent period.
216
  
The quota allocation needs to be agreed among all Members having a substantial 
interest in supplying the product concerned. If agreement cannot be made, the quota 
may be allocated according to the import share of the Members for a representative 
period.  
 
B. Provisional Measures 
Article XIX:2 of GATT and Article 5 of the SA provide that in critical 
circumstances where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, 
a Member may take a provisional safeguard measure pursuant to a preliminary 
determination that there is clear evidence that increased imports have caused or are 
threatening to cause serious injury. Such measures should only take the form of tariff 
increase which shall be promptly refunded if the subsequent investigation does not 
determine that increase imports have caused or threatened to cause serious injury to a 
domestic industry. The duration of the provisional safeguard measure is limited to a 
maximum 200 days and cannot be extended. The period of a provisional measure is 





4. Notification and Consultation 
It is the transparency requirement that the provisions regard to notifications and 
consultations are laid out in both Article XIX of GATT and the SA in regulating the 
activities in connection with the application of the safeguard measure. Article XIX:2 
of GATT 1994 concerns the procedural requirements for the application of 
safeguards. It provides, “before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to 
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the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article, it shall give notice in writing to the 
Contracting Parties as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford the 
Contracting Parties and those contracting parties having a substantial interest as 
exporters of the product concerned an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the 
proposed action. When such notice is given in relation to a concession with respect to 
a preference, the notice shall name the contracting party which has requested the 
action. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be 
difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken provisionally 
without prior consultation, on the condition that consultation shall be effected 
immediately after taking such action.” 
Article 12 of the SA provides for the notification and consultation process. The 
brief procedural requirements under Article XIX:2 have been refined and detailed in 
the new Agreement. Members are obligated to issue notifications at various states of 
the application of a safeguard measure to the Committee on Safeguards, which 
includes i) the initiation if the investigation (Article 12.1(a)); ii) the making of a 
finding of serious injury or threat thereof (Article 12.1(b)); iii) the decision to apply 
or extend a safeguard measure (including provisional measures) (Article 12.1(c)). 
Recent Panels repeatedly emphasized the importance of time notification that those 
three notifications should be made immediately after the relevant decisions.
218
 
Article 12.2 stipulates the required contents of the notifications. Article 12.2 
provides in the relevant part, “… the Member proposing to apply or extend a 
safeguard measure shall provide the Committee on Safeguard with all pertinent 
information, which shall include evidence of serious injury or threat thereof caused 
by increased imports, precise description of the products involved and the proposed 
measure, proposed date of introduction, expected duration and time table for 
progressive liberalization. In the case of an extension of a measure, evidence that the 
industry concerned is adjusting shall be also provided.” The extent of “all pertinent 
information” has been subject to question. The Appellate Body ruled that, at a 
minimum, notification should address the injury factors listed in Article 4.2(a) as 
evidence of injury and include all the other items expressly listed in Article 12.2.
219
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Article 12.3 provides for consultations prior to the application of a safeguard 
measure. It provides that “A Member proposing to apply or extend a safeguard 
measure shall provide adequate opportunity for prior consultations with those 
Members having a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned, with a 
view to, inter alia, reviewing the information under paragraph 2, exchanging views 
on the measure and reaching an understanding on ways to achieve the objective set 
out in paragraph 1 of Article 8”.  
Consultations would provide the involved parties with an important opportunity 
to exchange their views on the proposed safeguard measure. The importing country 
may be persuaded to modify the measure or even not to apply it at all, or may also 
agree on compensation during those consultations. Therefore, the exchange of views 
as well as any agreement during the consultation would be properly reflected in the 
final implementation of the measure.
220
 Successful consultations would lead to 





5. Duration, Midterm Review and Extend 
Both Article XIX of GATT and the SA provide that a safeguard measure should 
be applied “for such period of time” as may be necessary to prevent or remedy 
serious injury and facility an adjustment to the domestic injury. The duration 
requirement of an application of the safeguard measure denotes the “temporary” 
nature of the safeguard measures and also requires the proportionality between the 
measure applied and the injury. Article XIX did not specify the maximum duration of 
a safeguard measure, while the SA provides the detail requirements in Article 7.  
The period of a safeguard measure shall not exceed 4 years. The measure can be 
extended only once up to four more years if the continuation of the measure is 
determined necessary to remedy or prevent serious injury and there is evidence that 
the injury is adjusting. The total period of a safeguard measure including the period 
of any preceding provisional measure cannot exceed 8 years
222
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The extension of the measure would require investigation, following the 
procedures in Article 2-5. If the duration of a safeguard measure is over 1 year, the 
measure needs to be liberalized at regular intervals.
223
 An extended measure cannot 
be more restrictive than it was at the end of the initial period, and should continue to 
be liberalized.
224
 The time equal to the duration of the previous safeguard measure, 
provided the period of non-application is at least 2 years, must lapse before the re-
application of a safeguard measure with respect to the same product.
225
 If the 
duration of a safeguard measure exceed 3 years, the Member applying the measure 
must review the situation not later than the mid-term of the measure and, if 
appropriate, withdraw the measure altogether or increase the pace of liberalization.
226
  
The specified duration and the required time interval before the re-introduction of 
a safeguard measure highlight the temporary nature of safeguards. The liberalization 
requirement should encourage the domestic industry to make necessary adjustment. 
The mid-term review provides an opportunity to place a safeguard measure under 
scrutiny before its expiry.  
 
6. Compensation and retaliation   
An application of a safeguard measure inevitably breaches the balance of 
concessions between the importing and exporting Members. The WTO requires the 
Member proposing to apply a safeguard measure or seeking an extension of a 
safeguard measure shall endeavour to maintain a substantially equivalent level of 
concessions and other obligations to that existing under GATT 1994 between it and 
the exporting Members which would be affected by such a measure.
227
 To achieve 
this objective, the Members concerned may agree on any adequate means of trade 
compensation for the adverse effects of the measure on their trade. The right to 
suspend the substantial equivalent concessions was already set out in Article XIX:3.  
Article 8 of the SA further provides that should the Members concerned fail to reach 
agreement on compensation within 30 days, the affected exporting Members shall be 
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free, not later than 90 days after the measure is applied, to suspend the substantially 
equivalent concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994.
228
 Any form of 
compensation and proposed suspension under Article 8.2 must be notified 
immediately to the Council for Trade in Goods
229
, and the proposed retaliation is 
applicable on the expiration of 30 days from the receipt of such notice by the Council 
as long as the Council does not “disapprove” the proposed measure.  
 
7. MFN Principle in respect of Safeguard Measures 
Since safeguard measures do not require a finding of an “unfair” practice, the 
authorization of a discriminatory measure applicable to the import only from a 
particular source could have been an invitation for a trade war between the importing 
country applying a safeguard measure and the exporting country. The text of Article 
XIX neither specifically approves nor prohibits the selective application of a 
safeguard measure according to the sources of the product concerned. A specific 
MFN provision was included in the Charter of the International Trade Organization 
(ITO) at the Havana meeting, and the Contracting Parties generally understood that 
the MFN principle applies to safeguard measures, although the Charter has never 
acquired the legal effect. The Contracting Parties of the GATT later confirmed the 
application of the MFN principle in subsequent panel cases.
230
  As a result of long 
negotiations on the MFN issue, Article 2.2 of the SA specifically provided that 
safeguard measures shall be applied to a product being imported irrespective of its 
source.  
Although a non-selective principle was adopted in SA as to the application of 
safeguards, there are two possibilities where an importing country may depart from it.  
First of all, Article 5.2(b) of the SA allows a Member to depart from the MFN 
quota allocation if (i) imports from certain Members have increased in 
                                                     
228 However, there is an important qualification contained in Article 8(3) that such right of suspension “shall not 
be exercised for the first three years that a safeguard measure is in effect, provided that the safeguard measure has 
been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports.” 
229 Safeguards Agreement, Article 12.5. 
230 See, e.g. Norway – Restrictions on Imports of Certain Textile Products, BISD 27S/119, adopted 18 June 1980, 
para 14(b). The panel “was of the view that the type of action chosen by Norway, i.e. the quantitative restrictions 
limiting the importation of the nine textile categories in question, as the form of emergency action under Article 




disproportionate percentage in relation to the total increase of imports of the product 
concerned in the representative period, (ii) the reasons for the departure are justified, 
and (iii) the conditions of such departure are equitable to all suppliers of the product 
concerned. The duration of such a non-MFN measure shall not be extended beyond 
the initial 4 years, and shall not be permitted in the case of threat of serious injury. 
Secondly, GATT Article XXIV has been referred to as a possible justification to 
deviate from such a non-discrimination principle. In fact, footnote 1 of the SA Article 
2.1 provides that “[n]othing in this Agreement prejudges the interpretation of the 
relationship between Article XIX and paragraph 8 of Article XXIV of GATT 1994”, 




The panel in US – Line Pipe noted that availability of the Article XXIV defence 
against claims brought under the provisions of the SA is confirmed by this 
sentence.
232
 However, the Appellate Body refused to rule on the question whether 
Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 permits exempting imports originating in a partner 
of a free-trade area from a measure in departure from Article 2.2 of the SA based on 
the above quoted sentence. According to the other content of the footnote 1 to Article 
2.1 of the SA, the Appellate Body only admitted that the GATT Article XXIV:5 
defence to a violation of the Safeguard Agreement is only available when the 
“parallelism” principle was respected.
233
 Therefore, to the Appellate Body, the 
extensions of GATT Article XXIV:5 exception in the SA  in conditional.  
To date, whether GATT Article XXIV can justify the deviation from the MFN 
principle in Article 2.2 of the SA remains controversial in both academia and 
practice.
234
   
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The economic rationale of TRMs has long been debated. While economic 
justifications for import restrictions are controversial, political needs for trade 
                                                     
231 D Ahn, “Foe or Friend of GATT Article XXIV: Diversity in Trade Remedy Rules” (2008) 11(1) Journal of 
the International Economic Law 107, at p 127. 
232 Panel Report, US – Line Pipe, WT/DS202/R, adopted 8 March 2002, para.7.151 
233 Appellate Body report, US – Line Pipe, paras 198-199. 
234 For full discussion on this issue, see section 4.2 of this thesis. 
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remedy measures are quite strong and it is therefore likely that these measures will 
remain a lasting part of the world trading system. Disciplined trade remedy measures 
with well-paced liberalization plans can, at a minimum, provide Members with an 
opportunity for economic adjustment. GATT/WTO trade remedy rules were designed 
to reduce the negative impact on Members’ domestic industry by liberalizing their 
domestic markets and so advance the national economic interest of the Members that 
apply them. The agreements on anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing duty 
measures and safeguards were a success in that they did replace the popularity of 
grey-area measures in the GATT era. Then the task would be to minimize the adverse 
effects of import restrains with effective disciplines. 
Since the Uruguay Round, these instruments, particularly anti-dumping, have 
been increasingly used, by developing economies even more than by developed 
countries. Proliferating global trade remedy actions reflects the severe problems in 
GATT/WTO rules. Certain ambiguities in the current WTO rules as discussed in this 
chapter have caused confusion and controversy in the application of trade remedy 
measures. For example: i) the “zeroing” in anti-dumping calculation has not been 
explicitly prohibited in the legal text of the ADA; ii) many key terms of the 
provisions are ambiguous in definition, which led WTO dispute settlement panels to 
constantly formulate different interpretations; iii) except for the imposition of the 
measures, it is unclear whether national legislations and proceedings of TRMs 
applicable to other WTO Members have to take non-discriminatory stance.  
In addition, provisions of WTO TRMs leave sufficient room to the users to 
trigger those measures easily. For instance, in anti-dumping laws, the comparison is 
made on an ex-factory basis without consideration of the final price. Freight, 
advertising, insurance, and other direct and indirect costs are deducted from the sale 
price when assessing what the ex-factory prices are in both countries.
235
 In practice, 
when prices are constructed, overhead costs of 10 and 8 per cent profits are added to 
those ex-factory costs of production in the home country, which inflated the margin 
of price discrimination.
236
 Provisions stipulating that due allowance be made for the 
“differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation and other differences affecting 
                                                     
235 See section 2.1.2(D) of this thesis. 




price comparability” can further inflate foreign prices.
237
 Under the “W-T” anti-
dumping calculation method, dumping may be determined positive or the dumping 
margin may be exaggerated if the investigating authority makes its determination on 
arbitrarily selected transaction models.
238
 All these give some Members a good 
chance to misuse trade remedy actions as a strong protectionism weapon. 
Compare with CVD and safeguard measures, anti-dumping campaigns are far 
more devastating. There were almost 4000 anti-dumping initiations versus 262 CVD 
measures and 216 safeguard measures from 1995 to mid-2010.
239
 Compared with 
CVD and safeguard measures, anti-dumping is much easier applicable to any case of 
troublesome imports because 1) anti-dumping investigations are usually established 
on discriminatory bases and therefore particular exports can be picked out; 2) the 
rhetoric of foreign unfairness provides a vehicle for building a decent excuse for 
protection; 3) the price undertaking under the anti-dumping law as one of remedies 
has similar effects to the voluntary export restrictions, which are prohibited by 
safeguards; 4) the anti-dumping investigation process itself tends to curb competitive 
imports. This is because exporters bear significant legal and administrative costs and 
importers face the uncertainty of having to pay backdated anti-dumping duties, once 
an investigation is completed; 5) there is no rule against double jeopardy – if one 
petition against an exporter fails, minor re-specification generates a new valid 
petition. By all accounts, anti-dumping is a more problematically designed trade 
remedy measure. Its economics is ordinary protection; it excludes the domestic 
interests what will bear the costs; its unfair trade rhetoric undercuts rather than 
supports a policy of openness. Expressions of concern to modify the anti-dumping 
rules so as to restrain their use have been brought forward equally as the intense 
defences. Although anti-dumping, as well as CVD and safeguard measures were put 
into place in the negotiating mandate of the Doha Round, no progress has been made 
so far in these negotiations. 
All these facts have called the urgency to further strengthen the current trade 
                                                     
237 Ibid. 
238 Ibid. 
239 See “AD Initiations: By Exporting Country 01/01/95 - 30/06/10”, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_init_exp_country_e.pdf (visited in April 2011); “Countervailing 
Initiations: By Exporting Country 01/01/1995 – 30/06/2011”, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_init_exp_country_e.pdf; “Safeguard Initiations by Reporting 
Member – Period: 29/03/1995 to 31/10/2010” http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/safeg_e/safeg_stattab1_e.pdf 
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remedy rules in the WTO regime. They are also the reasons that more and more 
RTAs consider the preferential TRMs in their regional trade policies. While it is 
controversial on the reform of current trade remedy rules, these instruments simply 
present different ways of reaching a same goal – improvement of domestic 
producers’ competitive position against foreign exporters. Based on the discussion 
presented in this chapter, this research will make further comparison between trade 
remedy measures under the WTO regime with relevant approaches in RTAs, with the 
purpose to find out whether the preferential TRMs are more reasonable approaches 
that could reduce trade remedy actions and hence create a more competition-friendly 
environment for cross-border trade, or they are negative deviations that would harm 


























































Chapter 3 Trade Remedy Measures in the Regional 
Trade Agreements 
3.1 Introduction  
Under the WTO legal framework, RTAs are basically governed by Article XXIV 
of GATT 1994 and its supplement, the “Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XXIV of GATT 1994” (1994 Understanding). The objective of an RTA, 
which was indicated in the Preamble to the 1994 Understanding, is to contribute to 
the expansion of world trade by promoting closer integration between the economies 
of the parties to such agreements. Although the coverage and depth of preferential 
treatment amongst the member countries varies from one RTA to another, it has been 
noticed that, in general, modern RTAs tend to go far beyond WTO practices. In order 
to achieve deeper regional trade integration, they provided increasingly complex 
regulations and innovative mechanisms governing intra-trade. Some sophisticated 
RTAs even go beyond traditional trade policy mechanisms, to include regional rules 
on investment, competition, environmental protection, labour rights, etc.  
This tendency is also reflected in the area of trade remedy measures, i.e. anti-
dumping, countervailing duty measures and safeguards. Some RTAs have gone 
beyond the WTO by strengthening WTO rules to minimise the opportunity to use 
these measures in a protectionist manner, while other RTAs have completely 
eliminated the possibility of their use among participating countries. In the area of 
safeguards, some RTAs add new opportunities to use these measures.
240
 In brief, 
RTAs usually retain the possibility of using some of these measures based on the 
GATT/WTO regime, but in varying combinations. It is asserted that one of the 
reasons for diversity in the provisions is deemed to have been derived from the lack 
of a prescribed model with a consensus for the treatment of trade remedy measures in 
the RTAs.
241
 The rationales behind those strategies entail further analysis. More 
importantly, the innovative approaches on TRMs put in place through RTAs have 
brought many cases into the WTO dispute settlement forum. Almost all of the 
                                                     
240 OECD, “The Trade Relationship between Regional Trade Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System – 
Contingency Protection”, report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 06 
May, 2002 (TD/TC/WP(2002)20/FINAL), p 4.  
241 N Sagara, “Provisions for Trade Remedy Measures (Anti-dumping, Countervailing and Safeguard Measures) 
in Preferential Trade Agreements”, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 02-E-13, September 2002, p 32.  
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arguments have concentrated on the legality of those innovative approaches under 
the WTO framework. As with other unsettled issues in RTAs, this ambiguity not only 
makes international trade more complex, but also undermines the WTO’s 
transparency and predictability standards.  
In order to examine the TRM issues in RTAs, Chapter 3 is designed to go 
through these RTA-specific TRMs with the purpose to reveal the discrepancies 
between regional TRMs and the WTO TRMs and evaluate their potential influence 
on the regional trade and the trade with third-countries. Therefore, a comprehensive 
picture of current trade remedy approaches in RTAs is presented in this chapter, 
along with a comparative study with the WTO rules. Special attention is given to the 
RTAs, which eliminated TRMs between their member states, because of their 
significant deviation from the multilateral disciplines. In the meantime, considering 
many RTAs are facilitated with regional bodies, which are given a role to conduct 
investigations and/or review the final anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
determinations of national authorities, section 3.5 will address those special 
institutional mechanisms that apply to TRM issues in RTAs. 
The study in this chapter is mainly based on the legal text of selected regional 
trade agreements (see Annex 1). In a number of cases involving older RTAs or RTAs 
under planning, the study has also relied on decisions that were enacted subsequently 
after the RTA came into force or officially drafted agreements to establish the RTA. 
In addition, existing literature is considered to help understanding the context. Due to 
the great amount of RTAs under the WTO while the limited length of this thesis, the 
research will focus on those RTAs with representative approaches on trade remedy 
issues. 
 
3.2 Anti-dumping Measures in RTAs 
Anti-dumping actions started to gain popularity in the 1970s and soon after, anti-
dumping law became a hot topic in the study of international trade. Compared with 
the situation at the multilateral level, it is noted that RTA partners handle anti-
dumping measures much more carefully in bilateral trade. The consensus is using 






Generally there are three different approaches in RTAs on the application of anti-
dumping measures (see Table 4), i.e. maintenance of right to apply AD measure 
(category A), lesser use of AD measures (category B), and abolition of AD measures 
(category C). 
 
Table 4 Variances of Anti-dumping Measures in RTAs 
 
 






refer to WTO AD 
rules 
Dumped imports from RTA partner are 
completely subject to WTO AD rules 
US-Australia, US-Chile, US-Jordan, 
EC-Morocco,  EFTA-Egypt, Korea-
Chile, Japan-Singapore,  Mexico-Israel, 
New Zealand-Thailand 
B 




Dumped imports from RTA partner are 
subject to AD rules with higher threshold 
New Zealand-Singapore, US-CAFTA-
DR, Korea-Singapore, Canada-Costa 
Rica, Korea-EU 
C Abolish AD measures  
No AD measure is applicable on dumped 
imports from RTA partner (however, RTA 
partners are bound by common competition 
policy)  
EFTA, EEA, EFTA-Albania, EFTA-
Singapore, EFTA-Chile, ANZCERTA, 




3.2.1 Maintenance of Right to Apply Anti-Dumping Measures 
Of the RTAs observed in this research, more than half of them containing anti-
dumping provisions that make specific references to the GATT/WTO definition of 
dumping, and there is a clear tendency towards this in the post-1990 agreements. A 
greater proportion of RTAs require that appropriate measures to counteract dumping 
                                                     
242 For example, in the New Zealand-Singapore FTA (Article 9), the parties clearly expressed their desire to 
strength anti-dumping rules to bring greater discipline to AD investigations and minimise the opportunities to use 
anti-dumping in an arbitrary or protectionist manner.    
243 It is worth to note that, the provisions of anti-dumping in RTAs essentially amount to lex specialis to the 
corresponding provisions in the GATT/WTO. Thus, where a RTA has no anti-dumping provisions in their 
regional trade agreements, the WTO anti-dumping rules are assumed automatically apply if the members of those 
RTAs are also Members States of the WTO. Same rationale applies to similar situation refers to countervailing 
duties measures and safeguards.  
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be taken in accordance with the relevant GATT/WTO rules. Specific reference to the 
relevant GATT/WTO rules (e.g. on the definition of dumping and the protective 
measures to be taken) is much more prevalent in the FTAs than in CU.  
It was noted that, for example, the most US-related RTAs (e.g. US-Australia, 
US-Bahrain,  US-Chile, US-Jordan, US-Israel, US-Morocco, US-Singapore) have no 
specific provisions on anti-dumping. In the US-Singapore FTA, the provision on 
“Import and Export Restrictions” stipulates that:    
“1. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, a Party shall not adopt or 
maintain any prohibition or restriction on the importation of any good of the 
other Party or on the exportation or sale for export of any good destined for the 
territory of the other Party, except in accordance with Article XI of GATT 1994, 
including its interpretative notes, and to this end Article XI of GATT 1994, 
including its interpretative notes, is incorporated into and made a part of this 
Agreement. 
2. The Parties understand that the GATT 1994 rights and obligations 
incorporated by paragraph 1 prohibit, in any circumstances in which any other 
form of restriction is prohibited, export price requirements and, except as 
permitted in enforcement of countervailing and antidumping orders and 
undertakings, import price requirements.”
244
 
The bulk of these have been negotiated after NAFTA. One interpretation put 
forwarded on this is that the US wants to preserve its autonomy in applying its anti-
dumping procedures against RTA partners from the NAFTA experience.
245
  
Of course, same position is also taken in many other non-US-related RTAs, for 
example, the Canada-Israel FTA, EC-Chile FTA, EC-Morocco FTA, EFTA-Canada 
FTA, EFTA-Egypt FTA, Korea-Chile FTA, Japan-Singapore FTA, Mexico-Chile 
FTA, Mexico-Israel FTA, New Zealand-Thailand FTA, etc. In Japan-Singapore FTA, 
Article 14.5 explicitly provided that: 
“Nothing in this Article shall prevent a Party from imposing, at any time, on the 
importation of any goods of the other Party: 
                                                     
244 US-Singapore FTA, Article 2.7. 
245 R Teh, T J Prusa and M Budetta, “Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements”, Staff Working 




(b) any anti-dumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with the 
provisions of Article VI of GATT 1994, the Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in Annex 1A to the WTO 
Agreement; …” 
Over time, most of the RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO have not resulted in the 
elimination of the trade remedy protection (if this existed) and have not included a 
transition period during which this was to be achieved. Despite this, there has never 





3.2.2 Special Mechanism for Lesser Use of Anti-Dumping Measure    
Different with those RTAs which maintain anti-dumping measures follow strictly 
with the WTO general rules, many RTAs made special mechanisms on the anti-
dumping rules apply to imports from their RTA partners. In most cases, they did not 
provide an individual comprehensive framework on anti-dumping for intra-regional 
trade; instead, they introduced strengthened requirements and mild treatment on 
application of the anti-dumping measures based on the WTO Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. Those changes covered both substantive and procedural elements with 
the purpose of achieving lesser use of anti-dumping measures. 
 
1) Preferential dumping determination 
First of all, it is important to mention the changes on substantive requirements in 
dumping determination. In the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, it is prescribed that 
no anti-dumping measures should be applied where dumping margin is lower than 
2% or the injury margin is lower than 3%.
247
 These are the so-called “de minimis 
dumping margin” and “negligible injury result”. The agreement of CEP (Closer 
Economic Partnership) of New Zealand and Singapore agreed to strengthen the rule 
                                                     
246 This does not mean that anti-dumping, as well as other TRMs, are certainly allowed to exist in RTA. In fact, 
this issue was neither agreed among WTO negotiators nor clarified by the WTO adjudicating bodies so far. 
Therefore, it will be discussed in detail later in Chapter 4. 
247 Agreement on Anti-Dumping, Article 5.8. 
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to implement the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement in order to “bring greater 
disciplines to anti-dumping investigations and to minimize the opportunities to use 
anti-dumping in an arbitrary or protectionist manner”.
248
 Hence, the Agreement 
altered the substantial requirements of the anti-dumping rules in the WTO framework 
by increasing the de minimis dumping margin and the negligible injury threshold of 
the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement. The de minims dumping margin was raised from 
2% to 5% and the volume of dumped imports which shall normally be regarded as 
negligible increased from 3% to 5%.
249
 Apparently, anti-dumping actions will be 
reduced between Singapore and New Zealand by the uplifted thresholds. 
In the case of the Korea-Singapore FTA, preferential treatment in anti-dumping 
is reflected in the prohibition of “zeroing”. Pursuant to Article 6.2.3(a) of the Korea-
Singapore FTA, “when anti-dumping margins are established on the weighted 
average basis, all individual margins, whether positive or negative, should be 
counted toward the average”. Although the “zeroing” method in dumping calculation 
has been claimed inconsistent with the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement several times 
by WTO panels and the Appellate Body, it was constantly used by some WTO 
Members.
250
 Codification of the prohibition of “zeroing” in RTAs also strengthened 
WTO anti-dumping rules and prevented further disputes on this issue. 
Likewise, Article 2.8.1(h) of the Singapore-Jordan FTA provides that “in the 
conduct of investigations and reviews, the margin of dumping and the resulting 
dumping duty based on such margin shall be calculated by strict price comparison on 
the basis of transaction to transaction [“T-T”], and weighted average to weighted 
average [“W-W”], and not weighted-average price and individual price [“W-T”]”.  
This is in contrast to the WTO, where comparison between export price and the 
normal value on the basis of the W-T method is entirely permitted under the WTO 
Anti-dumping Agreement.
251
 However, in that case, dumping may be determined 
positive or the dumping margin may be exaggerated if the investigating authority 
makes its determination on arbitrarily selected transaction models. Therefore, 
prohibition of this method will significantly improve the fairness of the anti-dumping 
                                                     
248 New Zealand-Singapore CEP Agreement, Article 9.1. 
249 Ibid. 
250 See section 2.1.2 (1)(D) of this thesis. 





 This mechanism, however, is presently only available in the Singapore-
Jordan FTA. 
 
2) Preferential injury determination 
Lesser use of anti-dumping is reflected in the changes in injury determination as 
well. Pursuant to the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, where imports of a product 
from more than one country are simultaneously subject to anti-dumping 
investigations, the investigating authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of 
such imports.
253
 Nevertheless, Section 771(7)(G)(ii)(IV) of the US Tariff Act of 1930 
provides that, the US International Trade Commission (ITC) shall not cumulatively 
assess the volume and effect of imports under the WTO rules:  
“(III) from any country designated as a beneficiary country under the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (19 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.) for purposes 
of making a determination with respect to that country, except that the volume 
and effect of imports of the subject merchandise from such country may be 
cumulatively assessed with imports of the subject merchandise from any other 




(IV) from any country that is a party to an agreement with the United States 
establishing a free trade area, which entered into force and effect before January 
1, 1987, unless the Commission determines that a domestic industry is 
materially injured or threatened with material injury by reason of imports from 
that country.” 
Since the US-Israel FTA is the only FTA that entered into force and effect before 
January 1, 1987, “non-cumulation” was introduced into this agreement. Although the 
text of the US-Israel FTA did not explicitly stipulate this exception, the non-
cumulation requirement in Section 771(7)(G)(ii)(IV) of the US Tariff Act of 1930 
automatically applies. In the US-Central America-Dominican Republic FTA 
                                                     
252 For detail explanation and analysis of the “W-T” method for dumping calculation, see section 2.2.2 (1)(D) of 
this thesis. 
253 Agreement on Anti-Dumping, Article 3.3. 
254 The US – Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) is a non-reciprocal preferential agreements 
operated under a waiver from WTO rules and it is irrelevant to the CAFTA-DR FTA. However, In CAFTA-DR 
FTA, both parties agreed to treat each other as “beneficiary country” and refer their intra-regional anti-dumping 
measure to this provision.  
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(CAFTA-DR FTA), Article 8.8 confirms that in determining material injury for an 
anti-dumping action, the US shall “continue to treat each other Party as a 
‘beneficiary country’”, therefore not cumulatively assess the volume and effect of 
imports from Central America-Dominican Republic FTA.   
It was asserted that this so-called “non-cumulation” provision would 
substantially reduce the likelihood of injury determination because exportation from 
“beneficiary countries” is assessed separately from that of other countries (especially 
those export intensive countries such as China and India) in an anti-dumping 
investigation.
255
 Consequently, the imports of the “beneficiary countries” may not 
subject to anti-dumping measures though they are captured in an anti-dumping 
investigation at the initial stage.   
 
3) Preferential remedies 
Preferential treatment in anti-dumping remedies is also popular in RTAs. First of 
all, it reflects on the reduction of the duties. Since anti-dumping measures are aimed 
at eliminating certain unfair advantages the exporters gained from low priced imports, 
the amount of the price being undercut establishes a ceiling for the total amount of 
duties that can be levied on the entries of the subject products. WTO law encourages 
importing countries to apply lesser duty, if it would be adequate to remove the injury 
to the domestic industry, but it is not a legal obligation.
256
 Put differently, the 
importing countries can still charge higher duties than the necessary level if they 
wish to do so. In the Korea-EU FTA
257
, the Korea-Singapore FTA
258
 and the 
Singapore-Jordan FTA
259
, however, the “lesser duty rule” was officially codified. The 
RTA parties, when collecting the anti-dumping duties from the other side, must 
always stick to the least amount, as long as such amount is adequate to remove the 
injury to the domestic industry. Under this obligation, the complaining domestic 
industries can no longer pursue extra competitive advantages from anti-dumping 
measures, except for fair protection. At the same time, the exporters of the other RTA 
partner are assured to enjoy lowest barriers on the entry of the importing market even 
                                                     
255 See, D Ahn, “Foe or Friend of GATT Article XXIV: Diversity in Trade Remedy Rules”, J Intl’ Eco Law 11, 
No. 1 (2008), p 133.   
256 Agreement on Anti-Dumping, Article 9.1 
257 Korea-EU FTA, Article 3.14. 
258 Korea-Singapore FTA, Article 6.2.3(b). 
259 Singapore-Jordan FTA Article 2.8.1(g).  
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they were captured in anti-dumping cases.  
It is also typical that some RTAs reduced the time span on termination and/or 
review of anti-dumping duties, so that normal trading conditions can be restored in a 
shorter period. For example, the New Zealand-Singapore CEP Agreement and the 
MERCOSUR modified the period for termination and/or review of anti-dumping 
duties in WTO law by limiting the duration of anti-dumping duties to be undertaken 
for three, rather than the five years in WTO anti-dumping law.
260
 Under this 
circumstance, of course, the anti-dumping measure will be removed on importing 
products from RTA partners in much shorter period, while the imports from third-
parties may still face restrictions from the anti-dumping duties. Again, that would 
create discriminatory market access between the exporters of RTA members and the 
third-countries, and thus divert the importing source from third-countries. 
Additionally, pursuant to Article 3.11 of the Korea-EU FTA, for anti-dumping 
investigation on a good from the other party on which anti-dumping measures have 
been terminated in the previous 12 months as a result of review, pre-initiation 
examination must be undertaken “with special care”.
261
 Although there is no further 
explanation on what kind of “special care” will be enforced in practice, it indicates 
that the Korea or EU will place effort not to re-introduce anti-dumping measures on 
those imports. This is actually a mechanism to ensure less recurrence of anti-
dumping measures.  
   
4) “Public Interests” Clause 
It is well known that, although dumping and subsidization are unfair and harmful 
to the competitive industries in the importing country, the consumers and 
downstream industries may well benefited from those low priced imports. Therefore, 
taking the entire national welfare into account, not all dumping or subsidizations are 





, and the forthcoming EU-Columbia 
                                                     
260 New Zealand-Singapore CEP Agreement, Art 9:1(e); MERCOSUR, “Treaty Establishing a Common Market 
between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern 
Republic of Uruguay”, Art 4. 
261 Nevertheless, there was no further explanation on what “special care” exactly means. Therefore, such 
condition is not enforceable until further agreement is made between the Korea and EU. 
262 Canada-Costa Rica FTA, Article VII:1.2(a). 





 give the possibility to conduct a public interest test when applying 
anti-dumping measures.  
In the Canada-Costa Rica FTA, it was provided that: 
“In the interest of promoting improvements to, and clarifications of, the relevant 
provisions of the WTO Agreement the Parties recognise the desirability of: 
(a) establishing a domestic process whereby the investigating authorities can 
consider, in appropriate circumstances, broader issues of public interest, 
including the impact of antidumping duties on other sectors of the domestic 
economy and on competition; …” (emphasis added) 
In the Korea-EU FTA, provision is laid down simply as:  
“The Parties shall endeavor to consider the public interests before imposing an 
anti-dumping or countervailing duty.” (emphasis added) 
The softness of the wording (as highlighted) in above texts indicates that those 
requirements do not have any binding nature. Nonetheless, they clearly suggest the 
investigating authorities should balance the various interests at stake and examine the 
possible impact of the duties on the economic operators before imposing any 
measures. The consideration gives weight to the needs of commercial users and 
consumers who benefit from the imported goods and is very likely to reduce the 
initiation of anti-dumping measures in the RTA. 
 
3.2.3 Abolition of Anti-Dumping Measures in the RTAs 
In all RTAs observed in this research, nine of them entirely prohibited the use of 
anti-dumping measure in intra-regional trade, i.e., the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), the European Economic Area (EEA), EFTA-Albania FTA, 
EFTA-Singapore FTA, EFTA-Chile FTA, Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA), Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement 
(CCFTA), Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement between China-Hong Kong 
(China-Hong Kong CEPA) and China-Macao (China-Macao CEPA). Although these 
RTAs have different backgrounds and initiatives to take such strategy, the elimination 
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of anti-dumping measure often comes with an enforcement of common/harmonized 
competition rules. 
 
EFTA & EEA 
The EFTA is one of major regional groups in Western Europe, which was 
originally established based on the agreement signed in 1960 by Austria, Denmark, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. It is said to have 
been founded as a reaction to the creation of the EEC. A regional body – the EFTA 
Council – was established to supervise the agreement.  
At the initial stage of the EFTA, anti-dumping actions between member states 
remained possible. However, article 17 paragraph 2 of the EFTA Convention 
provided a boomerang clause for re-export of dumped goods free of charge. Under 
this clause,  
“Any products which have been exported from the territory of one Member State 
to the territory of another Member State and have not undergone any 
manufacturing process since exportation shall, when reimported into the 
territory of the first Member State, be admitted free of quantitative restrictions 
and measures with equivalent effect. They shall also be admitted free of customs 
duties and charges with equivalent effect …”
265
  
In economic theory, trans-border price discrimination, i.e., dumping, is not 
possible unless there is a market segmentation based on such factors as tariffs and 
transport costs that prevent price equalizing arbitrage.
266
 Accordingly, tariff 
elimination under the RTA will reduce (but not eliminate) the ability of firms to 
dump and the need for relief traditionally provided under the anti-dumping laws. In 
the EFTA where member countries are geographically close to each other (which is 
another element forecloses market segmentation), dumping is very likely diminished. 
Thus, the boomerang clause can be seen as a provision that reduces anti-dumping 
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there are two separate markets. The separation can be social, geographical, cultural or legal; and (2) One market 
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Marceau, Anti-dumping and Antitrust Issues in Free Trade Areas, (Clarendon Press 1994), p 12. 
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measures in the EFTA. 
In the meantime, anti-competitive practices were prohibited under the EFTA 
Convention (Article 15), but the states were still the only entities responsible for the 
implementation of Article 15. The EFTA Council did not have any power to conduct 
regional competition issues. The cross-border anti-competitive issues remained on a 
diplomatic level. In 1966, the EFTA countries agreed to notify and consult each other 
when introducing anti-dumping measures and when changing their own legislation 
on anti-dumping. Since then, anti-dumping issues as well as other unfair practices 
could be discussed in the EFTA Council.  
The reason for the success of the EFTA Council in dealing with anti-dumping 
and competition issues is regarded as the equal economic power of the EFTA 
members. Similar process contained in the bilateral free-trade agreements between 
the EEC and EFTA counties turned out to be inefficient.
267
  
With the purpose to solve wider economic integration in Western Europe, 
individual bilateral free-trade agreements were signed between the EEC and the six 
EFTA countries in 1972. After the United Kingdom and Denmark left the EFTA to 
join the EEC, an FTA agreement between EEC countries and the EFTA countries 
(Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, except for Switzerland
268
) was concluded in 
1992. It is the so-called European Economic Area (EEA) agreement. 
In EEA territory, not only trade in goods and services but also mobility of 
humans and capital, has been comprehensively liberalized. Between the EU and the 
EFTA, the preceding FTA to abolish the tariffs for industrial goods was already 
agreed upon in 1972. One of the targets of the EFTA for the formation of the EEA 
was abolition of anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures, in order to realize a 
more stable European market without the threat of those measures being imposed. 
In order to adjust itself for the preceding events of the EEA agreement with the 
EU in 1992 and the bilateral FTA between Switzerland and the EU in 1999, the 
EFTA had a major amendment in 1999. At the time of this agreement, the EFTA 
explicitly abolished anti-dumping and countervailing measures for intra-trade 
(Article 36 and 16 of the EFTA Convention). By that time, on a few occasions when 
unfair trading practices arose across the EFTA countries, bilateral negotiation solved 
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However, the elimination of trade remedy measures between the EU and EFTA 
was made conditional on the EFTA’s full acceptance of the acquis communautaire, 
which is perceived as the total body of EU law accumulated this far, including all the 
treaties, regulations and directives passed by the European institutions, as well as 
judgments laid down by the European Court of Justice. This approach is noted as a 
remarkable feature of the EEA agreement as well as the EU Enlargement agreements, 
perhaps because the EU is economically much stronger than any of those counties, 
and also because some EFTA members and the EU Enlargement candidate countries 
had been seeking full membership of the EU.   
Due to the formation of the EEA, the EFTA accepted the majority of acquis 
communautaire of the EU, and shares common rules of competition policies and 
state aid policies. Nevertheless, it did not accept the EU Common Agricultural 
Policies and the Common Fisheries Policies. As consequence, Article 26 of the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area stipulates the non-application of anti-
dumping and countervailing measures. However, Protocol 13 on the Non-
Application of Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures states that the coverage 
of non-application is limited to where Community acquis is fully integrated. This 
means that the agricultural sector is not included, and that, when avoiding 
circumvention, anti-dumping and countervailing measures can still be applied.  
 
ANZCERTA (Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement) 
The ANZCERTA came into effect in 1983 with the initial prospect of 
progressively reducing and eliminating trans-Tasman trade barriers in respect of 
goods. The objectives of the Agreement, according to Article 1, are “to strengthen the 
broader relationship between Australia and New Zealand; to develop closer 
economic relations between Australia and New Zealand through mutually beneficial 
expansion of free trade between the two countries; to eliminate barriers to trade 
between Australia and New Zealand in a gradual and progressive manner under an 
agreed timetable and with minimum of disruption and; to develop trade between 
New Zealand and Australia under conditions of fair competition.” The preamble of 
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the Agreement indicates the member states’ “commitment to an outward looking 
approach to trade”, and their belief that “a closer economic relationship will lead to a 
more effective use of resources and an increased capacity to contribute to the 
development of the region through closer economic and trading links with other 
countries, particularly those of South Pacific and South East Asia”.  
At the initial stage of ANZCERTA, anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
measures were included as principle operative provisions of the Agreement. Article 
15 of the Agreement proceeds on the following understanding: 
“Dumping, by which goods are exported from the territory of a Member State 
into the territory of the other Member State at less than their normal value, that 
causes material injury or threatens to cause material injury to an established 
industry or material retards the establishment of an industry in the territory of 




Paragraph 2 of the Article provides that each member of the ANZERTA could 
levy anti-dumping duties in respect of goods imported from the territory of the other 
Member State if it had determined that there was dumping, material injury (including 
threatened material injury to an established domestic industry), and a causal link 
between the dumped goods and the injury, and if it had afforded the other Member 
State the opportunity for consultations. Provisional measures, including the taking of 
securities, could be implemented in appropriate circumstances for up to six month.
271
 
Notably, ANZCERTA codified an optional anti-dumping action in the WTO Anti-
Dumping Agreement, i.e., anti-dumping on behalf of third-country
272
, between 
Australia and New Zealand. Pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article 15, upon the request 
of one party, the other party must take action if it appears that goods are being 
dumped in the territory of the other party by a non-ANZCERTA country, and that 
dumping is causing material injury (or threatening thereof) to an industry located in 
the first party. Such obligation demonstrates the strong responsibility of both parties 
to look after their entire regional industries on anti-dumping issues. 
Five years later, in 1988, both parties of ANZCERTA launched a general review 
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of the Agreement and took significant steps toward the integration of the trans-
Tasman trade. The centrepiece of this review was a Protocol on Acceleration of Free 
Trade in Goods (“1988 Protocol”) signed by both parties, in which the decision was 
made to eliminate the anti-dumping measure for trans-Tasman trade and to rely 
instead on protection against predatory trading practices through harmonized 
competition provisions from mid-1990s.  
Article 4 of the 1988 Protocol declared Article 15 anti-dumping provisions of the 
original ANZCERTA were now superseded, apart from the text relating to dumping 
by third countries in the territory of one Member State causing injury to an industry 
in the territory of the other Member State being intact. At the same time, it ordered 
that current investigations were to be terminated, and securities and undertaking were 
to be released from the same date. 
The reason for such a decision is clearly presented by the preamble to the 1988 
Protocol – the parties believe that the maintenance of anti-dumping provisions in 
respect of goods originating in the other Member States “cease to be appropriate as 
the Member States move towards the achievement of full free trade in goods between 
them and a more integrated market.”  
This general understanding was further explained by Graham and Richardson, 
indicating that,  
“In making this decision to abolish anti-dumping within the CER, the Australian 
and New Zealand governments recognized that... [At first,] different thresholds 
for establishing dumping and applying competition-law remedies between the 
two countries – significantly lower in the case of dumping – would have 
maintained protection for relatively inefficient sectors in the open trans-Tasman 
market and therefore hampered the efficient allocation of resources [and their 
efforts to promote competitiveness of the region in global market]... [Second, to 
maintain the anti-dumping measure] would have required a bigger bureaucracy, 
which itself would have spawned private-sector operations to service anti-
dumping investigations, which would be costly to both countries... [Third,] both 
governments believed that the removal of trade barriers would make the resort to 
anti-dumping action increasingly redundant, as the scope for price 
discrimination between the domestic and export market decreased and the threat 
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of cross-Tasman retaliation by competitors increased, with the possible 
occurrence of arbitrage... [Moreover,] maintaining anti-dumping remedies risked 
continuing prolonged disputes at an official level (as well as the commercial 
level), which neither government wanted.”
273
  
In brief, it was considered that, as of 1 July 1990, trans-Tasman trade was in the 
nature of domestic rather than international commerce. Therefore the operations of 
anti-dumping as a remedy to reduce distortion in the pattern of international trade 
were no longer suitable for trans-Tasman trade.
274
 At the same time, safeguards 
measures, export subsidies or export incentives on goods traded were no longer 
available in the area, despite the old rules on countervailing duty measures being 
intact. 
In the same Protocol, Paragraph 4 stipulates a crucial obligation that both 
countries extend the application of their respective competition law prohibitions on 
the misuse of market power to the trans-Tasman markets by stating that:  
“[e]ach Member State shall take such actions as are appropriate to achieve the 
application of its competition law by 1 July 1990 to [relevant anti-competitive 
conduct affecting trans-Tasman trade in goods] in a manner consistent with the 
principles and objectives of the Agreement.”  
It was regarded that, such obligation exactly arose from the abandoning of the 
anti-dumping remedy in ANZCERTA.
275
  
To fulfil this requirement, Australia introduced Trade Practices (Misuse of Trans-
Tasman Market Power) Act 1990 as a part of section 46A of the Trade Practices Act 
1974. The corresponding New Zealand provision is section 36A of the Commerce 
Act 1966. The doctrine of both provisions is that a corporation (“person”, under New 
Zealand legislation) that has a substantial degree of a market power (“a dominant 
position”, under the New Zealand legislation) in a trans-Tasman market shall not take 
advantage of (“use”, under the New Zealand legislation) that power or position to 
distort the orderly competitive market.  
                                                     
273 E M Graham and J D Richardson, Global Competition Policies, (Institute for International Economics, U.S., 
1995), p 399. 
274 P Prove, “The Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement” (1995) 1(1) 
International Trade and Business Law 113.  
275 K M Vautier, J A Farmer and R Baxt (eds),  CER and business competition: Australia and New Zealand in a 
global economy (Commerce Clearing House New Zealand 1990). 
127 
 
Developing the elements of the agreement was made easier by the fact that there 
was already a significant level of compatibility between the competition laws of 
Australia and New Zealand. New Zealand had closely modelled the competition-law 
provisions of its Commerce Act of 1986 on those of part 4 of the Australian Trade 
Practices Act of 1974. Although slightly differences existed between the two 
countries’ new laws covering trans-Tasman trade, a number of further changes were 
made to enable the new provisions to operate effectively. 
The ANZCERTA is an exponent of eliminating anti-dumping measures and 
applying domestic competition laws to the territory traditionally covered by anti-
dumping. However, similar initiatives are very rare in other regional trade 
agreements. It was emphasised by Peter Prove that the Australia-New Zealand 
initiatives were greatly facilitated by the close historical associations of the two 
countries and their mutual confidence in each other’s judicial and administrative 





Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) 
The CCFTA came into force on 5 July 1997 was intended to facilitate and to 
promote the accession of Chile to the NAFTA.
277
 One important area in which the 
CCFTA surpasses the achievement of the NAFTA parties to date is in trade remedies. 
In introducing legislation to give effect to this, the Canadian government expressed 
the hope that this might eventually create a precedent for the elimination of anti-
dumping in NAFTA. The elimination of anti-dumping provision is consistent with 
the Canadian trade position in Canada-United States Free trade Agreement (CUFTA) 
negotiations. 
In the CCFTA, a mutual exemption from the application of anti-dumping laws 
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was agreed upon between Canada and Chile as following:
278
   
Article M-01: Reciprocal Exemption from the Application of Anti-dumping 
Duty Laws 
1. Subject to Article M-03, as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement 
each Party agrees not to apply its domestic anti-dumping law to goods of the 
other Party. Specifically: 
(a) neither Party shall initiate any anti-dumping investigations or review with 
respect to goods of the other Party; 
(b) each Party shall terminate any ongoing anti-dumping investigations or 
inquiries in respect of such goods; 
(c) neither Party shall impose new anti-dumping duties or other measures in 
respect of such goods; and 
(d) each Party shall revoke all existing orders levying anti-dumping duties in 
respect of such goods. 
Article M-03 is a phase-in provision requiring that, for each good, the exemption 
will take effect as of the final elimination of import duties in both parties for that 
good at the tariff subheading level, or on January 1, 2003, whichever comes first. 
Regarding “exceptional circumstances that may arise with respect to the operation of 
[the trade remedies] Chapter”, the Agreement provides that, either party may request 




To ensure that the benefits of the CCFTA were not undermined by private 
barriers to trade, the parties also agreed upon provisions on competition policy and 
cooperation in Article J-01.  
Unlike the Australia-New Zealand CER, the CCFTA does not require either party 
to align their competition laws to each other. Instead, the agreement provides very 
general obligations relating to cooperation in the issues of competition law 
enforcement policy. The CCFTA obligates the parties to maintain measures 
prescribing anti-competitive business conduct, and to take appropriate enforcement 
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 In addition, the Agreement requires the parties to consult from time to time 
about the effectiveness of their competition laws and to cooperate in the enforcement 
of competition laws in the free trade area.
281
 The CCFTA did not require the 
establishment of a competition authority as both sides already had one. Nonetheless, 
each party is obliged to designate a contact point to facilitate communication 




In 2001, the competition authorities of both countries signed a more detailed 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), thus formalising the obligations of Article 
J-01of the CCFTA while reducing the effect of potential differences in the 
application of their relevant laws.
283
 The MOU provides for inter alia notification of 
the enforcement activities that may affect the other party’s interest in the application 
of its competition law,
284
 cooperation and coordination,
285
 avoidance of conflicts 
procedure,
286
 and the holding of meetings of competition officials.
287
 Thus it was 
commented that the CCFTA is a typical example of an FTA that eliminates anti-




The Elimination of Anti-Dumping Measures in Additional RTAs  







 also eliminated anti-dumping measures. For example, 
Article 16 of the EFTA-Singapore FTA provides that: 
“1. A Party shall not apply anti-dumping measures as provided for under the 
WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 in relation 
to products originating in another Party.  
2. In order to prevent dumping, the Parties shall undertake the necessary 
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measures as provided for under Chapter V.” 
Other than above mentioned RTAs that eliminated anti-dumping in intra-regional 
trade, some RTAs have also expressed their wishes to abolish the anti-dumping in 
intra-regional trade and placed this conception on agenda. Nevertheless, for a variety 
of reasons, they still maintain anti-dumping measures at present. For example, the 
Free Trade Agreement between Chile and Mexico (Chile-Mexico FTA) records that 
“the Parties undertake to begin negotiations as from the second year following the 
Agreement’s entry into force with a view to the reciprocal elimination of anti-
dumping duties”,
292
 although no conclusion has been made so far. In US-Australia 
FTA, the agreement does not abolish the anti-dumping duties for bilateral trade 
directly. However, unfair trading practices are also regulated by the competition 
policies provided in that agreement.
293
 The anti-dumping measures will perhaps be 
phased-out with the completion of the integration/harmonization of competition 
policies in both countries. The Common Market of Southern Cone (Mercado 
Commun del Sur – MERCOSUR) also contains a proposal for their gradual 
elimination from intra-zone trade before then end of 2001.
294
 Nevertheless, 
subsequent decisions have extended this deadline.  
 
3.2.4 Potential Trade Diversion Effect of the Preferential Anti-
dumping Measures in RTAs 
As discussed in chapter 2, anti-dumping rules are highly technical, containing 
numerous minor points to affect final determination. Therefore, success or failure of 
anti-dumping cases may well turn on technical matters. It has been noticed that 
existing RTAs adopted diverse methods to reduce anti-dumping measures in intra-
regional trade. It is quite clear that strengthened rules on anti-dumping in RTAs can 
largely reduce the import restrictions between RTA partners. However, the impact on 
third-countries is also worth observation.  
In a recent research, Dukgeun Ahn established a particular example to illustrate 
his concern on potential trade diversion effect with regard to the obligatory “lesser 
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duty” rule agreed upon in RTAs.
295
   
 
 
Figure 4. Trade diversion case by preferential anti-dumping action (this figure 
is also taken from Dukgeun Ahn’s work) 
“Suppose that Country I imports a gadget from three WTO Members, 
A, B, and C when the domestic market price is $ 100. Export prices and 
normal values for each Member are as shown in Figure 4, indicating that all 
exporters are currently engaged in dumping exportation. In a normal situation 
without applying a lesser duty rule, Country I would impose anti-dumping 
duties of $ 30, $ 30 and $ 40 for Country A, B, and C, respectively, to make 
up for the dumping margins that are the difference between normal values 
and export prices. The competitive conditions among exporters are restored 
with anti-dumping duties that make normal values actual competition prices 
in Country I. 
But suppose that Countries I and A established an FTA arrangement in 
which both countries agree on a lesser duty rule. In that case, Country I can 
impose the anti-dumping duty of only $ 10 to address the injury margin, not 
the dumping margin of $ 30, against Country A. So, the market price – 
including anti-dumping duty – for gadgets from A in Country I would be 
$ 100, whereas the prices for B and C be $ 110. Therefore, the preferential 
anti-dumping system under the FTA can also seriously distort competitive 
conditions among competitors, causing potentially substantial adverse effects 
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Price = $ 100 
A: Normal Value = $ 120 
Export Price = $ 90 
B: Normal Value = $ 110 
Export Price = $ 80 
C: Normal Value = $ 110 
Export Price = $ 70 
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on non-party countries.” 
It shows the fact that the preferential treatment in anti-dumping duty collection 
within the RTA has a direct impact on the imports price competition. If the demand 
for certain products in a domestic market is stable, applying lower duty to the 
imports from RTA partners would undoubtedly offer an opportunity to the firms of 
RTA partners to lower the exporting price of the products and therefore it would be 
easier for them to gain more market share, at the expense of the market share 
maintained by the imports from third-parties. This would result in increased barriers 
of market access for the imports from third-parties. Dukgeun Ahn stressed that, 
considering the fact that competitive conditions among exporters critically hinge on 
relative competitive advantages, distortion caused by preferential trade remedy 
systems may have considerable economic implication in a real economy.
296
 
The non-cumulation method in injury determination of an anti-dumping case (as 
provided in the US-Israel FTA), on the other hand, may be regarded as a parallel 
provision of selective safeguard application in the anti-dumping system. When an 
import from an RTA party is separated from – i.e. not cumulated on – other countries’ 
exportation for the purpose of injury determination, the RTA party is very likely to be 
exempted from the coverage of anti-dumping action since injury determination 
regarding imports from the RTA party tends to be negative, especially in the case of 
small exporters. Unlike the special treatment in terms of dumping margin calculation 
that normally works to reduce anti-dumping duties, a non-cumulation provision 
affecting injury determination is much more inclined to completely exclude RTA 
parties from anti-dumping actions. Then, exactly like selective safeguard application 
cases, trade diversion in favour of RTA parties may become more serious under a 
systemically created preferential system for anti-dumping measures. Nevertheless, 
whether these preferential treatments are consistent with the relevant WTO rules is so 
far unclear. 
 
3.3 Countervailing Duty Measures in RTAs 
Under multilateral rules, countervailing duties can be levied on imports which 
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benefit from subsidies if they cause or threaten material injury to an established 
domestic industry, or are such as to retard materially the establishment of a domestic 
industry. Similar to anti-dumping in RTAs, three approaches are found in the case of 
countervailing duty measures, i.e. 1) retain the right to apply a countervailing duty 
measure; 2) establish some kind of mechanism to make lesser use of the measure 
while maintaining the right to apply; or 3) abolish the application of the measure.  
In the RTAs observed by this research, the great majority either have no CVD 
provisions or clearly maintain the right to apply WTO CVD measures among the 
parties (see Table 5, category A and B). Only four RTAs abolished the CVD, namely 
China-Hong Kong, China-Macao, the EEA and the EFTA (in the EEA and EFTA, 
abolition of CVD measure does not extend to agricultural and fishery products) (see 
Table 5, category F). Only the Korea-EU FTA and the EU-Columbia-Peru FTA 
provide substantive preferential treatment on CVD with a “public interests” clause 
and codification of “lesser duty” rules on application of the measures (see Table 5, 
category D). The remaining RTAs may be classified as those containing certain 
special conditions different from the WTO rules primarily because they have regional 
bodies to conduct CVD investigations or have the power to review and remand final 
CVD determinations. Therefore, maintenance of the WTO CVD measure in intra-
regional trade is the main trend in existing RTAs. 
What makes the variance of RTA-specific CVD measures different from AD is 
that the CVD measure responds to subsidy – a governmental practice that is also 
subject to multilateral or bilateral disciplines. Accordingly, adoption of the CVD 
measure in a RTA usually hinges on the presence of a common policy/programme on 
subsidies or any additional disciplines that are imposed on the use of subsidies and 
state aid. Such relation was succinctly explained in 2007 WTO Working Paper that,   
“If the RTA members have a common policy on subsidies or state aid, they may 
be able to dispense with the use of countervailing duties. Alternatively, if the 
RTA members are able to agree on additional disciplines that apply to subsidies 
or state aid, then it may be possible to limit the application of countervailing 
duties in the RTA. But absent a common subsidy policy or additional disciplines 
on subsidies, it is unlikely for the provisions governing countervailing duties in 
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the RTA to depart from multilateral rules or practice.”
297
 
The difficulty in agreeing reduction or elimination of subsidies in RTA 
negotiations lies in the fact that part of the trade benefits from that will be captured 
by non-members. That the only meaningful negotiation on further reduction in 
agricultural subsidies is occurring at the multilateral level may explain WTO 
Members’ reluctance to give away such a ‘freebie’ and thus they haven’t put subsidy 
programmes on the table in their RTA negotiations. As consequence, CVD measures 
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3.3.1 Maintenance of Right to Apply CVD measures  
Regarding maintenance of the right to apply CVD measures in a RTA, a typical 
example may be demonstrated by the relevant provision in the EU-Mexico FTA, a 
FTA that maintains both WTO anti-dumping and CVD measures. The Community 
and Mexico confirm their rights and obligations arising from the WTO Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Implementation of Article 




In the New Zealand-Singapore FTA, the relevant text is laid down as: 
“1. The Parties agree to prohibit export subsidies on all goods including 
agricultural products. 
2.  If either Party grants or maintains any subsidy which operates to 
increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, 
its territory, it shall notify the other Party of the extent and nature of the 
subsidisation, of the estimated effect of the subsidisation on the quantity of the 
affected product or products imported into or exported from its territory and of 
the circumstances making the subsidisation necessary. In any case in which it is 
determined that serious prejudice to the interests of the other Party is caused or 
threatened by any subsidisation, the Party granting the subsidy shall, upon 
request, discuss with the other Party the possibility of limiting the subsidisation.  
This paragraph shall be applied in conjunction with the relevant applicable 
provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) 
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and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (WTO 
SCM Agreement). 
3.  The Parties reaffirm their commitment to abide by the provisions of the 
WTO SCM Agreement in respect of actionable subsidies. 
4.  Each Party shall seek to avoid causing adverse effects to the interests of 
the other Party in terms of Article 5 of the WTO SCM Agreement.”
300
 
Although this provision adds an additional obligation on prohibition of export 
subsidies on agriculture products, it virtually adheres to the WTO CVD rules.   
As mentioned in section 3.2.3, the Canada-Chile FTA and the ANZCERTA are 
two RTAs that have eliminated anti-dumping measures in their regional trade. 
Nonetheless, such elimination does not extend to the WTO CVD measures.
301
 A 
party will still have recourse to countervailing duties as permitted under the WTO if 
its domestic industry is injured, or threatened with injury, by subsidized imports from 
the other party. 
 
3.3.2 Special Mechanism for Lesser Use of CVD Measure 
Under WTO law, imposition of CVD measures is subject to a number of 
disciplines. The substantive requirements include determination of subsidy, 
determination of injury and determination of appropriate remedies; the procedural 
requirements include the requirement on initiation, consultation, investigation, 
evidence, retroactivity, duration, review and transparency.
302
 In common with AD, 
those RTAs that having special mechanism of CVD measures generally accept the 
definition of subsidy under the WTO rules, pattern regional CVD regimes after the 
SCM Agreement and contain special conditions that aim to reduce the application of 
CVD measures. However, unlike AD, in those cases that existing RTAs altered the 
WTO rules in diverse aspects, most RTAs only contain a special institutional 
mechanism, e.g. the existence of regional bodies, with regard to the CVD measure.  
Nonetheless, because of the close relationship between CVD measures and 
subsidy policies, the establishment of common policy or additional disciplines on 
                                                     
300 New Zealand-Singapore FTA, Article 7. 
301 Canada-Chile FTA, Article M-01 to M-08; ANZCERTA, Article 16. 
302 See section 2.3 of this thesis. 
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subsidies or state aid in RTAs forms a unique mechanism that reduces or replaces the 
use of CVD measure. Therefore, it will be included in the discussion below. 
 
1) Special conditions in RTA-specific CVD rules 
In the RTAs observed in this research, only the Korea-EU FTA and the EU-
Columbia-Peru FTA provide substantive preferential treatment on CVD: one 
condition put forward is a “public interests” consideration on application of a CVD 
measure, the other is a “lesser duty” clause in respect of the collection of 
countervailing duties. 
In EU-Colombia-Peru FTA, Article 39 provides that, with regard to anti-
dumping and CVD measures, 
“[i]n accordance with their domestic law, the EU and Colombia shall provide the 
opportunity for industrial users and importers of the product under investigation, 
as well as for representative consumer organisations, as appropriate, to provide 
information which is relevant to the investigation. Such information shall be 
taken into account by the investigating authority, to the extent that it is relevant, 
duly supported by evidence and filed within the time limits specified in the 
domestic law.” 
Pursuant to this “pubic interests” provision, the investigating authorities are 
responsible to not only take account of the losses of industries who are suffering 
from the subsidised imports, but also to take care of the needs of commercial users 
and consumers who benefit from the subsidised goods. Therefore, it is likely to 
reduce the initiation of CVD measures in the RTA. 
Similar to anti-dumping measures, countervailing duty measures are aimed at 
eliminating certain unfair advantages the exporters gained from government 
subsidies, thus the amount of the subsidy paid establishes a ceiling for the total 
amount of duties that can be levied on entries of the subject products. WTO law also 
encourages importing countries to apply lesser duty, if it would be adequate to 
remove the injury to the domestic industry, but, as with the AD rule, it is not a legal 
obligation.
303
 Therefore, the importing countries can still charge higher duties than 
the necessary level if they wish to do so. In the Korea-EU FTA and the EU-
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Columbia-Peru FTA, however, the “lesser duty rule” was officially codified.
304
 For 
example, Article 40 of the EU-Columbia-Peru FTA provides that,  
“Notwithstanding their rights under the Anti-dumping Agreement and the 
Subsidies Agreement as regards the application of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties, the EU and Colombia consider it desirable that duty 
applied be less than the corresponding margin of dumping or subsidy, as 
appropriate, if the lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the 
domestic industry.” 
Accordingly, the investigating authorities, when collecting the countervailing 
duties from the other side, are very likely to apply the least amount, as long as such 
an amount is adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry. The “lesser 
duty” rule on CVD measures ensures the countervailing duties are not abused, unless 
it is “necessary” to remedy the adverse effect caused by the subsidies at issue.  
 
2) Common policy or additional disciplines on subsidy/state aid in RTAs 
In section 3.2.3, it was noted that the ANZCERTA is perhaps the FTA that has 
gone the farthest in regional integration; most border measures have already been 
eliminated in the Trans-Tasman trade. Such elimination however does not extend to 
the CVD measures. Instead, the ANZCERTA includes disciplines on subsidies that 
are stronger than those contained in the WTO rules.  
In the ANZCERTA, all export subsidies were eliminated in internal trade by 
1987. Regarding domestic support, following the first five-yearly General Review of 
the ANZCERTA in 1988, the two members signed an Agreed Minute on Industry 
Assistance agreeing not to pay (from July 1990) production bounties or similar 
measures on goods exported to the other member and undertook to attempt to avoid 
the adoption of industry-specific measures (bounties, subsidies and other financial 
support) that have adverse effects on competition within the FTA. Following the 
second five-yearly General Review in 1992, this was strengthened by an agreement 
that each member would also give due consideration to representations from the 
other member on the effect that industry-specific, non-financial assistance may have 
on competition within the FTA. These measures have gone a long way towards the 
                                                     
304 Korea-EU FTA, Article 3.14; EU-Colombia-Peru FTA, Article 40. 
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elimination of subsidy-related trade distortions of all forms, a unique 
accomplishment among RTAs.
305
 As consequence, CVD measures have never been 
used since the ANZCERTA came into effect. 
The Korea-EU FTA and the EFTA-Israel FTA are two RTAs that provided 
additional disciplines on subsidy. 
The Korea-EU-FTA builds on the notion of a subsidy according to the relevant 
WTO rules; however, it introduced two additional types of prohibited subsidies – 
unlimited guarantee on debts and subsidies for ailing companies without a credible 
restructuring plan.
306
 Highlight on these two forms of subsidies derives from the EU 
state aid rules, in which they are identified as the most distortive subsidies to trade. 
Accordingly, first, the parties cannot therefore guarantee the debts or liabilities 
of certain enterprises without any limitation. The added value lies in the fact that an 
unlimited guarantee of this type, which would amount to a highly distortive 
permanent operating aid, would breach the agreement. Second, the parties can only 
grant support to ailing companies if they present a reasonable restructuring plan that 
ensures long-term viability and contribute themselves to the costs of restructuring. 
This provision transposes the centerpiece of the EU’s state aid rules
307
 into this 
bilateral agreement, and ensures that ailing companies are not artificially kept alive 
through public subsidies alone. This will increase the chances of efficient companies 
on both sides expanding their market shares at the cost of firms with unviable 
business models. 
From the legal perspective, this provision is distinguishable from the prohibited 
subsidy rules of the WTO SCM Agreement.  
First, specific subsidies to enterprise, especially when in financial distress, are 
explicitly highlighted as prohibited subsidies. In other words, the subsidies are 
disciplines based on the nature of the recipients. This is contrast with the WTO law 
that prohibits the subsidies based on use of subsidies – contingency in export 
performance or import substitution.  
Second, unlike the prohibited subsidy rules under the WTO SCM Agreement, 
                                                     
305 OECD, The Relationship between Regional Trade Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System (OECD 
2002), pp 11-12. 
306 Korea-EU FTA, Article 11.11. 
307 See EC Commission, “Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty”, 
Official Journal C 244, 01.10.2004, pp 2-17. 
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the provision requires the injury condition, i.e., “adverse effect” to trade of the other 
party that is a legal element for actionable subsidies in the SCM Agreement. In this 
sense, this provision is not a serious modification of the WTO rules. In fact, it is 
tantamount to the clarification of the SCM Agreement, because FTA parties would be 
able to rely on the WTO rules to prohibit those subsidies essentially under the same 
legal conditions. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that Korea and the EU – both among 
the most frequent targets of the SCM Agreement – have tried to agree on more 
stringent subsidy disciplines. Of course, if both parties adhere to this additional 
subsidy discipline, no corresponding CVD measures will be triggered between Korea 
and the EU. 
Contrary to the Korea-EU FTA, the common state aid policy provided by the 
EFTA-Israel FTA aims to exclude certain types of subsidies from the CVD measures. 
In other words, the FTA opts certain types of subsidies as “non-actionable subsidies”, 
a category which currently has not been agreed upon at the multilateral level.
308
  
In the EFTA-Israel, subsidy and CVD matters are governed by Article 18, 
providing that: 
“Any aid granted by a Party or through State resources in any form whatsoever 
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it may affect 
trade between an EFTA State and Israel, be incompatible with the proper 
functioning of this Agreement.” 
In addition, Annex VI of the FTA contains criteria for assessment of the state aid 
referred in Article 18, Annex VII provides the transparency requirement of state aid 
measures and Article 23 of the FTA lays down the procedures with regard to 
correspondent measures that a FTA party can counteract the state aid in the sense of 
Article 18. 
Pursuant to Annex VI (a), the state aid is classified as those measures “which 
result in a net transfer of funds from State sources to the recipient through direct 
subsidies or which result in tax revenues foregone through tax concession”; “aid 
granted under schemes which are fully paid for by the beneficiaries are not State aid 
in the sense of Article 18”. Consequently, four types of subsidies listed in Annex VI 
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(b) are regarded as falling outside the scope of the state aid in the sense of Article 18 
and thus are not subject to the CVD measure in the EFTA-Israel FTA: 
(i) credits and loans from State sources or agencies, if the interest and capital 
repayments are in accordance with current international market conditions; 
(ii) guarantees given by State or State agencies, if the premiums cover the 
long-term cost of the scheme; 
(iii) equity injections by State or State agencies if the rate of return on such 
investment can reasonably be expected to be at least equal to the cost of 
State borrowing; 
(iv) tax measures including social security charges that are part of the general 
national income norm for tax purposes, available to all enterprises, and 
uniformly applied in a country. 
Moreover, ten types of subsidies listed in Annex VI (c) are regarded as fully 
consistent with Article 18, which include: 
(i) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided 
that such aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the 
products concerned; 
(ii) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional 
occurences; 
(iii) aid to research, development and innovation; 
(iv) aid given to sectors with problems of overcapacity to rationalize the 
structure of industry by ensuring an orderly downscaling of production 
and employment; 
(v) general aid to export promotion such as national weeks, store promotion, 
industrial fairs, provided that such aid is not company-specific; 
(vi) regional development aid to the extent that it does not interfere with 
conditions of fair competition;  
(vii) the aid in form of general public services to trade and industry on terms 
and conditions not favouring certain sectors and enterprises;  
(viii) general aid for the creation of new employment opportunities provided 
such jobs are not in sectors already suffering from overcapacity;  
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(ix) environmental aid; 
(x) aid to small and medium-sized enterprises is intended to offset 
disadvantages directly linked to the size of the firm in question. 
Under WTO law, some subsidies highlighted above are not subject to the CVD 
measures either (e.g. the state aids that are available to all enterprises), but others are 
entirely actionable or well disputable. The list of “non-actionable subsidies” in the 
EFTA-Israel FTA is a significant departure from WTO subsidy and CVD rules and 
will undoubtedly reduce the application of CVD measures between its members. 
 
3.3.3 Abolition of CVD Measures in RTAs 
In the RTAs observed in this research, only four RTAs have abolished CVD, 
which are the China-Hong Kong CEPA, China-Macao CEPA, EEA and EFTA 
(except for agricultural and fishery products). Therefore, abolition of CVD in RTAs 
is very rare at present and it heavily depends on the existence of a common political 
system. 
 
In the China, Hong Kong and Macao CEPA, although the economic policies and 
political cultures of Hong Kong and Macao still differ markedly from Mainland 
China, Hong-Kong (since 1
st
 July 1997) and Macao (since 20
th
 December 1999) are 
governed by the political framework of China’s “one country, two systems”. 
Accordingly, all subsidy schemes in these three economic entities are meant to be 
supervised by one central government. A similar case may not happen in other RTAs.  
For the EEA and the EFTA, as aforementioned, abolition of CVD measures is a 
natural result of establishment of a common policy on subsidy under the acquis 
communautaire of the EU.
309
  
Although abolishing CVD measures with the establishment of common policy 
on subsidies or state aid is also possible in other EU-related RTAs, it has been proved 
that implementing such strategy is not an easy task. Taking the EC-Egypt FTA as an 
example, subsidies and CVD are governed under separate provisions – Article 23 and 
Article 34 of the agreement. Article 34 lays down a general rule that prohibits “any 
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public aid which distorts, or threatens to distort, competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods”. In the meantime, it requires the 
regional body – the Association Council – to build up necessary rules for 
implementation of the prohibition on public aid within five years of the entry into 
force of the agreement. Article 23 states that the WTO rules on subsidies and CVD 
measures shall apply between the parties, until the necessary rules on public aid 
referred to in Article 34 are adopted. In other words, although the WTO CVD 
measure is maintained by the EC-Egypt FTA, it is only on a temporary basis and will 
be abolished once the common policy on public aid is implemented. Similar 
arrangements are also found in the EC-Croatia, EC-Israel, EC-Jordan, EC-Lebanon, 
EC-Morocco and the EC-Tunisia FTAs.
310
 However, no further development was 
noticed on this issue, though the prescribed time-schedule has already expired. 
 
3.3.4 Potential Trade Diversion Effect of the Preferential CVD 
Measures in RTAs 
Given the fact that very few RTAs have adopted special CVD rules or 
completely abolished CVD measures in internal trade at present, it does not appear 
that there is significant threat of trade diversion arising from the specific rules 
adopted on CVD in RTAs. In theory, unlike the ADA and the Safeguards Agreement, 
the WTO SCM Agreement provides WTO Members multilateral response to 
subsidies, which allows a WTO Member to secure its interests in a third-country’s 
market, when the product of such a Member is displaced or impeded by a like 
product that is granted subsidy. In the case of trade diversion arising from the 
specific CVD rules in RTAs, a non-RTA country may end this adverse effect by 
taking countermeasure through such multilateral response. 
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Taking Dukgeun Ahn’s illustration as example, suppose that Country I imports a 
gadget from three WTO Members, A, B, and C; export prices for each Member are as 
shown in above figures, indicating that A granted subsidy on the industry that 
produces gadgets, but B and C have no subsidy.  
When Countries I and A established an FTA arrangement in which both countries 
agree on abolition of CVD measures, the market share of A is very likely to increase 
and the market share of B or C may decrease; in other words, trade diversion may 
happen. Pursuant to the WTO SCM Agreement, B and C will have a way to 
terminate such adverse effect. If the subsidy granted by A is export subsidy or import 
substitution subsidy, which is prohibited by the SCM Agreement, B or C may request 
A to withdraw this subsidy or further refer the case to the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism;
311
 If the subsidy granted by A is an actionable subsidy, a similar 
response is available, as long as B or C could demonstrate that the effect of the 
subsidy is to displace or impede their exports from the market of Country I.
312
 
Therefore, with the backup of the multilateral response provided by the SCM 
Agreement, the special CVD rules or abolition of CVD in RTAs may not distort 
competitive conditions among competitors as seriously as the case of AD and SGs. 
The only risk lies in the possibility that some damages are irreversible, although the 
subsidy might eventually be removed. 
 
3.4 Safeguard Measures in RTAs 
In chapter 2, it was discussed that, in GATT/WTO, the rationale of safeguard 
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A: export price = $ 90  
(with subsidy) 
 
B: export price = $ 110 
  (no subsidy) 
C: export price = $ 110 
  (no subsidy) 
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measures is to prevent sharp impact on domestic industry from sudden increased 
imports resulting from market concessions under the GATT/WTO rules, so that 
domestic industry could have some breathing space to cope with strong 
competition.
313
 Because of their emergency nature, safeguard measures differ from 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties which respond to unfair trade practices in 
various aspects:  
1) The safeguard measure can only be applied when the injury to like or 
directly-competitive domestic industry of the importing country must be at 
“serious” level;  
2) it does not question the fairness of the trading practice on the part of the 
exporter; 
3) it has to be applied on a non-discriminatory basis, i.e. against all imports of 
the goods irrespective of sources; and  
4) once the safeguard measure is applied, the importing country must allow 
equivalent compensation to the exporting country.  
In the context of RTA, preferential reduction/elimination of tariffs and duties are 
usually lower than the MFN level so that they incur more risk to cause injury (or 
threat thereof) to domestic industry in RTA member countries before they adapt 
themselves to the new competition environment. Thus, safeguard measures become 
very important protective instrument in RTAs, especially in the transition period. 
According to a WTO report,
314
 most RTAs provide for the use of safeguard measures 
to deal with emergency situations such as balance of payments, structural adjustment 
or agricultural problems. Emergency safeguard provisions (i.e. GATT Article XIX-
type actions) are found in practically all the agreements, whether of a general or a 
specific nature. To cushion the adverse effect coming from preferential tariff 
reduction/elimination under the RTA, many RTAs even established a special 
safeguard mechanism only applicable to intra-regional trade to prevent a serious 
import surge from regional partners. This is known as a “bilateral safeguard 
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 In substance, bilateral safeguard measure is a built-in mechanism that 
deals with the imports surge resulting from the RTA concessions only. Therefore, it is 
an ad hoc system unattached to the WTO safeguard regime. 
As illustrated in the table below (Table 6), in the RTAs observed in this research, 
almost all of them contained safeguard provisions, but in various combinations: some 
RTAs adopt multilateral safeguard disciplines in intra-regional trade with no special 
provisions regarding regional imports (category A). Some RTAs include measures 
specifically applicable to the RTA bilateral trade while applying equal safeguard 
measures to any state in global-wide action (category E). Unlike the AD & CVD 
measures in RTAs, no particular RTA modified the detail application threshold of 
WTO safeguards that apply in regional trade (category B and F). However, whether 
having bilateral safeguards or not, many RTAs exclude regional imports from the 
global safeguards, as long as the imports from the other party are not a substantial 
cause of serious injury or threat thereof (category C and G). A small number of RTAs 
even completely abolish the safeguard measure in regional trade (category D and H).  
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3.4.1 Bilateral Safeguard Measures in RTAs 
In contrast with the WTO safeguards, bilateral safeguard action is usually 
permitted only if it is determined that the injury was due to the reduction/elimination 
of tariffs and duties contemplated in the RTA agreement;
316
 this measure is used in 
the transition period; and, any bilateral safeguard restrictions or increased duties 
should not exceed the MFN rate in force at the time. For example, NAFTA permits 
bilateral safeguard measures to be applied to bilateral trade, if the increasing imports 
of a good from a NAFTA party, as a result of reduction or elimination of duties 
provided in this agreement, alone constitutes a substantial cause of serious injury, or 
a threat thereof to a relevant domestic industry of the other party. Such bilateral 
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Similarly with anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures, most RTAs do 
not detail in their texts either the procedures to be followed by parties on the 
invocation of a bilateral safeguard action or rules for the imposition of the resulting 
trade-restrictive measures. They generally establish a link to WTO disciplines and 
stipulate specific conditions on what measures are allowed where necessary. In 
nearly all of these RTAs, increased imports of a product may trigger a bilateral 
safeguard mechanism. However, against the multilateral context, at least some of the 
bilateral safeguards criteria defined in RTAs are less stringent.  
 
1) Consultation 
Typically, RTAs provide for strict prior consultation and notification and state a 
preference for measures which least distort their functioning. Regional bodies often 
play an important role in initial communication and consultation procedures.  
In JSEPA (Article 18.3), a party shall immediately deliver a written notice to the 
other party upon initiating an investigatory process relating to the injury investigation, 
making a finding of the injury and making a decision to apply such a measure. 
Adequate opportunity for prior consultations should be provided.  
The EFTA-Singapore FTA only includes bilateral safeguard measures, and does 
not mention global safeguard measures at all. Article 17 of the Agreement between 
the EFTA States and Singapore states that, the party intending to take an emergency 
measure under this Article shall promptly make notification to other parties and the 
Joint Committee, containing all pertinent information which shall include evidence 
of serious injury or threat thereof caused by increased imports, precise description of 
the product involved, the proposed measure, proposed date of introduction and 
expected duration of the investigation and the proposed measure.   
MERCOSUR stipulates bilateral safeguard measures in the Annex IV Safeguard 
Clause to the Treaty. Each state party of MERCOSUR may apply safeguard clauses 
to imports of products benefiting from the trade liberalization programme established 
                                                     





. If imports of a given product damage or threaten serious damage 
to its market as a result of a significant increase in imports of that product from the 
other states parties over a short period of time, the importing country shall request 
the Common Market Group to hold a consultation with a view to ending such a 
situation. The importing country shall accompany its request with a detailed 
statement of the supporting facts, reasons and justifications. The Common Market 
Group shall begin consultations within a maximum of 10 calendar days from the 
submission of the request by the importing country and shall conclude them, having 
taken a decision thereon, within 20 calendar days from the start of consultations.
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To minimise the distorting effect of the safeguards, the MERCOSUR parties agreed 
to use these rules only in exceptional cases. However, as a consequence of the 
expiration of the transitional period at the end of 1994, the bilateral safeguards have 
no longer been applicable.  
 
2) Injury requirements 
As previously mentioned, bilateral safeguard is essentially a built-in mechanism 
that deals with the imports surge resulting from the RTA concessions only. Therefore, 
apart from most EU-related FTA agreements,
320
 almost all RTAs observed in this 
research linked the invocation of a bilateral safeguard measure to injuries resulting 
from preferential concessions granted in the agreement. Such requirement ensures 
that the regional imports will not be wrongly captured by bilateral safeguard action, 
if an increasing of imports that causes or threatens to cause serious injury to a RTA 
country’s relevant industry is a result of the tariff concessions under the WTO. In that 
case, a global safeguard measure should apply irrespective of any resources of the 
imports. To enhance such assurance, other RTAs facilitated with a bilateral safeguard 
mechanism also provide that the bilateral safeguard can be applied only if such 
imports of goods from a RTA party alone constitutes a substantial cause of serious 
injury, or threat thereof to a relevant domestic industry of the other party. For 
example, In NAFTA, bilateral safeguard measures can be applied to bilateral trade in 
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NAFTA only if:  
1) the increasing imports of a good from a NAFTA party is a result of reduction 
or elimination of duties provided in this agreement,  
2) such increasing imports of a good from a NAFTA party alone constitute a 
substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof to a relevant domestic 
industry of the other party.
321
  
Similar provisions are found in JSEPA
322





 and US-Singapore FTA
325
. 
Under WTO safeguard rules, the standard injury requirements for invocation of 
emergency safeguards are serious injury (or threat thereof), or substantial cause of 
serious injury (or threat thereof). Compared with the WTO safeguard rules, the array 
of reasons provided for in RTAs for invoking emergency safeguards among parties is 
also wider-ranging. 
Some RTAs attach importance on the general economic and social status of the 
region, including serious economic, social or environmental difficulties of a sectoral 
or regional nature, trade deflection, serious detriment (or threat thereof) to the 
external financial stability caused by imports from regional partners, etc. Such 
provisions are popular in European-country-related RTAs. For example, the EEA and 
EFTA state that, a member state may unilaterally take appropriate safeguard 
measures “if serious economic, social or environmental difficulties of a sectorial or 
regional nature liable to persist are arising...”
326
 In the EU-Mexico FTA, bilateral SG 
is applied when (a) “serious injury to the domestic industry of like or directly 
competitive producers in the territory of the importing party”; or (b) “serious 
disturbances in any sector of the economy or difficulties which could bring about 
serious deterioration in the economic situation of a region of the importing party”.
327
 
Similar conditions are provided in a number of EFTA-related RTAs, e.g. the EFTA-
Croatia FTA and the EFTA-Israel FTA.
328
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3) Applicable measures 
The applicable measures of bilateral safeguards usually take the form of an 
increase in the rate of tariff and duty on the certain goods involved in the action. 
Again, because the bilateral SG aims to regulate the regional trade flows under RTA 
concessions, almost all RTAs indicate that the applicable measures that remedy or 
prevent the injury shall not be at a level higher than the MFN rate. At the same time, 
most RTAs reclaim the requirement contained in the WTO Safeguard Agreement, 
that the applicable measure shall be no more than the minimum extend necessary to 
prevent or remedy the injury.
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In addition, some RTAs provide that any member, who intends to invoke 
safeguard action, must propose a mutually acceptable schedule to progressively 
liberalise safeguard measures in a reasonable timescale. The EU-Mexico FTA Article 
15 provides that “such measure shall contain clear elements progressively leading to 
their elimination at the end of the set period, at the latest.” 
Quite different to WTO safeguard rules, not all bilateral safeguards are to be 
imposed on a non-discriminatory basis amongst regional members. In NAFTA, 
bilateral safeguard measures can only involve tariff changes (not quotas) and any 
increased duty must not exceed the most favoured nation rate in force at the time, or 
at the time NAFTA came into force, whichever is the lesser. Noteworthy, Article 801 
does not clarify whether the imposition of bilateral safeguard measure shall be based 
on the MFN principle in NAFTA, where an importing member encounters serious 
injury or the threat of serious injury on its domestic industry from another member. 
In practice, the importing member imposes safeguard measures only to the country 
whose imports individually constitute a substantial cause of serious injury or threat 
thereof.
330
 But in the EFTA
331
 and the EFTA-Israel FTA
332
, it was clearly stated that 
the affected member states may suspend preferences provisionally and without 
discrimination.  
 
                                                     
329 For example, the EU-Mexico FTA, EFTA, and the JSEPA. 
330 See NAFTA, Final Panel Reports, U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on Broom Corn Brooms from Mexico (Broom 
Corn Brooms), USA-MEX-1997-2008-01, adopted on 30 January 1998, http://registry.nafta-sec-
alena.org/cmdocuments/4ec05db7-9497-48cf-87cf-930c206afd93.pdf 
331 EFTA Convention Article.40, 41. 
332 EFTA-Israel FTA Article 25. 
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4) Time span 
Pursuant to WTO safeguard rules (global safeguard measure), the period of a 
safeguard measure shall not exceed four years. The measure can be extended only 
once up to four more years if the continuation of the measure is determined 
necessary to remedy or prevent serious injury and there is evidence that the injury is 
adjusting. The total period of a safeguard measure including the period of any 
preceding provisional measure cannot exceed 8 years.
333
 
In contrast to WTO safeguard rules, RTAs often regulate more stringent time 
limits for safeguard measures to apply. Bilateral safeguard measures are basically 
only available during a transition period (except that a small number of RTAs permit 
the use of it with the consent of the other party after the transition period has expired, 




, Canada-Cost Rica FTA
336
 and Chile-Mexico 
FTA
337
). In addition, the time span of bilateral safeguards is much shorter, along with 
stricter limits on extension and re-application of the measure.  
For example, in JSEPA, bilateral safeguards can only be used once and up to one 
year during the transition period.
338
 In both the EU-Mexico FTA and EFTA-
Singapore FTA, measures can be taken only for a period not exceeding one year or 
with strict exceptions for three years; no measures shall be applied to the import of a 
product which has previously been subject to such a measure for a period of at least 
five years, since the expiry of the measure.
339
 In the Canada-Costa Rica FTA, “no 
[bilateral safeguard] action may be maintained for a period exceeding 3 years. 
During the transition period, the party may apply safeguard measures to the same 
good no more than 2 times.”
340
 In the US-Australia FTA, bilateral safeguard 
measures shall be applied not exceeding two years except that the period may be 




                                                     
333 WTO Agreement of Safeguards, Article 7.3 and See section 2.3.3(5) of this thesis. 
334 Korea-EU FTA, Article 3.2(5).  
335 NAFTA, Article 801. 
336 Canada-Costa Rica FTA, Article VI.2. 
337 Chile-Mexico FTA, Chapter 6-02.3. 
338 JSEPA, Article 18. 
339 EU-Mexico FTA, Decision No 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council of 23 March 2000, Article 15; EFTA-
Singapore FTA, Article 17(3). 
340 Canada-Costa Rica FTA, Article VI.2.  
341 US-Australia FTA, Article 9.1. 
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3.4.2 Global Safeguard Measure Provisions in RTAs 
Unlike anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures in RTAs, no particular 
RTA has been identified in this research that modifies the detailed threshold of WTO 
safeguards that apply to regional trade. Instead, application of global safeguard 
action for intra-trade varies depending on whether it is abolished in a RTA. 
Accordingly, three different approaches are found in existing RTAs:  
a) abolish global safeguards in any circumstances;  
b) abolish global safeguards in principle but with exceptions under certain 
conditions; or 
c) apply global safeguard measures irrespective of intra-trade or trade with non-
members 
 
a) RTAs which abolish global safeguard measures 
In all RTAs observed in this research, only the New Zealand-Singapore FTA and 
Australia-Singapore FTA abolished global safeguard measures unconditionally. Since 
both FTAs have no bilateral SG mechanism, no forms of safeguard measures are 
permitted in these two FTAs. 
Article 8 of the New Zealand-Singapore FTA explicitly provides that: 
“Neither Party shall take safeguard measures against goods originating in the 
other Party from the date of entry into force of this Agreement”. 
In the Australia-Singapore FTA, Article 9 reads as:  
“A Party shall not initiate or take any safeguard measure within the meaning of 
the WTO Agreement on Safeguards against the goods of the other Party from the 





 also abolished global safeguard 
measures. Nevertheless, such abolition did not take place until the end of the 
transitional period.  
                                                     
342 Safeguard measures between Australia and New-Zealand was originally provided in Article 17 of the 
ANZCERA and it is in transitional nature. Since the transition period ended when free trade in goods based on 
the Protocol of 1988 was achieved, the safeguard measures were abolished in the ANZCERTA. 
343 MERCOSUR, Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic 
of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Annex IV, Article I. 
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The best explanation as to the rarity of abolition of global safeguards in RTAs 
may be the emergency nature of safeguard measures. On-going reduction/elimination 
of tariffs and duties cross borders without any protective instruments – even the last 
resort, i.e., the emergency safeguard measures – may cause vital crisis to domestic 
competitive industries.  
The reasons for eliminating global safeguards between Australia-New Zealand 
and Singapore were perhaps because: 1) there is mutual confidence in each other’s 
judicial and administrative structures, and; 2) the manufacturing industries in 
Australia-New Zealand and Singapore are generally complementary to each other. 
Thus, the risk arising from each other’s imports is relatively small. If a crisis happens, 
it can be solved at a diplomatic level.  
 
b) RTAs which abolish global safeguards in principle but with exceptions under 
certain conditions 
The RTAs that abolish global safeguards in principle but with exceptions under 
certain conditions are NAFTA
344
, the Canada-Chile FTA
345
, and the Canada-Israel 
FTA
346
, which mainly concern Canada and the US. The safeguard action in principle 
is abolished for intra-trade, unless the import share of a member country accounts for 
a substantial share of total imports or is importantly contributing to the serious injury. 
For example, NAFTA Article 802 reserves to each member government the right to 
impose global safeguard measures authorized by GATT Article XIX and the WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards. However, it also provides that, NAFTA member exports 
“must be excluded” unless they account for a “substantial share” of total imports; and 
action can only be taken against these exports, when they considered individually or 
together with those of the other NAFTA member, contribute “importantly” to the 
serious injury. “Substantiality” is defined in terms of whether the NAFTA member 
was one of the top five suppliers to the market over the previous three years. An 
important contribution is deemed not to have arisen where the growth rate of imports 
from the NAFTA member concerned is “appreciably lower” than that of the other 
import sources. Preferential treatment to NAFTA exporters is also provided in 
                                                     
344 NAFTA, Article 802. 
345 Canada-Chile FTA, Article F-02.   
346 Canada-Israel FTA, Article 4.6. 
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restricting the importing NAFTA member from reducing imports below the trend of 
imports, and also requiring allowance for reasonable growth. 
 
c) RTAs which apply global safeguard measure irrespective of intra-trade or 
trade with non-members 
The RTAs which apply global safeguard measure irrespective of intra-trade or 
trade with non-members are the EEA, the EFTA
347
, the Korea-EU FTA
348
, the EU-
Columbia and Peru FTA,
349
 the EFTA-Canada FTA
350





and the Japan-Brunei Darussalam FTA
353
, which mainly concern the 
European countries and Japan. 
Although RTAs under this category appear to fully respect the WTO safeguard 
rules, for those RTAs facilitated with bilateral safeguards, these two types of 
measures usually cannot be applied cumulatively. This may also give rise to 
discrimination in global safeguard actions. The Korea-EU FTA, Article 3.7(4) and 
the EU-Columbia and Peru FTA, Article 45 express that products under bilateral 
safeguard measures should not be subject to global safeguard measure.
354
 Put 
differently, when one party applies global safeguards, the relevant imports from the 
other party must be excluded if such imports are subject to bilateral safeguards. In 
this circumstance, duties on the product from the FTA party will be no more than the 
MFN rate, while other countries’ product will confront higher customs duties. 
 
3.4.3 Trade Diversion Effect of the Preferential Safeguard Measures 
in RTAs 
The major problem of selective application of global safeguard measures rests on 
the fact that such application of safeguard measures often results in substantial 
change of import sources instead of import volumes. As illustrated in the US – Line 
                                                     
347 EFTA, Article 40(4). 
348 Korea-EU FTA, Article 3.7(1). 
349 EU-Columbia and Peru FTA, Article 43. 
350 EFTA-Canada FTA, Article 25(11). 
351 EFTA-Chile FTA, Article 20. 
352 JSEPA, Article 18(5). 
353 Japan -Brunei Darussalam FTA, Article 21(6). 
354 Similar provision is also noticed in EU-Columbia and Peru FTA, Article 45. 
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Pipe case, the exclusion of NAFTA parties from US safeguard measures resulted in 
import reduction mainly from Korea that was the historically largest exporter; 
however, at the same time, a significant increase of import from Mexico to leave 
overall import roughly unchanged. Mexico actually became the largest exporter after 
the imposition of – indeed, exemption from – the safeguard measure.
355
 In an 
empirical work that analysed the impact of the discriminatory safeguard measures, it 
was also proved that formal exceptions for RTA partners do allow these countries to 
gain market share on average, sometimes at the expense of other suppliers.
356
 
However, whether such preference is legally allowed under the WTO framework is 
questionable. 
 
3.5 Special Institutional Mechanism Applies to TRM Issues in 
RTAs and the Influence 
In addition to the substantive changes on TRMs, many RTAs are facilitated with 
regional bodies, which also affect the trade remedy measures in regional trade. Some 
of them act as a forum for negotiation, some are able to review domestic 
investigations, and some are given a role to conduct investigations themselves. 
Although there are clear distinctions between the different powers that are available 
to those regional bodies, with the authority to monitor/conduct the investigating 
process, the regional institutions either work as good office where disputes arise, or 
handle the cases directly to prevent arbitrary use of TRMs led by national authorities. 
These regional institutions usually govern all trade remedy issues as well as the 
subsidies. This tends to be the most prevalent feature of the RTA-specific 
countervailing provisions that are different to the WTO regime.  
In the case of the EU-related RTAs, almost all of them contain specific 
provisions on TRMs. These provisions have a number of common features. In 
particular, there is always a regional body (named as “joint committee”, “trade 
committee”, “cooperation council” etc.) that is established to oversee the whole 
                                                     
355 D Ahn, “Foe or Friend of GATT Article XXIV: Diversity in Trade Remedy Rules” (2008) 11(1) Journal of 
the International Economic Law 107, at 129; see also WTO Panel Report, US – Line Pipe, WT/DS202/R, adopted 
8 March 2002, para 4.26. 
356 C P Brown and R McCulloch, “The WTO Agreement on Safeguards: An Empirical Analysis of 
Discriminatory Impact”, in M G Plummer (ed.), Empirical Methods in International Trade: Essays in Honor of 
Mordechai Kreinin (Edward Elgar Publishing 2004) 145.  
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regional trade agreement. With the sole exception on the EEA, all the RTAs 
concluded by the EU subject the imposition of trade policy measures to a 
consultation procedure.  
For example, the Korea-EU FTA is facilitated with a “Working Group on Trade 
Remedy Cooperation” with the function to: 
(a) “enhance a Party’s knowledge and understanding of the other Party’s trade 
remedy laws, policies and practise; 
(b) oversee the implementation of this Chapter; 
(c) improve cooperation between the Parties’ authorities having responsibility for 
matters on trade remedies; 
(d) provide a forum for the Parties to exchange information on issues relating to 
anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures and safeguards; 
(e) provide a forum for the Parties to discuss other relevant topics of mutual 
interest including: 
(i) international issues relating to trade remedies, including issues relating to 
the WTO Doha Round Rules negotiations; and 
(ii) practices by the Parties’ competent authorities in anti-dumping, and 
countervailing duty investigations such as the application of ‘facts 
available’ and verification procedures; and  
(f) cooperate on any other matters that the Parties agree as necessary.” 
Accordingly, when (or even before) a trade remedy action is initiated, the parties 
involved must inform the regional body immediately and launch consultation with 
attempts to arrive at a mutually agreed solution. Trade remedy action proceeds, only 
if no mutually acceptable solution is reached.  
The RTAs, into which the EFTA countries have entered with the same partners as 
the EU, also exhibit similar patterns. For example, the EFTA-related RTAs widely 
include a requirement that before one RTA party initiates an CVD investigation to 
determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged subsidy in the other party, 
the former must make written notice to the later with a view to finding a mutually 
acceptable solution under the supervision of the Joint Committee.
357
 . Apart from 
serving as a forum for consultations or notifications, they play no central role in the 
                                                     
357 See EFTA-Columbia FTA, Article 2.15(2); EFTA-Mexico FTA, Article.11; EFTA-Albania FTA, Article. 16. 
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trade remedy investigation process. The requirement for consultation and/or the 
involvement of the overarching institutional body prior to the adoption of protective 
measures in fact acts as a sort of safety valve in anti-dumping cases in RTA. 
Compared with the regional body that simply serves as a negotiation forum for 
TRM issues, NAFTA provides for an ad hoc bi-national panel, which has power to 
review final anti-dumping and CVD determinations as a replacement for domestic 
judicial review. On its own initiative, an involved NAFTA party may request review 
of a final determination by a panel based on the request of a person who would 
otherwise be entitled under the law of the importing party, to commence domestic 
procedures for judicial review of that final determination.
358
  
Different from a domestic court, a bi-national panel consists of five panelists: 
each litigant chooses two of the five panelists, and the panelists themselves choose 
the fifth.
359
 Decisions of the five person panels are by majority vote and must be 
based on the votes of all members of the panel.
360
 In case, for any reason, a panellist 
is not be able to continue to participate in the process or in deliberations, proceedings 
of the panel shall be suspended pending a selection of a substitute panellist.
361
 
Pursuant to Article 1904(3), bi-national panels apply both the law of the country 
whose agency made the determination under review and that country’s standard of 
review, which otherwise a national court having jurisdiction would apply to the 
proceeding. The United States, Canada and Mexico all have different standards of 
review for their various agencies’ determinations. These different standards of review 
have resulted in different results at the bi-national level. 
Since the bi-national panels completely replace national judicial review of final 
anti-dumping and countervailing determinations, the panels either uphold or remand 
(in whole or in part) a final administrative agency determination in anti-dumping or 
countervailing investigations. In the event of a remand, the original administrative 
agency is supposed to reconsider its decision in light of the panel’s determination. 
Panel decisions cannot be appealed to domestic courts.
362
 Article 1904(9) states that 
“the decision of a panel under this Article shall be binding on the involved Parties 
                                                     
358 NAFTA, Article 1904(5). 
359 NAFTA Annex 1901.2 sets forth the details of the qualifications and selection procedures for the member of a 
bi-national panel. Panelists are drawn from a roster of 75 individuals, mainly international trade lawyers. 
360 NAFTA, Annex 1901.2(5). 
361 NAFTA, Annex 1901.2(9) 
362 NAFTA, Article 1904(11). 
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with respect to the particular matter between the Parties that is before the panel”.  
The introduction of a bi-national panel review mechanism could reduce some of 
the cost of using domestic judicial review system and secure some fairness of judicial 
review as seen in the negotiation of the NAFTA.  
As a replacement of the domestic courts, one exceptional feature of Chapter 19 
dispute settlement is that the bi-national panel’s decision is final. Within the panel 
process there is no appeal of a Chapter 19 bi-national panel decision except where 
there is an allegation of gross misconduct, bias, or serious conflict of interest, where 
the panel decision departs from a fundamental rules of procedure, or where the panel 
exceeds its power, authority, or jurisdiction and such actions materially affected the 
decision.
363
 In such instance alone, an “extraordinary challenge procedure,” an 
appeal of the panel decision, is permitted to a special three person review panel for 
decision.
364
 However, this appeal may be taken only by a NAFTA government, not 
by the private “interested parties” that appeared before the national administrative 
agency and the bi-national panel.
365
  
The regional agreements of the Central American Common Market (CACM)
366
 
and Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
367
 are also facilitated with a regional body, 
which usually consists of representatives of all regional members or an expert group 
on trade issues. Those regional bodies are given the role of conducting investigations 
and/or reviewing the final determinations of national authorities. With the power to 
conduct/monitor the investigating process, the regional institutions either work as 
good office where disputes arise, or handle the cases directly to prevent arbitrary use 
of the trade remedy measures led by national authorities. 
In CACM, the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA) 
is given the authority to conduct anti-dumping investigations.
368
 In the CARICOM, 
one of the regional organs – the Council for Trade and Development (COTED) – has 
the authority to conduct anti-dumping investigations, to authorize member states to 
                                                     
363 NAFTA, Article 1904(13).  
364 See NAFTA, Article 1904, para. 13.  
365 See, NAFTA, Article 1904, paras, 5 and 13.  
366 The CACM was constituted under the “General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration” between 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, signed at Managua in December 1960 and came into force in 
1961.  
367 The Caribbean Community, originally called Caribbean Community and Common Market, was established by 
the “Treaty of Chaguaramas” which came into effect in 1973. The first four signatories were Barbados, Jamaica, 
Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago; it now extends to 15 Caribbean countries.  
368 “General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration”, Article XXI.  
160 
 
apply anti-dumping measures and to keep such measures under review.
369
 It is 
regarded that the use of regional bodies in TRM cases in these RTAs may have been 
intended as a device to lower the public cost; it also alleviates the potential for 
domestic producers to lodge a complaint taking advantage of the national 
investigating authority to seek TRMs. Thus, an RTA that gives a role to regional 
institutions in conducting investigations and in final determinations may see less 
initiations and findings on TRMs.
370
  
Although the trade diversion effect arising from the preferential TRMs analysed 
above is theoretically assumptive and may be collective in practice, existing 
literature has presented some realistic evidence through empirical analysis. For 
example, in NAFTA case, Goldstein conducted a test is to examine whether there is a 
significant difference in outcome of the appeals before bi-national panels as opposed 
to national tribunals.
371
 She computed the ratio of the share of US unfair trade orders 
against Canada as a proportion of Canadian imports to the United States and found 
that, in 1987, before the FTA, the Canadian ratio of AD orders to its share of US 
imports was 0.83; by the close of 1990, that number had been reduced to 0.33. This 
reduction in unfair trade orders occurred only in Canadian trade as the same ratio 
computed for the European Community and Japan rose during the same period. She 
attributes this shift to the rulings of the NAFTA bi-national panels. Rugman and 
Anderson reviewed the initial five-year period (1989-1994) of the operation of 
CUFTA.
372
 They noted that two thirds of Canadian appeals of US trade remedy 
actions before bi-national panels were remanded compared with one third for non-
NAFTA countries before US tribunals, namely the Court of International Trade. 
Although they are critical of the bi-national panels and make a number of 
recommendations for improving them, given this evidence they acknowledged that 
Canada obtained a unique benefit from the bi-national panels under CUFTA. 
 
                                                     
369 “Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including the CARICOM Single 
Market and Economy”, Art 15.    
370 R Teh, T J Prusa and M Budetta, “Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements”, Staff Working 
Paper ERSD-2007-03 (WTO 2007), p 20. 
371 J Goldstein, “International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American ‘Unfair’ Trade Laws” 
(1996) 50(4) International Organization 541, pp 541-64. 
372 A M Rugman and ADM Anderson, “NAFTA and the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: A Transaction Cost 




From above context, it can be seen that using special TRMs that distinguish from 
the WTO regime has become a predominant feature of RTAs. Taking the WTO’s 
trade remedy measure as standard, the variances of the RTA-specific TRMs can 
theoretically be classified into five categories: 
1) There is no relevant provision contained in the regional agreement (thereby 
parties are assumed to be bound by the WTO law);  
2) The regional measure completely refers to the WTO rules;  
3) The regional measure refers to WTO rules but was modified with lower 
thresholds on imposition of such a measure;  
4) The regional measure refers to WTO rules but was modified with higher 
thresholds on imposition of such a measure; and 
5) The regional measure was expressly abolished in the RTA. 
In the RTAs observed in this research, there is no regional TRM provision under 
category 3). Most RTA parties either maintain their rights and obligations prescribed 
under the WTO regime or adopted regional trade remedy rules stricter than the WTO 
law. In order to cope with the pressure resulting from RTA concessions, many RTAs 
contain ad hoc trade remedy mechanisms that only target the regional trade flow, i.e. 
the bilateral safeguard clauses. However, the trade restriction under bilateral 
safeguards is usually lower than the MFN level. Therefore, practically all special 
mechanisms adopted in regional TRMs tend to reduce or eliminate the trade remedy 
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By all appearances, the innovations and mechanisms on TRMs in RTAs reduce 
the number of trade remedy actions and the potential arbitrary use of these 
instruments between the RTA members. Thus, for most RTAs, they are ultimately 
positive for internal trade flow. However, whether they would create negative 
influence on the third-countries is unclear. The prevailing concern on this matter is 
whether inefficient RTA industries will be artificially maintained or protected at the 
expense of those efficient industries of third-countries. 
The frequency of trade remedy actions in recent decades makes the lesser use of 
those measures in RTAs more sensitive to the third-counties. It is asserted by some 
scholars that, while preferential trade remedy rules in RTAs may reduce actions 
against RTA members, they will not necessarily reduce the total number of actions. 
Initiations of the TRMs or impositions of the measures against non-members may 
increase to such an extent that the total incidence of trade remedy actions at the 
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global level remains unchanged.
373
 Through above theoretical and empirical analysis, 
it may be safe to concluded that, providing preferential TRMs between the RTA 
partners would, more or less, cause adverse effect to the third-parties. 
The advocates of RTAs may argue that as RTA is an exception to the multilateral 
system, regional integration will unavoidably affect third-countries’ interests. Being 
an exception to the WTO non-discriminatory principle, RTAs are truly allowed 
certain space to deviate from the WTO general rules. However, neither the WTO 
agreements on safeguards, anti-dumping and subsidy and countervailing measures, 
nor the language of Article XXIV of GATT and the 1994 Understanding, which 
govern the relation between the WTO and the RTAs, are clear enough on the issue of 
how to treat RTA-specific trade remedy measures. Therefore, it is necessary to 
examine whether TRMs in RTAs are allowed to deviate from the WTO general rules 
on TRMs, in what conditions, and to what extent they are allowed to deviate. These 
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Chapter 4 Legal Criteria for WTO-Consistent Trade 
Remedy Measures in Regional Trade Agreements 
4.1 Introduction 
Under the WTO agreements, which are based on the MFN principle, countries 
cannot normally discriminate between their trading partners. If a Member State of the 
WTO grants another Member a special favor (such as a lower customs duty rate for 
one of their products), then that country has to do the same for all other WTO 
Members.
374
 Nevertheless, recognizing RTAs could be effective instruments to 
promote the trade liberalization and foster the economic development of the 
multilateral trading system, GATT/WTO confers onto the Members which are parties 
to RTAs a special right to deviate from WTO MFN principle as necessary for the 
constitution of a customs union or free trade area. As briefly introduced in Chapter 1, 
GATT Article XXIV, the central provision governing RTA issues in trade of goods 
under the GATT/WTO framework, allows Members to provide discriminatory trade 
policies to their regional partners, provided that they adhere to certain transparency 




However, the problem here is, apart from providing some basic rules, GATT 
Article XXIV does not clearly indicate how TRMs should be managed in RTAs. 
Therefore, the options on how to adopt the TRMs in RTAs have been significantly 
left to the individual RTAs since the beginning.  
With the proliferation of RTAs in recent decades, such uncertainty has brought 
more and more disputes and arguments on RTA-related TRMs. Taking the safeguards 
issue as an example, five out of six safeguard measures have been forwarded to 
dispute settlement proceedings under the WTO Safeguards Agreement regarding the 
safeguard actions to date,
376
 in which national authorities excluded the products 
                                                     
374 The Most-Favoured-Nation treatment is stipulated in GATT Article I.  
375 See section 1.4 of this thesis. 
376 These six cases are: (1) Appellate Body Report, Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear,  
“Argentina – Footwear (EC)”), WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000; (2) Appellate Body Report, Korea – 
Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products (“Korea - Dairy”), WT/DS98/AB/R, 
adopted 12 January 2000; (3) Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports 
of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities (“US – Wheat Gluten”), WT/DS166/AB/R, adopted 19 January 
2001; (4) Appellate Body Report, United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen 
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imported from regional partners from the eventual safeguard measures. The plaintiffs 
claimed that such conduct seriously violated the non-discrimination requirement 
under the WTO Safeguards Agreement. It is also regarded by some people as new 
trade barriers to the non-RTA member countries, contrary to the basic tenet of RTA. 
However, the defendants responded that such action is a need for the constitution of 
RTA. It can be justified by GATT Article XXIV – even it violates the Safeguards 
Agreement. In the face of these disputes and arguments, the WTO negotiators neither 
reached any agreements nor provided any clear guidance. What has been noticed 
over time is a mixing and muddling of the internal and external requirements in the 
review process. 
To address this issue, this chapter starts with a discussion of the WTO legal 
criteria on TRMs in RTAs with the aim of clarifying: 1) whether TRMs in RTAs are 
allowed to deviate from the WTO general rules on TRMs; and 2) if the answer is 
“yes”, under what conditions they are allowed to deviate. It then turns to work out a 
methodology, through which a RTA-specific TRM could be tested against the WTO’s 
criteria. 
Without clear guidelines on how to adopt the TRMs in RTAs, the traces on 
WTO’s requirements on this issue can be inferred primarily from three analyses: (i) a 
“parallelism” requirement developed by WTO dispute settlement panels in case law; 
(ii) the relationship between Article XXIV and the other WTO provisions (here, 
especially referring to the GATT Article VI, Article XIX and WTO agreements on 
anti-dumping, countervailing duties measures and safeguards), and; (iii) the specific 
requirements on RTAs contained in GATT Article XXIV and the 1994 Understanding. 
The latter two analyses are the main focus of this section. Due to the complexity 
of the two sets of trade remedy rules existing in the WTO and RTAs, the discussion 
firstly introduces WTO principle provisions governing RTAs – GATT Article XXIV 
and the 1994 Understanding. At first, the discussion will investigate the relationship 
between GATT Article XXIV and other WTO agreements, to find out (i) whether 
RTA-specific trade remedy rules need to follow the WTO agreements on anti-
                                                                                                                                                      
Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia (“US - Lamb”), WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16, 
May 2001; (5) Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular 
Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (“US – Line Pipe”), WT/DS202/AB/R, adopted 8 March 2002; (6) 
Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, 
(“US - Steel”),WT/DS248/AB/R, adopted 10 December 2003. The only case not involves RTA is Korea – Diary. 
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dumping, countervailing duty measures and safeguards; (ii) in the event that a 
measure adopted by RTA is inconsistent with other WTO provisions, whether Article 
XXIV can be invoked as a defence to justify it. Subsequently, emphasis will be 
placed on the detail legal requirements related to the RTA-specific TRM issues, i.e. 
Article XXIV paragraphs 4, 5 and 8.   
In addition to analysis of the WTO legal text on RTAs, WTO dispute settlement 
panels also provided valuable references on RTA-specific rules’ WTO-consistency 
test in their findings. These references are an important supplement to the ambiguous 
WTO provisions and so they are also included in discussion of this paper.
377
         
 
4.2 “Parallelism” Requirement in Application of RTA-Related 
Global Safeguard Measures  
In terms of the discriminatory TRMs in RTAs, to date, there are five cases which 
refer to global safeguard measures that exclude imports from regional partners. 
Therefore, it is important to have a look first at how the WTO panels dealt with these 
issues. 
In the dispute Argentina – Footwear (EC), US – Wheat Gluten and US – Line 
Pipe, the Appellate Body avoided making any rulings on whether, as a general 
principle, a member of a RTA can exclude other members of that RTA from the 
application of a safeguard measure
378
, or on whether GATT Article XXIV permits 
exempting imports originating in a partner of an RTA from a measure in departure 
from the MFN requirement of the Safeguard Agreement.
379
 However, the panels and 
Appellate Body “invented” a “parallelism” requirement on application of a safeguard 
action, considering the products imported from regional partners. The concept of 
parallelism first appeared in Argentina – Footwear (EC) provided by the panel and 
                                                     
377 Pursuant to the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding Article 3.2, decisions of the Appellate Body do not 
creating binding precedent. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body has held that adopted Panel reports create 
legitimate expectations among the parties to the dispute. As a result, the Appellate Body and the Panel rely on the 
reasoning and conclusions of previous Appellate Body reports to support their own. See 
http://www.wto.int/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/repertory_e/s8_e.htm 
378 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC), para. 113; Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, 
para 99. 
379 Appellate Body Report on US – Line Pipe, para 198. 
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later confirmed by the Appellate Body
380
: 
“[t]he imports included in the [injury] determinations made under Articles 2.1 
and 4.2 should correspond to the imports included in the application of the 
measure, under Article 2.2.”
381
 
The parallelism requirement originated from EC’s argument in Argentina – 
Footwear (EC). The Panel consented to this view after analysing the footnote 1 of 
Article 2.1 of the WTO Safeguards Agreement, which authorizes a customs union to 
take a safeguard measure on behalf of its member states against non-member 
countries. According to the ordinary meaning of the text of the footnote to Article 2.1, 
in the case of measures imposed by a customs union, there are two options for 
imposing safeguard measures, i.e., (i) as a single unit or (ii) on behalf of a member 
state. In the former case, all the requirements for the injury determination shall be 
based on the conditions existing in the customs union as a whole. In the latter case, 
when a safeguard measure is imposed on behalf of a member state, all requirements 
for the injury determination shall be based on the conditions existing in that member 
state and the measure shall be limited to that member state. According to the context 
of the footnote, the Panel explained that,  
“This result supports the interpretation that the two options offered by the 
footnote to Article 2.1 read in conjunction with Article 2.2 imply a parallelism 
between the scope of a safeguard investigation and the scope of the 
application of safeguard measures. Thus, in the light of the context of the 
footnote to Article 2.1, a member-state-specific investigation in which serious 
injury or threat thereof is found based on imports from all sources could only 
lead to the imposition of safeguard measures on a MFN-basis against all 
sources of intra-regional as well as extra-regional supply of a customs union. 
By the same token, a customs-union-wide investigation could only lead to the 
application of safeguard measures to all sources of extra-regional supply and 
could not justify the application of safeguard measures against some or all 
sources of intra-regional supply, as these would be part of the domestic 
                                                     
380 Panel Report and Appellate Body Report on Argentina – Footwear (EC), respectively at para 8.91 and para 
113.  
381 Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, at para 96, emphasis added.   
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industry in that context.”
382
 
It should be noted that, the Panel’s parallelism requirement is only applied in two 
circumstances: (i) in a member-state-specific investigation in which injury 
determination is based on imports from all sources; and (ii) in a customs-union-wide 
investigation in which injury determination could only be based on the imports from 
third countries. The Panel did not mention whether regional imports could be 
excluded from safeguard measures where an injury determination is based on third-
parties’ imports by a member state of CU. The Appellate Body in Argentina – 
Footwear (EC) only confirmed the Panel’s finding that Argentina’s investigation, in 
which it evaluated whether serious injury or the threat thereof was caused by imports 




When the issue appeared again in US – Wheat Gluten, the Appellate Body 
explained the parallelism requirement from another angle. The Appellate Body read 
Article 2 of the Safeguards Agreement as providing that:   
“The same phrase – ‘product... being imported’ – appears in both... paragraphs 
of Article 2. In view of the identity of the language in the two provisions, and 
in the absence of any contrary indication in the context, we believe that it is 
appropriate to ascribe the same meaning to this phrase in both Article 2.1 and 
2.2. To include imports from all sources in the determination that increased 
imports are causing serious injury, and then to exclude imports from one 
source from the application of the measure, would be to give the phrase 
‘product being imported’ a  different  meaning in Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of 
the  Agreement on Safeguards.  In Article 2.1, the phrase would embrace 
imports from all sources whereas, in Article 2.2, it would exclude imports 
from certain sources. This would be incongruous and unwarranted.”
384
 
(original emphasis)  
The Appellate Body then stated in US – Wheat Gluten that “the imports included 
in the determinations made under Articles 2.1 and 4.2 should correspond to the 
                                                     
382 Panel Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC), para 8.87. 
383 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC), para 113. 
384 Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, para 96.  
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imports included in the application of the measure, under Article 2.2.” 
385
 This 
interpretation substantially developed the “parallelism” provided by the Panel in 
Argentina – Footwear (EC), and exactly linked the scope of the injury determination 
and the scope of the application of the measure.  
In US – Wheat Gluten, the United States conducted a separate causal analysis 
between the imports from Canada and the imports from all sources which caused 
serious injury to domestic industry. The United States subsequently determined that 
the imports from Canada did not reach the “substantial share” and did not “contribute 
importantly” to the injury. However, the Panel found that, once the injury 
determination is made based on the imports from all sources, a safeguard measure 
must be applied to the imports from all sources regardless of the result from such an 
analysis because imports from different sources may have collectively caused the 
injury and therefore the exclusion of the imports from a particular source from the 
application of a safeguard measure is not warranted.
386




Moreover, the Appellate Body in US – Wheat Gluten also added that a gap 
between imports covered under the investigation and imports falling within the scope 
of the measure can be justified only if the national authorities “establish explicitly” 
that imports from sources covered by the measure alone “satisf[y] the conditions for 
the application of a safeguard measure, as set out in Article 2.1 and elaborated in 
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.” 
388
 In US – Line Pipe, the United States 
contended that it had considered the injurious effect of imports from non-NAFTA 
countries. However, the Appellate Body found that the note only included 
conclusions about such injurious effects, and that the United States had failed to 
provide a “reasoned and adequate explanation” that establishes “explicitly” that 




In US – Line Pipe the Appellate Body stated that, in light of the parallelism 
requirement, exempting regional imports from safeguard measures is permitted only 
                                                     
385 Ibid. 
386 Panel Report, US – Wheat Gluten., para 8.176. 
387 Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, paras 98-100.  
388 Appellate Body Report, US – Line Pipe, para 181.  
389 Ibid, paras 197-199; Appellate Body Report on US – Lamb, para 103 (original emphasis). 
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in two different circumstances
390
: 
(1) Where the imports from a regional partner are not considered in the 
determination of serious injury; and 
(2) Where the imports from a regional partner are considered in the 
determination of serious injury, provided that the national authorities have also 
established explicitly, through a reasoned and adequate explanation, that imports 
from a source outside the RTA, alone, satisfied the conditions for the application of a 
safeguard measure as set out in Safeguards Agreement. 
In this author’s understanding, the parallelism requirement in essence obligates 
the parties who are implementing the safeguard measures, to conduct a separate 
investigation of the injury determination on the imports solely from third-parties, 
regardless of any conclusion made from the investigation of the injury determination 
based on the imports from all sources. Once it is determined that the imports from 
third parties alone caused serious injury or threat thereof, safeguard measures can be 
applied to those imports from third parties only. The parallelism requirement actually 
grants permission to exclude the regional imports from the global safeguard measure.  
In summary, the parallelism requirement allows WTO Members to exclude the 
imports from RTA-partners from the application of the global safeguard measure, 
where the national authority demonstrates that the imports from the third-parties 
alone satisfy the conditions set up in the WTO general rules on safeguards. However, 
the parallelism requirement is not completely consistent with the requirements under 
GATT Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards on two issues, for the reasons: 
(1) Parallelism requires the national authorities to exclude the regional imports in 
the consideration of the injury determination if the Member wants to exclude the 
regional imports from the application of the measure. This is not consistent with 
Article 4 of the Safeguards Agreement, which requires the national authorities to take 
account of all relevant factors having a bearing on the situation of the domestic 
industry, although the injury effects of the regional imports should not be attributed 
to the third-parties’ imports.  
(2) Parallelism is ambiguous on whether Article XXIV is a defence to exclude 
the regional imports from global safeguard measures. In US – Line Pipe, the 
                                                     
390 Appellate Body Report, US - Line Pipe, at para 198. 
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Appellate Body avoided this question, providing that:  
“We need not, and so do not, rule on the question whether Article XXIV of the 
GATT 1994 permits exempting imports originating in a partner of a free-trade 
area from a measure in departure from Article 2.2 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards. The question of whether Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 serves 
as an exception to Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards became relevant 
in only two possible circumstances. One is when, in the investigation by the 
national authorities of a WTO Member, the imports that are exempted from 
the safeguard measure are not considered in the determination of serious 
injury. The other is when, in such an investigation, the imports that are 
exempted from the safeguard measure are considered in the determination of 
serious injury, and the national authorities have also established explicitly, 
through a reasoned and adequate explanation, that imports from sources 
outside the free-trade area, alone, satisfied the conditions for the application of 
a safeguard measure, as set out in Article 2.1 and elaborated in Article 4.2.”
391
 
In other words, according to the Appellate Body, GATT Article XXIV only 
comes into play if parallelism has been respected. From this statement, one can 
deduce that, for the Appellate Body, GATT Article XXIV can never justify a 
violation of parallelism. Yet, the Appellate Body has never explained why this is the 
case.
392
 If this question is not substantially answered, it is hard to discern why 
excluding the regional imports from the safeguard measure is WTO-consistent, when 
they are allowed to be excluded from the investigation of the injury determination.  
Moreover, the parallelism requirement is based on footnote 1 of Article 2.1 of the 
WTO Safeguards Agreement. Since there is no similar text in contained in GATT 
Article VI (neither in the Agreement on Anti-Dumping nor in the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), this approach cannot solve the 
discriminatory treatment in anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures that 
invoking GATT Article XXIV as a defence raises. Therefore, it is necessary to re-
address the WTO-consistency test on the TRMs in RTAs. 
 
                                                     
391 Appellate Body Report, US - Line Pipe, at para. 198. 
392 J Pauwelyn, “The Puzzle of WTO Safeguards and Regional Trade Agreements” (2004) 7(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 109, at p 122.  
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4.3 Relationship between Article XXIV and WTO Rules on 
Safeguards, Anti-Dumping and Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures  
 
Since GATT/WTO provisions are based on the non-discriminatory principle 
while Article XXIV is an exception to the WTO non-discrimination principle, there is 
a natural tension between the GATT/WTO general provisions and the RTA-specific 
rules. In these circumstances, GATT Article XXIV plays a role as a conflict clause 
identifying whether a RTA-specific measure is permitted.  However, the language of 
GATT Article XXIV does not explicitly address that to what extent it can be invoked 
as an exception. Put differently, it is unclear whether GATT Article XXIV is an 
exception solely to the GATT Article I (the MFN clause) or to other provisions under 
the GATT/WTO (e.g., GATT Article VI, XIX and the WTO agreements on anti-
dumping, countervailing duty measure and safeguards) as well. Thus, to examine 
whether the RTA-specific TRMs should follow the rules in GATT/WTO general rules 
on those measures, the first important question to address is whether GATT Article 
XXIV can be invoked as defence to justify such deviation (i.e., the legal relationship 
between GATT Article XXIV and the GATT/WTO provisions governing the TRMs). 
 
4.3.1 Relationship between Article XXIV and Other Provisions of the 
GATT 
The relationship between Article XXIV and other GATT provisions is mainly 
defined in paragraph 5 of Article XXIV that grants WTO Members a right to 
derogate from the obligations under other GATT provisions upon the formation of a 
CU or FTA: 
“Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement [the GATT Agreement] shall 
not prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a 
customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement 
necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area…” 
The first question to be answered regarding this issue is whether Article XXIV 
174 
 
should be considered as derogation from Article I of the GATT 1994 only, or from 
other the provisions of the GATT 1994 as well. Both views have historically co-
existed in the Membership.
393
 This question refers to whether Article XXIV provides 
additional rights to RTA parties and therefore may be used as a legal cover for 
otherwise GATT-inconsistent measures or trade policies which the parties to a RTA 
might take or maintain. Persuasive arguments were brought forward to support the 
latter view: 
1) The opening sentence of Article XXIV: 5 refers to the “provisions of the 
Agreement”, not to any one or any defined number of particular provisions of the 
Agreement, not just Article I.
394
  
2) International law on multilateral treaties generally holds that parties to a 
multilateral agreement can form subsequent agreements between a subset of the 
membership of the wider agreement, varying their rights and obligations between 




According to this view, the CRTA added, the act of joining an RTA does not 
modify any of the rights and obligations of a Member towards other Members under 
WTO instruments, as illustrated by the fact that the assumption of Article XXIV: 5 is 
that parties to RTAs can resort to all of the regulations of commerce available to 
them under the various WTO instruments in the conduct of their commercial 
relations with third countries. That would mean, for example, that measures in the 
context of an RTA could differ from the relevant WTO provisions, provided that they 
do so in a manner that does not diminish the rights of third parties.
396
 
This view was also supported by the discussions of the Council for Trade in 
Goods (CTG), at the time of adoption of the first terms of reference for the 
examination of a RTA in the WTO. The mandate for examination of RTAs normally 
reads as follows:  
                                                     
393 For example, in Turkey – Textiles case, the panel concluded that Article XXIV permits derogations from 
Article I, but not from other GATT provisions. See Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, paras 9.188 and 9.189.  
394 Turkey’s argument, Panel Report, Turkey-Textiles, para 6.67; Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, para 12. 
395 Vienna Convention, Art 41.  
396 WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Synopsis of “Systemic” Issues Related to Regional Trade 
Agreements - Note by the Secretariat, WT/REG/W/37, 2 March 2000, p 12. EC, who also stated that this was 
balanced to some extent by the requirement that the incidence of duties and other regulations should not increase 
as a result of the formation of the RTA (WT/REG/M/14, para 13 and WT/REG/M/15, para 54).  
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“According to the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the 
GATT 1994 ‘all notifications under paragraph 7(a) of Article XXIV shall be 
examined by a working party in the light of the relevant provisions of the 
GATT 1994 ...” 
397
 
Since this terminology refers only to the GATT 1994 and does not specify 
whether the examination may also be carried out against the background of all WTO 
Agreements relating to the trade in goods, it was agreed to expand the terms of 
reference through an understanding, whereby Members have  
“... the mandate to examine the incidence and restrictiveness of all duties and 
regulations of commerce, in particular those governed by the provisions of the 
Agreements contained in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement ... although the 
Working Party would conduct its examination in light of the relevant 
provisions of the Agreements contained in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, 
the conclusions of the Report of the Working Party would be confined to 
reporting on consistency with the provisions of Article XXIV”.
398
  
These terms of reference (including the understanding) became standard for all 
subsequent examinations of RTAs notified under GATT Article XXIV.  
In accord with above interpretations, it is observed that Article XXIV has an 
extraordinary independent position in GATT. It is a derogation from all provisions of 
GATT 1994, and not merely from the MFN principle. 
 
4.3.2 Relationship between Article XXIV and WTO Agreements (e.g. 
the WTO Agreements on Anti-Dumping, Countervailing Duty 
Measures and Safeguards) 
Above analyses made it clear that Article XXIV can justify the violation of other 
GATT provision, including Article VI that addresses the anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty measures, Article XVI which deals with subsidies, and Article 
XIX which deals with the safeguards. In addition, the terms of reference laid down 
                                                     
397 See WTO, Working Party on the Enlargement of the European Communities - Accession of Austria, Finland 
and Sweden - Terms of Reference and Membership, WT/REG3/1, 13 March 1995.  
398 Ibid. This same understanding applies mutatis mutandis to FTAs.  
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by the CTG above expressed that the Working Party would also conduct its 
examination in light of the relevant provisions of the Agreements contained in Annex 
1A of the WTO Agreement  (the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization). 
However, one would ask whether GATT Article XXIV can justify a measure that 
violates the agreements included in Annex 1A of WTO Agreement despite the GATT 
provisions.  It was noticed in the CRTA discussions that, at the same time as 
multilateral non-tariff trade policy disciplines were developing well beyond the 
original GATT rules, Article XXIV provisions with respect to these matters remain 
static and their relationship with the new disciplines is undefined.
399
 On the face of it, 
the exception in GATT Article XXIV:5 applies solely to inconsistencies with the 
provisions of “this Agreement”, that is GATT 1994 itself. The exception might not, 
therefore, justify RTA measures that are inconsistent with other WTO agreements. 
In Turkey – Textiles, the issue of whether the EC-Turkey customs union was 
consistent with the requirements of Article XXIV was not questioned by the 
complainant, India. Instead, India’s claim was that “WTO Members forming a 
customs union, irrespective of whether their union met the requirements set out in 
Article XXIV or not, had to abide by the disciplines of Article XI:1 of GATT and 
Article 2.4 of the ATC with respect to the trade of third Members”.
400
 The Appellate 
Body specifically addressed this issue in footnote by stating that the chapeau “refers 
only to the provisions of the GATT 1994”.
401
 Nonetheless, the Appellate Body 
considered that Article XXIV:5 could provide an exception for an inconsistency with 
Article 2.4 of the ATC because Article 2.4 itself permits restrictions introduced under 
“relevant GATT 1994 provisions”. The Appellate Body considered that this explicit 
reference to GATT 1994 in Article 2.4 means that the exception in Article XXIV is 
“incorporated in the ATC”.
402
  
The Appellate Body’s reasoning in Turkey – Textiles suggests that the exception 
does not extend automatically to all WTO provisions. In Turkey – Textiles, the 
extension was based on an express reference, in another covered agreement, to GATT 
                                                     
399  WTO Negotiation Group on Rules, Compendium of Issues Related on Regional Trade Agreements – 
Background Note by the Secretariat, TN/RL/W/8/Rev.1, 1 August 2002, p 12. 
400 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, para 6.30. 





By the same token, in a recent case China – Raw Materials, the panel and the 
Appellate Body excluded China’s right to recourse to GATT Article XX as a defence 
to justify China’s export restriction on certain raw materials. The conclusion is based 
on the fact that, Paragraph 11.3 of the China’s Accession Protocol clearly states that 
all fees and charges shall be eliminated on those raw materials, and it does not 
include any express reference to GATT Article XX, or to provisions of the GATT 
more generally that may connect China’s commission under Paragraph 11.3 with 
GATT Article XX exception.
403
  
In line with above rulings, extensions of the exception in Article XXIV:5 to other 
Annex 1A agreements will also depend on the wording and context of the relevant 
provisions. In respect of the TRMs, no such express reference was discovered in the 
Agreement on Anti-dumping, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures or the Agreement on Safeguards
404
. Scholars who support the Appellate 
Body’s “express reference” ruling asserted “[I]f the exception in Article XXIV:5 
permits an RTA measure that is inconsistent with another goods agreement, a conflict 
exists between GATT 1994 and the other agreement. If a panel automatically applied 
the GATT 1994 exception to the other agreement, without examining the specific 
context, this would be contrary to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement.”
405
  
So, does that mean, accordingly, GATT Article XXIV cannot justify the 
measures inconsistent with the agreements on anti-dumping, countervailing measures 
or safeguards? 
                                                     
403 Panel Report, China – Materials Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (“China-Raw 
Materials”),WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R, dated 5 July 2011, para. 7.124; Appellate Body Report, 
China-Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R, dated 30 January 2012, para 291. 
404 In US-Line Pipe, another consideration in extending the exceptions in Article XXIV of GATT 1994 to the 
Agreement on Safeguards is the last sentence of the footnote 1 to the latter agreement, which states: 
“Nothing in [the Agreement on Safeguards] prejudges the interpretation of the relationship between 
Article XIX and paragraph 8 of Article XXIV of GATT 1994.” 
The panel in US – Line Pipe noted that availability of the Article XXIV defence against claims brought under the 
provisions of the Safeguards Agreement is also confirmed by this sentence. (See, Panel Report, US – Line Pipe, 
para.7.151) However, the Appellate Body refused to rule on the question whether Article XXIV of the GATT 
1994 permits exempting imports originating in a partner of a free-trade area from a measure in departure from 
Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards based on above quoted sentence. According to the other content of 
the footnote 1 to Article 2.1 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Appellate Body only admitted that the GATT 
Article XXIV:5 defence to a violation of the Safeguard Agreement is only available when the “parallelism” 
principle was respected (See, Appellate Body report, US – Line Pipe, paras 198-199). Therefore, the extensions 
of GATT Article XXIV:5 exception in the Safeguards Agreement in conditional. See section 4.2 of this thesis 
above. 
405 N JS Lockhart and A D Mitchell, “Regional Trade Agreements under GATT 1994: An Exception and Its 
Limits”, in A D Mitchell (ed), Challenges and Prospects for the WTO (Cameron May 2005) 217, at p 229. 
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In US – Line Pipe, Korea added another argument on this issue that 
“the Agreement on Safeguards constitutes a lex specialis vis-à-vis the general 
obligations arising from the GATT 1994.  The obligations arising under the 
Agreement on Safeguards may go beyond the obligations arising from the GATT 
1994.  In the event of conflict, Korea argues, the provisions of the Agreement on 
Safeguards prevail pursuant to the General interpretative note to Annex 1A of the 






As a matter of fact, although the GATT 1994, which incorporates the original 
Article XXIV in GATT 1947 and the 1994 Understanding, is part of the Annex 1 A of 
the WTO Agreement, the other Annex 1A agreements are given priority over the 
GATT 1994. The General Interpretative Note in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement 
(the “General Interpretative Note”)
407
 explicitly provides that: 
“In the event of conflict between a provision of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 and a provision of another agreement in Annex 1A to the 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (referred to in the 
agreements in Annex 1A as the ‘WTO Agreement’), the provision of the other 
agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.” 
The other Annex 1A agreements include, inter alia, the Agreement on Anti-
dumping, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the 
Agreement on Safeguards. Thus, it is easy to conclude that the latter provisions 
prevail over the GATT 1994 in the event of conflict.  
In response to Korea’s proposition, the panel in US – Line Pipe ruled that the 
Article XXIV:5 of the GATT 1994 can provided a defence to Article 2.2 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards. The panel highlighted the “close interrelation between 
Article XIX and the Safeguard Agreement”, and the fact that “safeguard measures 
subject to the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement are understood to be Article 
XIX measures”.
408
 It noted that Article XXIV:5 provides a defence to the MFN 
                                                     
406 Panel Report, US – Line Pipe, para 7.159. Appellate Body Report, US – Line Pipe, para 40. 
407 The General Interpretative Note was set forth at the beginning of the Annex 1A “Multilateral Agreements on 
Trade in Goods” of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. It is a provision that 
specifies the relationship between the GATT 1994 (and the related understandings) and side agreements on trade 
in goods. 
408 Panel Report, US – Line Pipe, para 7.150. 
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obligations in Article I, XIII, and XIX of GATT 1994
409
 and that it would be 
“incongruous” if it did not also provide a defence to the MFN obligation in Article 
2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards for the same measure.
410
 
Thus, the panel’s reasoning can be seen as a development on the Appellate 
Body’s “express reference” ruling in Turkey-Textiles, which extended the exception 
in Article XXIV:5 to a provision of a side agreement in Annex 1A on the basis of the 
“close interrelation” between such side agreement and another GATT provision that 
allows the exception in Article XXIV:5. 
Although the Appellate Body declared the panel’s findings on Article XXIV 
moot and of no legal effect,
411
 the panel’s reasoning on this issue is compelling in 
accord with the “effectiveness” principle on interpretation of the WTO Agreement. In 
Korea – Dairy, the Appellate Body made an important statement that: 
“We agree with the statement of the Panel that: It is now well established that 
the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’ and therefore all WTO 
obligations are generally cumulative and Members must comply with all of them 
simultaneously ... In light of the interpretative principle of effectiveness, it is the 
duty of any treaty interpreter to ‘read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a 
way that gives meaning to all of them, harmoniously’. An important corollary of 
this principle is that a treaty should be interpreted as a whole, and in particular, 
its sections and parts should be read as a whole.”
412
 
Accordingly, the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of GATT 1994 
should be recognized as imposing a single, cumulative set of obligations on the same 
measures – that is, safeguard measures.
413
 In addition, the preamble of the Agreement 
on Safeguards expressed that it was established “to clarify and reinforce the 
disciplines of GATT 1994, and specifically those of its Article XIX (Emergency 
                                                     
409 Ibid, para 7.146. 
410 Ibid, para 7.150. 
411 Appellate Body Report, US – Line Pipe, paras. 198-199 
412  Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy, para.77. This proposition is supported in the context of the 
relationship between GATT Article III, the TRIMS Agreement, and the SCM Agreement (Indonesia – Autos), 
GATT Article XIII and the Agreement on Agriculture (EC – Bananas III), GATT Article XIII and the Safeguards 
Agreement (US – Line Pipe), and GATT Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement (Korea – Dairy), as well as 
the EC – Bananas III and Canada – Periodicals decisions of the Appellate Body in connection with the 
relationship between GATT and GATS. 
413 See section 2.1.2 of this thesis. 
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Action on Imports of Particular Products)”.
414
 The link is particularly strong in the 
case of the MFN obligation because this same obligation is imposed in both Article 
2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards and in Articles XIX of GATT 1994. 
Nonetheless, in US – Line Pipe, neither did the panel nor the Appellate Body 
make any clarification on the predominant argument put forward by Korea, i.e., 
whether the Agreement on Safeguards constitute a lex specialis vis-à-vis the general 
obligations arising from the GATT 1994, so that it overrides GATT Article XXIV; 
and whether the conflict rule addressed in the General Interpretative Note applies to 
this relationship. The answer is given in another case – Indonesia – Autos.  
In Indonesia – Autos, the panel explicitly examined the concept of “conflict” in 
international treaty interpretation, providing that: 
“In international law for a conflict to exist between two treaties, three 
conditions have to be satisfied. First, the treaties concerned must have the same 
parties.  Second, the treaties must cover the same substantive subject matter. 
Were it otherwise, there would be no possibility for conflict.  Third, the 
provisions must conflict, in the sense that the provisions must impose mutually 
exclusive obligations.”
415
 (emphases added) 
According to the above conditions, in the case of the GATT Article XXIV–
Agreement on Safeguards relationship, no “conflict” could possibly exist because 
these two set of rules direct to substantially different subject matters – the GATT 
Article XXIV regulates the WTO Members’ rights and obligations when constituting 
a regional trade agreement; while, the Agreement on Safeguards sets out the rules on 
imposition of safeguard measures. In the context of the WTO Agreement, the 
“conflict” in the General Interpretative Note rather governs the relationship between 
GATT Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards. In other words, the Agreement 
on Safeguards constitutes a lex specialis vis-à-vis the obligations in GATT Article 
XIX instead of GATT Article XXIV. Therefore, the hierarchical order laid down in 
the General Interpretative Note does not apply to the GATT Article XXIV–
Agreement on Safeguards relationship. 
Defining the GATT Article XXIV–Agreement on Safeguards relationship should 
                                                     
414 Preamble, Agreement on Safeguards. 
415  Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (“Indonesia-Autos”), 
WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, dated 2 July 1998, footnote 649. 
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start with the examination of the possible conflict between GATT Article XIX and 
the Agreement on Safeguards. Since the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX 
of GATT 1994 are recognized as a single, cumulative set of obligations on the same 
measure, in the event that GATT Article XIX allows exceptions in GATT Article 
XXIV:5, the Agreement on Safeguards is deemed offer exception to GATT Article 
XXIV:5 as well, unless it specifically opts itself out of such exception. The same 
rationale should apply to the relationship between GATT Article XXIV and the 
Agreements on Anti-dumping and the Agreements on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures due to the fact that they complement GATT Article VI, which also allows 
exceptions in GATT Article XXIV:5. 
To conclude, the exception in GATT Article XXIV:5 not only applies to all 
provisions of GATT 1994, but may also extend to the provisions of the other Annex 
1A agreements in the WTO, provided that there is “express reference” in a such side 
agreement to GATT 1994, or there is a “close interrelationship” between such a side 
agreement and another GATT provision that allows the exception in Article XXIV:5. 
For the purpose of this paper, it can be determined that GATT Article XXIV can 
provide a derogation from the general obligations in GATT/WTO on TRMs, no 
matter whether such obligations are contained in GATT 1994 or in the WTO 
agreements on anti-dumping, countervailing duty measures and safeguards. Of 
course, this derogation is limited and conditional upon the requirements of Article 
XXIV being met. We will now turn to look at the conditions set by Article XXIV. 
 
4.4 GATT Article XXIV & the 1994 Understanding 
As RTA is an important exception to the MFN principle that is the cornerstone of 
the WTO, Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the 1994 Understanding establish 
strict criteria for an acceptable RTA. The central requirements are contained in 
paragraphs 4, 5 and 8. Article XXIV provides that an acceptable RTA under the 
GATT is an agreement in which duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce 
are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the parties 
(paragraph 8) and which does not raise duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce with respect to trade with third countries (paragraph 5). An RTA should 
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meet both internal (“substantially all the trade liberalization”) and external (“not to 
raise trade barriers against non-parties”) requirements. Article XXIV:4 puts an 
emphasis on this position, saying that the purpose of a RTA should be to facilitate 
trade between the parties and not to raise barriers to the trade of non-parties with the 
parties. Accordingly, the discussions in this section contain two parts: (i) external 
requirements on RTAs regulated in Article XXIV:5; and (ii) internal requirements on 
RTAs regulated in Article XXIX:8. 
 
4.4.1 Article XXIV:5 – External Requirement on RTA 
Paragraph 5 provides for the external requirements on the constitution of an RTA, 
more specifically, an assessment of the conditions of third countries’ access to the 
markets of the parties to an RTA, before and after the formation of the RTA. The 
basis for such an assessment is found in subparagraph (a) for CU and in 
subparagraph (b) for the FTAs:   
“Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the 
territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-
trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation 
of a customs union or of a free-trade area;  Provided that: 
a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a 
formation of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce 
imposed at the institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect 
of trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall 
not on the whole higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the 
duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories 
prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such interim 
agreement, as the case may be; 
b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the 
formation of a free-trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce 
maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable at the 
formation of such free-trade area or the adoption of such interim agreement 
to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not parties to 
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such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the 
corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the 
same constituent territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or 
interim agreement as the case may be; and...  
c) any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall include 
a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a 
free-trade area within a reasonable length of time. (emphasis added)” 
1) Definition and Scope of “duties and other regulations of commerce” 
For the purpose of this paper, the first issue that needs to be clarified here is the 
definition (or coverage) of the expression “duties and other regulations of commerce 
(ORC)” in Article XXIV:5(a) and (b). This refers to whether the assessment of pre- 
and post-RTA trade barriers statutorily includes TRMs in RTAs, especially those 
applicable between the constituent countries of a RTA. 
Since anti-dumping and countervailing measures are described as “duties” in 
Article VI of the GATT (as well as in the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI 
of the GATT 1994, the Agreement on Anti-dumping and the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures), and safeguard measures can also take the form of 
“duties”, it could be arguable that those TRMs are comprehended within the scope of 
“duties” mentioned in Article XXIV:5. However, according to Gobbi Estrella and 
Horlick’s work, evidence was found in the French and Spanish versions of the GATT 
that the term equivalent to “duties” in the English version refers to “customs duties” 
only. Therefore, it was concluded that the duties resulting from anti-dumping, 
countervailing measures and safeguards cannot be easily encompassed by such a 
specific meaning.
416
 As observed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, anti-dumping, 
countervailing and safeguard measures can take the form of customs duties as well as 
price undertaking, quantitative restrictions and extra charges that rectify the low price 
of imports that impair the competition in the importing market. In the former case, 
they fall into the category of “duties” and, in the latter case, they should be 
considered as “other regulations of commerce”. However in all instances, TRMs are 
                                                     
416 A T Gobbi Estrella and G N Horlick, “Mandatory Abolition of Antidumping, Countervailing Duties and 
Safeguards in Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas Constituted between WTO Members: Revisiting a Long-
standing Discussion in Light of the Appellate Body’s Turkey – Textiles Ruling”, in L Bartels and F Ortino (eds), 
Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford University Press 2006) 109, at p 118. 
184 
 
encompassed in ORC and hence they are regulated by Article XXIV:5. 
Although the GATT/WTO did not define the term ORC in Article XXIV:5(a), (b) 
or Article XXIV:8(a)(ii), nor did they specifically distinguish it from the term ORRC 
in Article XXIV:8(a)(i) and (b), the term ORC did receive some interpretation from 
the WTO adjudicating body.  
In Turkey – Textiles, the Panel explicitly defined the meaning of ORC by stating 
that:   
“While there is no agreed definition between Members as to the scope of 
this concept of ‘other regulations of commerce’... More broadly, the ordinary 
meaning of the term ‘other regulations of commerce’ could be understood to 
include any regulation having an impact on trade (such as measures in the 
fields covered by WTO rules, e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary, customs 
valuation, anti-dumping, technical barriers to trade; as well as any other trade 
related domestic regulation, e.g. ...).”
417
 (emphasis added) 
In line with this opinion, ORC is considered to include “any measures having an 
impact on trade” including both border measures which applied upon 
importation/exportation have impact on the cross-border movement of goods (i.e. 
importation/exportation measures, duties, tariffs and charges (other than simply 
“duties”)), and marketplace regulations which applied to imported products that 
adversely affect them as compared with domestic products in the sense of Article III 
of the GATT.
418
 To scholars supporting a broader meaning of ORC, it includes 
anything “trade related” even the subject matter does not fall within the WTO 
Agreements, e.g. domestic/regional regulations on environment, competition, labour 
standards, etc.
419
 In respect of TRMs, no matter if the scope of ORC is defined 
narrowly or broadly, trade remedies, which affect the cross-border movement of 
goods, are clearly included in ORC, without noting the fact that anti-dumping was 
expressly indicated in the list of ORC provided by the Turkey – Textiles Panel. 
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It is clear that ORC has an “outward-looking” meaning and refers to those 
regulations governing the trade of the parties to an RTA with non-RTA parties.
420
 
Hence, the fundamental question here is: does Article XXIV:5 assessment extend to 
RTA internal trade policies (or the impact of the RTA internal trade policies on trade 
with third parties)? 
This question is of special relevance to RTA internal TRM issues discussed in 
this paper. Take anti-dumping measures as an example: in the case where an RTA 
contains preferential anti-dumping provisions inside while retaining the WTO anti-
dumping rules towards the third-parties, should we examine the resulting effect of 
internal anti-dumping provisions on non-RTA member countries against Article 
XXIV:5(a) or (b)? In this case, the anti-dumping measure applicable to the non-RTA 
countries is evidently not “higher or more restrictive” compared with that applicable 
before the formation of the RTA. However, the internal preferential anti-dumping 
provisions in such a RTA are very likely affect trade flow and reduce the market 
share of the products from non-RTA members before the constitution of such RTA. 
Thus, it is questionable whether such preference violates Article XXIV:5(a) or (b). 
According to the ordinary meaning of the expression “duties and other 
regulations of commerce” “in respect of/to the trade with contracting parties not 
parties to such union or agreement”, the legality assessment contained in Article 
XXIV:5(a) or (b) rather directs to the “duties and other regulations of commerce” 
that have a straight link with third-parties. Therefore, trade diversion effects caused 
by a RTA’s internal trade policies will not make this RTA inconsistent with Article 
XXIV:5(a) or (b). 
As there are no agreed definition and scope on ORC, some WTO Members 
urged a formal specification on the concept of ORC for the sake of future RTA 
review and dispute settlement.
421
 One suggestion raised by Korea is to use the 
Standard Format for Information on Regional Trade Agreements [hereafter: the 
Standard Format]
 422
 provided by the CRTA in 1996 to serve as a starting point to 
help clarifying the concepts of ORC and ORRC.
423
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The Standard Format was established to provide uniform guidelines for RTAs 
that would standardize the format in which RTAs would be notified in accordance 
with paragraph 7(a) of GATT Article XXIV. However, the information requested in 
this Standard Format “does not prejudge the scope and coverage of the consistency 
aspect of the examination process, nor does it replace the requirement for parties to 
regional trade agreements to provide Members with all relevant texts of the laws and 
detailed trade and tariff data”.
424
 Therefore, WTO Members “may adhere to the 
requirements of the Standard Format on a voluntary basis; in this respect, it should be 
viewed as Guidelines by the [CRTA] Chairman as to basic information that could be 
provided by parties notifying regional agreements to the WTO.”
425
  
As noted by Korea, many of the issues to be considered in interpreting the terms 
ORC and ORRC arise out of this document. In its section covering “Trade 
Provisions”, the Standard Format requests information on virtually all possible 
measures relating to trade that may be covered by a RTA as listed below:  
- Import Restrictions: Duties and Charges, Quantitative Restrictions, 
Common External Tariffs; 
- Export Restrictions: Duties and Charges, Quantitative Restrictions; 
- Rules of Origin; 
- Standards: Technical Barriers to Trade, Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures; 
- Safeguards; 
- Anti-dumping and countervailing measures; 
- Subsidies and State-aid; 
- Sector-specific provisions; and 
- Other: cooperation in customs administration, import licensing and 
customs evaluation, etc., in cases where they differ from those applied on 
a MFN basis. 
Noteworthy, the information sought in the Standard Format “does not preclude 
Members from posing questions in writing and seeking additional information from 
                                                     






 In other words, this list is comprehensive but not exhaustive. Therefore, 
measures not listed are also worth consideration in respect of ORC and ORRC, 
including domestic marketplace regulations affecting imports/exports and 
domestic/regional regulations which direct to the subject matters that are presently 
not covered in WTO regime.  
As noted by Korea, the Standard Format does not use the terms ORC or ORRC 
at all, even though those terms appear in GATT Article XXIV. Thus, it would be 
instructive for the CRTA to explain why the Standard Format does not use the same 
terms to describe measures that are specifically used in GATT Article XXIV.
427
 
Although no link has been established between the Standard Format list and the 
term ORC/ORRC, the illustration of the Standard Format list serves a good 
formulation to specify the coverage of “ORC” referred to in paragraphs 5(a)(b) and 
8(a)(ii) and “duties and ORRC” referred to in Article XXIV:8(a)(i) and (b). 
Following the Turkey – Textiles Panel’s ruling, it will be undisputable that all trade 
provisions listed in the Standard Format should be included in the scope of ORC. On 
the other hand, the categories divided by the Standard Format may be borrowed to 
distinguish the “other regulations of commerce” (ORC) from “other restrictive 
regulations of commerce” (ORRC). 
 
2) Compare the trade barriers on third parties before and after the constitution of a 
RTA 
The consequent issue is how to compare pre- and post- RTA trade barriers to 
judge a RTA’s compatibility or how a WTO member that is party to a RTA knows if it 
has satisfied this requirement. This issue was raised especially in respect of the CUs, 
since the parties to a CU after the formation of such CU are required to take common 
trade policy to the third-parties. In other words, members forming a CU must adjust 
their external protection (e.g. tariffs) so that all members provide the same level of 
protection.  
In adjusting external protection levels when forming a CU, members of the CU 
must be mindful of their Article XXIV:5(a) obligation. Article XXIV:5(a) states: 
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“[W]ith respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a 
formation of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce 
imposed at the institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect of 
trade with the contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall not 
on the whole higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties 
and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the 
formation of such union or the adoption of such interim agreement, as the case 
may be.”  
The use of the phrases “on the whole” and “general incidence” suggests that 
Article XXIV:5(a) does not require an item-by-item comparison of protection before 
and subsequent to the formation of the CU. Instead, a general comparison of overall 
external protection before and subsequent to the formation of the CU appears 
sufficient.  
Although no consensus was reached in GATT years, the 1994 Understanding 
ended any lingering debate on this issue. The interpretation makes clear that the 
comparison is to a tariff-line basis and is worth quoting at length. Article XXIV:5 
itself does not stipulate precise criteria on this issue. Whereas, the 1994 
Understanding paragraph 2 provides the evaluation of the general incidence of the 
duties and other regulations of commerce applicable before and after the formation 
of a CU:  
“The evaluation under paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV of the general 
incidence of the duties and other regulations of commerce applicable before and 
after the formation of a customs union shall in respect of duties and charges be 
based upon an overall assessment of weighted average tariff rates and of 
customs duties collected. This assessment shall be based on import statistics for 
a previous representative period to be supplied by the customs union, on a tariff-
line basis and in values and quantities, broken down by WTO country of origin. 
The Secretariat shall compute the weighted average tariff rates and customs 
duties collected in accordance with the methodology used in the assessment of 
tariff offers in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. For this 
purpose, the duties and charges to be taken into consideration shall be the 
applied rates of duty. It is recognized that for the purpose of the overall 
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assessment of the incidence of other regulations of commerce for which 
quantification and aggregation are difficult, the examination of individual 
measures, regulations, products covered and trade flows affected may be 
required.” (emphases added) 
However, opinions within the CRTA again fall into two distinct camps where 
customs unions are concerned (sub-paragraph 5(a)):
428
  
(a) Some maintained that, in such a case, only the net effect of the barriers on 
third parties is to be considered: while an increase in the overall level of barriers is 




(b) Others see the phrase “not to raise barriers” not only as an attempt to 
maintain a standstill in overall barriers against third parties but as preventing any 
new barriers from being raised.
430
 
In the Turkey – Textiles case, the Panel found that “What paragraph 5(a) provides, 
in short, is that the effect of the resulting trade measures and policies of the new 
regional agreement shall not be more trade restrictive, overall, than were the 
constituent countries’ previous trade policies” and that paragraph 5(a) provided for 




With respect to “other regulations of commerce” adopted by a CU, the Appellate 
Body in Turkey – Textiles further explained that “Article XXIV:5(a) requires that 
those applied by the constituent members after the formation of the customs union 
‘shall not on the whole be... more restrictive than the general incidence’ of the 
regulations of commerce that were applied by each of the constituent members 
before the formation of the customs union. Paragraph 2 of the Understanding on 
Article XXIV explicitly recognizes that the quantification and aggregation of 
regulations of commerce other than duties may be difficult, and, therefore, states that 
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‘for the purpose of the overall assessment of the incidence of other regulations of 
commerce for which quantification and aggregation are difficult, the examination of 




The Appellate Body then agreed with the Panel that the terms of Article 
XXIV:5(a), as elaborated and clarified by paragraph 2 of the Understanding on 
Article XXIV, provide: 
“… that the effects of the resulting trade measures and policies of the new 
regional agreement shall not be more trade restrictive, overall, than were the 
constituent countries’ previous trade policies.”
433
 
As quoted in the above ruling, the Appellate Body stressed that Article XXIV:5 
requires the evaluation of not merely the form but the effects of trade policy measures 
of the new RTAs. It can be concluded that, the Panel and the Appellate Body in 
Turkey – Textile clearly supported the view (a) that the evaluation of the trade 
measures and policies of a CU focuses on the net effect of the barriers or third parties. 
Any single barriers of trade being raised may not be an issue under Article XXIV:5(a) 
and the 1994 Understanding. In the event that new barriers are raised due to the 
formation of a CU, such new barriers should be permitted, providing that the overall 
level of the barriers of such RTA is still lower than the level before the constitution of 
the CU, because it is very likely that the effect of the new barriers will be evened out 
by other trade measures and policies.  
In contrast with the assessment approach on CU, the language contained in 
Article XXIV:5(b) in respect of the FTA seemingly does not refer to duties and other 
regulations of commerce as a whole, but to individual instruments. Thus, the external 
requirement on the constitution of a FTA “assumed, is not, in principle, to come to 
more or less the pre-FTA situation by rebalancing various instruments; it is to ensure 
that each and every individual trade instrument will not become more restrictive, 
post-establishment of the FTA”.
434
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4.4.2 Article XXIV:8 – Internal Requirement on RTA 
Article XXIV:8 sets out internal criteria on the constitution of RTA: 
  “For the purposes of this Agreement: 
(a)  A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single 
customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that 
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where 
necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are 
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in 
products originating in such territories, and, 
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same 
duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of 
the union to the trade of territories not included in the union; 
(b)  A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more 
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, 
XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the 
constituent territories in products originating in such territories.”  
In other words, it lays down a definition on what qualifies as a FTA or a CU, 
which essentially requires WTO Members wishing to enter into a CU or a FTA will 
have to eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce with respect to 
substantially all trade in products originating in the constituents of the regional 
integration scheme. The language shows that it seeks to protect RTA members 
themselves from another member’s exclusion of trade from the agreement and to 
protect other WTO Members from claiming an exception from the MFN principle for 
agreements that are not really FTAs or CUs. The internal requirement of FTAs and 
CUs is virtually the same. The idea behind the Article XXIV:8 requirement was to 
ensure that countries go “all the way” in their regional liberalization. GATT framers 
wanted RTAs to be vehicles that would eventually lead to multilateral free trade 






Although Article XXIV:8 lays down important requirements specifically on how 
to treat the duties and ORRC between the member states of RTA, whether trade 
remedy measures should be eliminated in RTAs has proven controversial.  
Looking closer into Article XXIV:8, when the key paragraph 8(a)(i) and (b) rule 
that a CU or FTA is meant to eliminate the “duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce ... with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories in products originating in such territories...”, it exclusively permitted 
several GATT provisions (i.e. Article XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) to be retained 
in the formation of a CU or FTA. Neither GATT 1994 Article VI (anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures) nor Article XIX (safeguard measures) is cited in this 
exception list. This expression can be easily understood on its face that those TRMs 
should certainly be eliminated in a RTA. Nevertheless, since early reviews of RTAs 
under the GATT, the absence of GATT Article VI and XIX in the exceptions list in 
Article XXIV:8 has become an issue of whether this provision obligates the RTA to 
eliminate the TRMs for intra-regional trade, or allows the RTA to retain the TRMs.
436
 
The WTO Secretariat has observed that “[t]he drafting history does not indicate why 
Articles XI-XV and XX were included in the list of exceptions while others, in 
particular Article XIX, were not included”.
437
 The disagreements on TRMs most 
likely derive from their contingency nature, which is similar to some regulations 
included in the exceptions list in Article XXIV:8, as well as the impact on trade flow 
once they are imposed discriminatively.
438
 So far, no consensus has ever been 




Given the fact that there are plenty of terms and expressions in Article XXIV:8 
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that have not gained a common understanding among WTO Members, disagreement 
on trade remedy issues in RTAs extensively involves several questions listed below. 
The first question is whether the “duties and ORRC” encompasses TRMs? 
Although the term “duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce” is 
presented as a central notion of Article XXIV:8, its definition and scope have never 
been clearly identified in any official GATT/WTO documents. Hence, it is not clear 
what exactly the “duties and ORRC” means. The exclusion of TRMs in the 
exceptions list could mean that TRMs are simply not ORRC, thus they are not 
subject to elimination according to Article XXIV:8. In this circumstance, Article 
XXIV:8 cannot justify elimination or discriminatory TRMs in RTAs at all.  
But it is also possible that the TRMs are included in “duties and ORRC”. Then 
other possibilities arise. 
Apparently, Article XXIV:8 divided the duties and ORRC applicable between 
the WTO Members into two groups – the group of measures included in the 
parenthesis are not subject to elimination in RTAs, whereas the remaining duties and 
ORRC must be eliminated on substantially all the trade to meet the qualification of a 
RTA. Prevailing debate on intra-regional TRMs, which does not fall into the 
parenthesis, arose over the nature of this exceptions list provided in Article XXIV:8 
–  that is, whether it is illustrative or exhaustive. 
If the list of exceptions under Article XXIV:8 of GATT is interpreted as 
exhaustive, TRMs, as well as other duties and ORRC which are not covered in the 
list, should be deemed “forbidden” among RTA partners. To the contrary, if the list of 
exceptions is only illustrative, the parenthesized measures that are exempted from 
elimination in a RTA may encompass TRMs. As a consequence, RTA members 
would be either permitted or obligated to maintain TRMs, same as other 
parenthesized measures, in intra-regional trade. In this regard, the mandatory or 
optional nature of the list of exceptions to the rule on elimination of duties and 
ORRC in Article XXIV:8 is of relevance.  
In the parenthesized listed exceptions, Article XXIV:8 states that “except, where 
necessary, those permitted under ...”. Disagreement thus turned on whether the list of 
exceptions to the rule on elimination of duties and ORRC in Article XXIV:8 may or 




One interpretation (the “may” interpretation) reads the phrase as providing that a 
party to a CU or FTA is allowed to apply the restrictions listed in the parenthesis to 
imports from its RTA partners, when that party deems it necessary. In line with this 
interpretation, the RTA parties are not obligated to maintain those restrictive 
regulations of commerce addressed in the parenthesis. As a consequence, no matter 
whether the TRMs fall into the list of exceptions or not, RTA members are entitled to 
eliminate them in intra-regional trade.  
The other interpretation (the “must” interpretation) reads the same phrase as 
permitting a party to a CU or FTA to apply the restrictions in the listing to the trade 
of its partners in the arrangement whenever necessary pursuant to the terms and 
principles of the listed provisions themselves. Since most listed provisions set forth 
criteria prescribing that the measures they regulate shall apply on a MFN basis, the 
“must” interpretation implies that the measures regulated by the provisions in the 
listing must remain applicable in intra-CU or intra-FTA trade and must be imposed 
on RTA parties whenever imposed on third parties.
440
 The rule applies to TRMs as 
well if the listed exceptions are illustrative. 
Moreover, some scholars assert that since Article XXIV:8 stipulates that a CU or 
FTA is understood as duties and ORRC (except, ...) are eliminated with respect to 
“substantially all the trade” between the constituent territories of such a CU or FTA, 
the rule on elimination of duties and ORRC with respect to “substantially all the 
trade” requires that trade restrictions not be applied (rather than be applicable) to a 
portion of the intra-RTA trade correspondent to the “substantially all the trade” 
threshold.
441
 Even if the analyses on ORRC and the exceptions list allow the 
existence of TRMs in intra-regional trade, the “substantially all the trade” threshold 
renders the maintenance of TRMs in RTAs impossible or applicable to an 
insubstantial portion of trade only. Thus, the “substantially all the trade” requirement 
also merits consideration in respect of whether TRMs are subject to elimination in 
RTAs according to GATT Article XXIV:8. 
 
1) The scope and definition of “duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce”  
                                                     
440 Ibid, at p 122. 
441 Ibid, at p125. 
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As noted by Matsushita et al, the disagreement on the scope of the term arose in 
the 1970 Working Party report on EEC-Association with Africa and Malagasy States 
is that whether the fiscal charges on imports in the RTA should be eliminated as 
“duties and ORRC” according to Article XXIV:8. The members of the Working 
Party which were not members to such a FTA held that the free trade within the 
meaning of Article XXIV:8(b) did not exist in view of the continued imposition by 
certain parties to the FTA of fiscal charges on imports from other members.  
However, the members of the FTA declared that “the provision of Article XXIV, 
concerning the concept of a free-trade area concerned only protective measures. The 
taxes referred to were of a fiscal character, not protective…”
442
 In the end, where the 




The discussion on how to deal with trade remedies such as anti-dumping, 
countervailing and safeguard measures also starts with the definition and scope of the 
duties and ORRC in Article XXIV:8.  
Compared with the expression “other regulations of commerce” (ORC) 
contained in Article XXIV:5(a)(b) and Article XXIV:8(a)(ii), the term ORRC is 
prefixed with the adjective word “restrictive”. The reference to restrictiveness would 
seem to argue that ORC and ORRC were intended to have different meaning. 
However, the coincident wording of these two terms makes it reasonable to believe 
that the “measures referred to in Article XXIV:8(a)(i) and (b) are a subset of the ORC 
referred to in paragraphs 5(a)(b) and 8(a)(ii), distinguished by its restrictive nature, 
thus the meaning of ORC informs the meaning of ORRC.”
444
 Raising the Turkey-
Textiles panel’s ORC definition for possible application to ORRC, the ORRC should 
be understood as any regulations having “restrictive” effect on trade. 
Borrowing the trade regulations listed in the Standard Format, it might be argued 
that the rules of origin and standards (e.g. the TBT and the SPS measures) are not 
encompassed in the scope of ORRC as they are not ordinary “restrictive”, because 
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they are not intended, as other measures are, to reduce market access for economic 
reasons. The only possibility to include them in ORRC is where they accord less 
favourable treatment to like imported products of the regional members. 
445
 In 
contrast, anti-dumping and countervailing measures are described as “duties” that are 
imposed on the importation of products in addition to ordinary customs duties in 
GATT Article VI and the Agreement on Anti-dumping/SCM; safeguard measure is 
defined as a modification or withdraw of market access concession for imported 
goods under GATT Article XIX and the Agreement of Safeguards, which normally 
takes the form of either duty or quantitative restriction. Although those TRMs are 
temporary in nature, their very purpose is to restrict imports in a legitimate time-span 
and they do have restrictive effect on imports within this period of time. Thus, there 
is little reason to infer that TRMs are not encompassed in the scope of ORRC. 
Therefore, this conclusion invites further examination of whether they should be 
eliminated in RTA under GATT Article XXIV:8. 
 
2) The exhaustive or illustrative nature of the exceptions list of Article XXIV:8 
As mentioned previously, to meet the qualification of a RTA, RTA members are 
required to eliminate duties and ORRC applicable between them on substantially all 
the trade. However, Article XXIV:8 specifically exempts a group of measures, i.e. 
Article XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX, from the obligation of elimination in RTA. 
To establish whether TRMs are subject to elimination in RTA, most discussions are 
linked to the exhaustive/illustrative nature of the permitted exceptions to the internal 
elimination of “other restrictive regulations of commerce” (ORRC) in an RTA, as 
provided in Article XXIV:8. 
Three interpretations have been put forward in this regard.  
First, the list of exceptions under Article XXIV:8 of GATT should be interpreted 
as exhaustive. The duties and ORRC that are not covered in the list, including trade 
remedies, should be deemed “forbidden” among RTA partners.  
Second, the list of exceptions is only illustrative; the parenthesized measures that 
are exempted from elimination in RTA may encompass TRMs. As a consequence, 
                                                     
445 See, J H Mathis, , “Regional Trade Agreements and Domestic Regulation: What Reach for ‘Other Restrictive 
Regulations of Commerce’?”, in L. Bartels and F. Ortino (eds), RTA and the WTO Legal System (Oxford 
University Press 2006) 79, at p 91, footnote 33. 
197 
 
RTA members are either obliged or permitted to maintain TRMs in intra-regional 
trade. 
The third “flexible” interpretation, supported by the EU in the context of global 
safeguards, is that the application of those measures to RTA partners is “permitted 




People holding the “exhaustive” view have interpreted the reference to “other 
regulations restricting trade” to include TRMs and anti-dumping actions in particular. 
They argue that, since RTAs have the objective of dismantling all barriers to intra-
regional trade, one natural expectation is that RTA members will abolish the use of 
trade remedies against intra-bloc trade.
447
 On this view, the elimination of TRMs is a 
requirement under GATT Article XXIV. This view is strengthened by the fact that 
paragraph 8(b) of GATT Article XXIV allows, where necessary, RTA members to 
exclude certain GATT articles from the general requirement to “eliminate other 
regulations restricting trade”. It would have been easy to add GATT Article VI (anti-
dumping and countervailing duties) and XIX (safeguards) to the excluded GATT 
Articles, if that had been the intention of the framers of the GATT. That they are not 
would suggest to some that RTAs which retain the use of trade remedy instruments 
are inconsistent with GATT rules.
448
 From the treaty interpretative view, some 
asserted that since the bracketed list provides an exception to the general rule of 
elimination of ORRC, it would normally be interpreted in a manner precluding the 




The advocates of the “illustrative” position hold the view that, while Article XX 
(General Exceptions) is included in the list, Article XXI (Security Exceptions) is not, 
so if the list is “exhaustive”, import-export control concerning security cannot be 
                                                     
446 WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Synopsis of “Systemic” Issues Related to Regional Trade 
Agreements - Note by the Secretariat, WT/REG/W/37, 2 March 2000. The EU is reported to hold the view that 
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utilized. This would be unacceptable to any WTO Member.
450
 In a like manner, it 
was noticed that GATT Article XVIII-B (BOP restrictions by developing countries) is 
not included in the exceptions list.
451
 Article XVIII-B permits less economically 
developed WTO members to impose BOP restrictions, subject to several conditions, 
including the conditions that the restrictions “avoid unnecessary damage to the 
commercial or economic interests of any other contracting party” and that the party 
imposing the restrictions relax the restrictions as its economic conditions improve. 
These qualifications make the operations of Article XVIII-B similar to the operation 
of GATT Article XII-XV mentioned in the Article XXIV:8 exceptions list. Inclusion 
of one regulation while excluding another which serves a very similar purpose also 
explains the illustrative nature of the list. 
To address these arguments, people in the “exhaustive” camp allege that Article 
XXI exclusively states: “Nothing in this Agreement ... shall prevent any contracting 
party from taking any action which it considered necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests.” It seems a strong case that “nothing in this Agreement” 
includes the requirement of “elimination of the duties and ORRC” under GATT 
Article XXIV:8. Thus, notwithstanding that Article XXIV:8 does not specifically 
exempt Article XXI measures, a member of an RTA may apply national security 
exceptions to its RTA partners.
452
 As for the GATT Article XVIII-B, it was pointed 
out that the BOP provisions of Article XVIII-B were added to the GATT in the 1955 
Review Session amendments, seven years after the formal text of Article XXIV was 
adopted.
453
 It is possible that the drafters of Article XVIII-B simply overlooked 
amending the Article XXIV:8 exceptions list to include Article XVIII. Unlike the 
Article XXI and Article XVIII-B, it may be difficult to make strong argument that 
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why TRMs could be retained in a RTA.
454
 
However, given the seriousness of the law making and the conclusion of the 
WTO Agreement in 1995, it is hard to believe that the negotiators and the drafters of 
the WTO Agreement would have overlooked these two provisions. 
In dispute settlement in the WTO era, the Argentina – Footwear (EC) Panel 
opined that safeguards could be entertained between the regional members as, “[i]n 
our view, that paragraph does not necessarily prohibit the imposition of safeguard 
measures between the constituent territories.”
455
 Although the Appellate Body 
skilfully rejected the Panel’s view without explaining why, it implicitly determined 
that a member of a RTA may impose safeguards against other members of the RTA, 
as well as in the case of US – Wheat Gluten and US – Line Pipe.
456
 While not a 
definitive ruling on this issue, this line of jurisprudence suggests that the Appellate 
Body read the list of exceptions in Article XXIV:8 as not exhaustive. 
 
3) The optional or mandatory nature of the exceptions list 
Noteworthy, the illustrative view does not answer the question whether TRMs, 
on the other hand, can be eliminated in RTA. In other words, even if TRMs are 
comprehended in the exceptions list, the wording of Article XXIV:8 is ambiguous on 
whether they must or may be retained in RTAs (in the later case, they can also be 
eliminated as the RTA members wish). In the parenthesized listed exceptions, Article 
XXIV:8 states that “except, where necessary, those permitted under ...”. 
Disagreement thus turned on whether the list of exceptions to the rule on elimination 
of duties and ORRC in Article XXIV:8 may or must be retained in RTA, focusing on 
how the phrase “where necessary” shall be read. In an early work on this issue, two 
possible interpretations were put forward in light of the context of Article XXIV:8: 
First, it could mean that an RTA member country may apply those restrictions 
listed to other RTA members, notwithstanding the general requirement to eliminate 
substantially all barriers to intraregional trade, where the RTA member deems it 
necessary in order to address the policy concerns underlying each restriction. This 
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The second possible reading is that an RTA member is permitted to apply the 
restrictions to other RTA members where necessary to act in conformance with the 
terms and principles of the exceptions measures themselves. Most of the other 
articles in the exceptions list also include criteria limiting the extent to which they 
can be applied in a manner prejudicial to the interests of particular WTO members. 
This second reading of the “where necessary” language suggests that they too must 
be applied to RTA members as well as non-members where necessary to meet those 
criteria. Policy considerations support this reading for each of the listed exceptions as 
well. In each case, excluding imports of another RTA member from application of the 
exceptions increases the burden on imports from non-RTA members or discriminates 
against them without sound policy justification.
458
 
In Turkey – Textiles the Appellate Body resolved the long lasting debate on the 
optional or mandatory nature of the list of exceptions in Article XXIV:8. When 
stating its framework for assessing the availability of defence based on Article XXIV 
of the GATT, the Appellate Body ruled in Turkey – Textiles that: 
“Sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) of Article XXIV establishes the standard for the internal 
trade between constituent Members in order to satisfy the definition of a 
“customs union”. It requires the constituent members of a customs union to 
eliminate “duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce” with respect to 
“substantially all the trade” between them.”
459
 
Furthermore, the Appellate Body noted, with regard to the exceptions list in the 
same provision, that: 
“The terms of subparagraph 8(a)(i) provide that members of a customs union 
may maintain, where necessary, in their internal trade, certain restrictive 
regulations of commerce that are otherwise permitted under Articles XI through 
XV and under Article XX of the GATT 1994.” (emphasis added) 
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The above quotations leave no doubt that the Appellate Body endorsed the 
“may” interpretation of the meaning of the exception listing.
460
 According to this 
ruling, the RTA parties are not obligated to retain those restrictive regulations of 
commerce addressed in the parenthesis, as the case may be. On the assumption that 
the list of permitted exception is illustrative, i.e. the TRMs may be included in the 
exception list to ORRC, Article XXIV:8 still leaves room for the RTA members to 
eliminate the TRMs internally. In this sense, the “flexible” interpretation that views 
Article XXIV:8 “permits but not obliges” the existence of TRMs in RTAs is a 
development of the illustrative interpretation. 
 
4) “Substantially all the trade” 
As mentioned at the outset, since Article XXIV:8 requires the constituent 
members of a CU/FTA to eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce with respect to “substantially all the trade” between them, “substantially 
all the trade” (SAT) becomes another parameter related to the 
elimination/maintenance of TRMs in RTAs. 
The SAT requirement in Article XXIV:8 is generally considered that the 
elimination of duties and ORRC in RTAs should cover a sufficient percentage of 
trade and at the majority sectors of the national economy. Because there is no exact 
definition referring to the term “substantially all the trade”, neither the GATT 
contracting parties nor the WTO Members have ever reached an agreement on to 
what extent an elimination of the trade barriers in RTAs would meet such 
requirement.
461
 Disagreements normally give rise to how much volume of the trade 
(in percentage) should be liberalized in RTAs, whether the SAT requirement allows 
any major sector to be excluded from the liberalization and what other factors should 
be taken into account when evaluating the SAT.
462
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The economist Jagdish Bhagwati considered that Article XXIV:8’s SAT 
requirement was intended to close all potential legal loopholes that would allow the 
GATT/WTO system to degenerate into an array of less-than-100-percent RTAs. In 
practice, however, he argues, this rule’s ambiguity and potential pressures from RTA 
advocators has made it nearly impossible for the GATT/WTO to sanction RTAs that 
doesn’t cover all trade between its members.
463
 
The panel in the Turkey – Textiles case examined this issue and concluded that 
the “ordinary meaning of the term ‘substantially’...appears to provide for both 
qualitative and quantitative components.”
464
 In particular, the panel noted that “in the 
terms of sub-paragraph 8(a)(i), the possibility for parties to a customs union to 
maintain certain restrictions of commerce on their trade with each other, including 
quantitative restrictions (“…where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, 
XIII, XIV, XV and XX”). This implies that even for “substantially all trade 
originating in the constituent countries” to be covered [...], certain WTO compatible 
restrictions can be maintained.”
465
 The Appellate Body agreed with the panel on this 
point, concluding that the SAT test in Article XXIV:8 requires both a percentage of 
trade to be liberalized and the non-exclusion of any major sector.
466
 It also confirmed 
the panel’s view that that this test offers the requisite flexibility because, although it 
does require “something considerably more than merely some of the trade”, 
“substantial” is clearly not the same as “all”.
467
 
Advocates of the “exhaustive” view on ORRC assert that since Article XXIV:8 
requires the duties and ORRC (except, ...) are eliminated with respect to 
“substantially all the trade” between the constituent territories of a RTA, the rule on 
elimination of duties and ORRC with respect to SAT requires that trade restrictions 
                                                                                                                                                      
“[the] GATT Analytical Index (vol.2) on p 824 in footnote 162 provides and exhaustive list of 
Working Party reports dealing with this issue, where the outcome is still the same; the term under 
examination has not been clearly defined in relevant GATT practice. In series of papers that the 
WTO Secretariat prepared for the Committee, the conclusion was inescapable: 50 years of practice 
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not be applied (rather than applicable) to a portion of the intra-RTA trade 
correspondent to the SAT threshold.
468
 Even if the analyses on ORRC and the 
exceptions list allow the existence of TRMs in intra-regional trade, the SAT threshold 
renders the maintenance of TRMs in RTAs impossible or applicable to an 
insubstantial portion of trade only. Some advocates in “illustrative” camp hold the 
view that, “substantially all the trade” (not “all the trade”) offers enough flexibility to 
permit regional TRMs.
469
 This also suggests the TRMs are only applicable to the 
insubstantial portion of the RTA internal trade if they are included in the exceptions 
list to ORRC. 
However, whether products subject to ORRC listed in the parenthesis in Article 
XXIV:8 are part of the “substantial” or “insubstantial” portion of trade is arguable. In 
Lockhart and Mitchell’s work, the authors asserted that the measures included in the 
exceptions list to ORRC should not be constrained to the “insubstantial” portion of 
trade. To demonstrate their view, they specifically analysed the restrictions 
maintained pursuant to GATT Article XX: 
“Article XX provides a general exception to all GATT 1994 obligations. In 
certain circumstances, Article XX allows Members to promote governance 
priorities – such as public health and environmental protection – that conflict 
with WTO rules. [...] There is broad recognition in the WTO agreements, and 
among WTO Members, that Members should have discretion to pursue these 
other priorities, subject to the conditions governing the exceptions to WTO rules. 
However, if a product subject to health restrictions permitted by Article XX 
necessarily formed part of the insubstantial portion of trade on which ORRCs 
had not been eliminated, this would constrain WTO Member’s right to pursue 
health objectives. In a customs union or an FTA, a WTO Member would be able 
to promote health only through internal restrictions on the “insubstantial” group 
of products. As well as being questionable in terms of State sovereignty, this 
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reading of Article XXIV:8 would be at odds with the text of Article XX.”
470
  
Thus, they read the structure of Articles XXIV:8(a)(i) and (b) as requires a RTA 
to “eliminate all ORRCs – except those bracketed – on substantially all trade.”
471
 
Since the exceptions list is located immediately after the phrase “duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce” and, together with this phrase, the regulations in 
the bracket should also be excluded from the SAT threshold.  
In line with this understanding, WTO Members would be entitled to maintain, 
where necessary, any of the ORRC listed in the brackets with respect to any product 
and any percentage of the trade. This interpretation of the SAT threshold would, 
therefore, avoid the problem of constraining Members from maintaining measures 
permitted under Article XX. 
This argument is particular strong, taking account of the fact that Article XX(b) 
states “nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any Member of measures ... necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health”. If GATT Article XXIV:8 meant that Article XX health measures 
could only be maintained on the insubstantial portion of trade, it would ‘prevent’ the 
adoption or enforcement of health measures on ‘substantially all the trade’, contrary 
to Article XX. Therefore, maintenance of the restrictions under the exceptions list in 
Article XXIV:8 should not be bounded in the “insubstantial” portion of trade. 
According to this interpretation of the SAT requirement, if the exceptions list to 
ORRC is exhaustive, TRMs must be eliminated on a substantially portion of trade in 
RTAs, for example, 90 per cent of the trade. The imposition is possible but only 
limited to the remaining 10 per cent of trade. However, if the exceptions list is 
illustrative only, which means TRMs may be maintained in RTAs as same as other 
parenthesized measures, the SAT requirement does not affect the imposition of 
TRMs. 
To sum up the above analysis, it is clear that TRMs can be eliminated in RTAs. 
More reasonably, the elimination is optional. Otherwise, questions would arise such 
as:  
i) Whether TRMs should be treated as the ordinary restrictive regulations of 
                                                     
470 N JS Lockhart and A D Mitchell, “Regional Trade Agreements under GATT 1994: An Exception and Its 
Limits”, in A D Mitchell (ed), Challenges and Prospects for the WTO (Cameron May 2005) 217, pp 240-241. 
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commerce that are subject to elimination in RTAs? The very nature of the safeguards 
is emergency protection which restrict import surge that cause serious injury to like 
domestic industry on temporary basis. It is questionable why the BOP measures are 
allowed to exist in RTA but safeguards are not. In the meantime, anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures are duties to counter unfairly low-priced or subsidised 
imports. It is hard to convince that such protection against the unfair trade practices 
must be eliminated in RTAs. 
ii) Whether mandatory elimination of TRMs is practical for RTA integration? 
The constitution of an RTA normally leads to tariff reduction and border barriers 
below the MFN rate. Prompt elimination of the trade remedy measures would no 
doubt have an adverse impact on domestic industries in RTA member countries 
especially in transition period. In fact, most existing RTAs facilitate TRMs as 
necessary instruments when adjusting their market integration between the 
constituent countries. The origination of TRMs under the GATT/WTO demonstrates 
that a government is usually reluctant to open its domestic market without 
contingency protection. The same rationale should apply to regional integration as 
well. 
It might be the reason why no agreement has been reached between the WTO 
Members on this issue and why the Appellate Body pragmatically permitted the 
existence of safeguards in RTAs, although Article XIX is not explicitly indicated in 
the exceptions list to ORRC. Therefore the “flexible” interpretation on ORRC is 
considered the most reasonable and practical approach in respect of TRMs – the 
application of those measures to RTA partners should be “permitted but not obliged”, 
to the extent that their application does not prejudice the rights of third parties. Given 
this situation, to eliminate TRMs in intra-regional trade, other conditions are needed 
to facilitate the implementation of such deviation ensuring it meets the external 
requirements not to raise any barriers to third countries. One practical resolution 
might be to examine whether a RTA-specific TRM is “necessary” to the formation of 




4.5 “Necessity Test” in the Context of Article XXIV 
4.5.1 “Necessity test” in the Context of Article XXIV:5  
As a matter of fact, the Appellate Body in Turkey – Textiles tightened the criteria 
whereby a RTA could be justified under the WTO, by further confining a specific 
condition that need to be fulfilled in order to fully justify the use of the exception of 
Article XXIV provisions by Member States – the parties to the RTA must 
demonstrate that the formation of the RTA would be prevented if it were not allowed 
to introduce the measure in question.  
In other words, the Appellate Body laid down a “necessity test” in examining 
any exceptions invoked under GATT Article XXIV. In particular, according to the 
Appellate Body, such “necessity test” is parallel with the internal and external 
requirements contained in Article XXIV:8 and 5. If the measure at issue were noticed 
not being “necessary” to the formation of the RTA, even if the RTA fulfilled the 
internal and external requirements, it may still be nullified by the Appellate Body. 
The Turkey – Textiles case concerned certain quantitative restrictions imposed by 
Turkey on 19 categories of textile and clothing products imported from India. Turkey 
adopted these quantitative restrictions upon the formation of a customs union with 
the EU, with the purpose to adjust its external policy to the same level as the EU. 
India claimed that the imposition of these quantitative restrictions on textiles and 
clothing violated GATT Article XI and XIII, as well as Article 2.4 of the Agreement 
on Textile and Clothing. The Panel found these quantitative restrictions to be 
inconsistent with Articles XI and XIII of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.4 of the 
ATC.
472
 The issue raised by Turkey in this appeal was whether these quantitative 
restrictions were nevertheless justified by GATT Article XXIV.
473
 
When reviewing Turkey’s appeal, the Appellate Body, in clarifying whether a 
Member is justified to adopt otherwise WTO inconsistent measures when setting up a 
CU, focused on the chapeau to Paragraph 5: 
“Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the 
territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union...; Provided 
                                                     
472 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, para 9.86.  




The Appellate Body stated that “the chapeau of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV is 
the key provision for resolving the issue before us in this appeal.”
474
  
The Appellate Body’s analysis focused on the phrase “shall not prevent” found 
in the chapeau, and considered that the chapeau implies that “Article XXIV can 
justify the adoption of a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT 
provisions only if the measure is introduced upon the formation of a customs union, 
and only to the extent that the formation of the customs union would be prevented if 
the introduction of the measure were not allowed”.
475
 Hence, this interpretation laid 
down a substantive obligation upon defendant states to be fulfilled before they could 
avail of the Article XXIV exception.  
Accordingly, the Appellate Body summarised that: 
“Article XXIV may justify a measure which is inconsistent with certain other 
GATT provisions. However, in a case involving the formation of a customs 
union, this ‘defence’ is available only when two conditions are fulfilled. First, 
the party claiming the benefit of this defence must demonstrate that the measure 
at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully meets the 
requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV. And, second, that 
party must demonstrate that the formation of that customs union would be 
prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue. Again, both 




Therefore, the GATT-conformity of preferential (or non-)application of these 
non-tariff measures within RTAs appears to depend on whether or not those measures 
are “necessary” for the formation of RTAs in the sense of Article XXIV:5 and 8 of 
GATT 1994. To the extent of their necessity for the formation of an RTA, otherwise 
GATT-inconsistent measures can find justification under Article XXIV:5 of GATT. 
The Appellate Body asserted that, in order for an RTA to be eligible for the defence 
                                                     
474 Appellate Report, Turkey – Textiles, para 43. 
475 Appellate Report, Turkey – Textiles, para 46 (emphases added). 
476 Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Textiles, para 58. That reversed the Panel finding that Article XXIV did not 
authorize a departure from GATT/WTO obligations other than Article I of GATT (Panel Report, Turkey – 
Textiles, paras 9.186-9.188).  
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under Article XXIV of GATT against the claim of MFN violation, it is incumbent on 
the parties to the RTA to demonstrate that the measures in question are “necessary” 
for the formation of the RTA, in the absence of which the formation of the RTA 
would have been made impossible, and that the measures at issue were introduced 




4.5.2 “Necessity test” in the Context of Article XXIV:8 
In Turkey – Textiles, the Appellate Body developed and applied a necessity test 
to the exception for RTAs in GATT Article XXIV:5. A similar test could also be 
applied to the TRMs in Article XXIV:8. In that context, TRMs can be eliminated or 
significantly deviate from the WTO TRM rules to the extent that the formation of an 
RTA would be prevented if not doing so. 
However, it is not clear whether the necessity test applies solely to 
inconsistencies arising from the imposition of external trade restrictions or also to 
inconsistencies arising from the elimination of internal trade restrictions. In US – 
Line Pipe which concerned the safeguard measure imposed by the United States that 
excluded imports from other NAFTA members, one of the central questions was 
whether such discriminatory imposition of safeguard measure can be justified under 
Article XXIV. 
To address this question, the panel distinguished Turkey – Textiles on the basis 
that the measure at issue in the US – Line Pipe case, which involved the facilitation 
of internal trade, is the very raison d'être of any RTA. It concluded “[i]f the alleged 
violation of GATT 1994 forms part of the elimination of ‘duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce’, there can be no question of whether it is necessary for the 
elimination of ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce’”
478
. This may be 




The panel further stated in the footnote to above view that,  
“Indeed, the application of a necessity test in such circumstances would give rise 
                                                     
477 Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Textiles, para 46.   
478 Panel Report, US – Line Pipe, para 7.148.  
479 J P Trachtman, “Towards Open Recognition? Standardization and Regional Integration under Article XXIV of 
GATT” (2003) 6(2) Journal of International Economic Law 459, at p 475.  
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to absurd results. For example, assume that an FTA eliminates duties on peanuts, 
but not cars. In the context of a necessity test, third countries could claim that it 
was not necessary to eliminate duties on peanuts to meet the “substantially all 
the trade” threshold of Article XXIV:8(b), as that threshold could have been met 
by eliminating duties on cars. In such cases, it is difficult to imagine how a 
necessity requirement could ever be fulfilled.”
480
 
Based on the US’s demonstration that NAFTA complies with Article 
XXIV:5(b)(c) and Article XXIV:8, and the panel’s own finding that elimination of 
safeguard measure is required by Article XXIV:8(b)
481
, the panel thus concluded that 
the exclusion of Canada and Mexico’s imports from global safeguard is undoubtedly 
necessary. 
The Appellate Body in US – Line Pipe, unfortunately, only reiterated the 
exclusion was only possible subject to a parallelism requirement when matching both 
source of investigation and application as to the same subject parties, and considered 
the panel’s necessity test was irrelevant and hence it is moot and having no legal 
effect.
482
 Therefore, whether elimination of safeguards for the purpose of Article 
XXIV:8 is irrebuttably “necessary” is undetermined. 
It should be noted that the “necessity test” analysis provided by the panel is 
based on the definition of the term ORRC. In the appeal of the case, Japan 
questioned the panel’s conclusion by arguing that the safeguard measure is in fact not 
required to be eliminated by Article XXIV:8.
483
 Thus, the exclusion of Canada and 
Mexico’s imports from US global safeguards should not be sanctioned as 
“necessary” in this regard. The EC claimed that “the imposition of a new safeguard 
measure in US – Line Pipe amounted precisely to the introduction of a trade 
restriction having adverse effect on the trade of other Members … The argument that 
the exclusion of its NAFTA imports from the measure was authorized as part of the 
elimination of the restrictions necessary to establish a free-trade area is contradicted 
by the facts”
484
. These arguments demonstrate that in the current circumstance where 
                                                     
480 Panel Report, US – Line Pipe, footnote 137. 
481 Ibid, para 7.141. The panel stated that “[s]ince the line pipe measure introduces a tariff quota, we consider that 
the line pipe measure constitutes a "dut[y] [or] other restrictive regulation[] of commerce" within the meaning of 
Article XXIV:8(b).” 
482 Appellate Body Report, US – Line Pipe, para 199. 
483 Ibid, para 72. 
484 Ibid, para 66. 
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there is no consensus on whether TRMs are included in ORRC, the panel’s reasoning 
should not apply to the elimination of the TRMs in RTAs.  
In this regard, it should be noted that the panel’s ruling in US – Line Pipe in fact 
is only applicable to the measures that are mandatorily to be eliminated in RTAs, not 
to those non-tariff measures included in the parenthesized exceptions list in Article 
XXIV:8. In Article XXIV:8(a)(i) and (b), it is clearly stated that:  
“duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, 
those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated 
with respect to …” 
Therefore, a necessity test is inherently built in Article XXIV:8 with regard to 
those non-tariff measures demonstrated in the exceptions list.  
Scholars who consider that the necessity test should be confined to the external 
restrictions point to the fact that Article XXIV:5 aims to prevent increases in the level 
of external trade restrictions. Because the necessity test was derived from Article 
XXIV:5, it should apply solely to inconsistencies arising from the imposition of 
external trade restrictions.
485
 However, as the chapeau of paragraph 5 is the sole 
provision in GATT Article XXIV that grants WTO Members a right to derogate from 
the obligations under other GATT provisions upon the formation of a CU or FTA,
486
 
it could logically be inferred that the necessity test contained in the chapeau of 
Article XXIV:5 applies to the RTA internal measures that is not mandatorily 
requested to be eliminated, e.g. the TRMs in RTAs.  
This view can further be supported by an overriding requirement contained in 
Article XXIV:4 and the 1994 Understanding. Paragraph 4 of Article XXIV sets forth 
a general requirement for an acceptable RTA, including both internal and external 
concern. It states that “the purpose of a customs union or free-trade area should be to 
facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the 
trade of other contracting parties with such territories. (emphasis added)” This 
purpose is explicitly reaffirmed in the fifth paragraph of the Preamble of the 1994 
Understanding, providing that in the formation or enlargement of a RTA, the 
constituent members should “to the greatest possible extent avoid creating adverse 
                                                     
485 N JS Lockhart and A D Mitchell, “Regional Trade Agreements under GATT 1994: An Exception and Its 
Limits”, in A D Mitchell (ed), Challenges and Prospects for the WTO (Cameron May 2005) 217, at p 227. 
486 See analyses in section 4.3 of this thesis. 
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effects on the trade of other Members.” Therefore, it is easy to presume that, Article 
XXIV:4 together with the 1994 Understanding sets forth an overriding requirement 
for RTA to comply with, which embraces an economic concern that a RTA should not 
entail trade diversion effects. 
From the pragmatic perspective, since there is no compensation mechanism 
available on the trade diversions resulting from discriminatory TRMs, the necessity 
test can provide a good instrument to balance trade benefit between the members of 
RTA and third countries. 
Although the Appellate Body has not explicitly stated that the Turkey – Textiles 
necessity test is applicable in the context of Article XXIV:8, interestingly, in 
Argentina – Footwear(EC) – a case with regard to exclusion of regional imports in 
global safeguard measures, it reiterated that such test is an essential part of the 
conditions to justify WTO-inconsistent measures in the context of RTAs.
487
 This 
implies a possibility to adopt the necessity test on RTA-related safeguard measures in 
the future. 
Nevertheless, the present necessity test interpreted by the WTO tribunals in 
respect of GATT Article XXIV poses significant inadequacy and requires substantial 
improvement. In Turkey – Textiles case, with respect to the necessity criterion, 
Turkey asserted that if it had not imposed the quantitative restrictions at issue, the EC 
would have “exclude[ed] these products from free trade within the Turkey/EC 
customs union”. The EC would have done so to prevent trade diversion: to prevent 
these products from flowing into the EC through Turkey, and thereby avoiding the 
application of the EC’s quantitative restrictions. These goods accounted for 40 per 
cent of Turkey’s trade with the EC, thus raising concerns that, if they were excluded, 




However, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that there were less trade 
restrictive alternatives available, including the use of rules of origin to distinguish 
between Turkish and third country textiles. This would have addressed the problem 
of trade diversion, and obviated the need to exclude the textiles and clothing sector 
                                                     
487 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC), paras 109-110. 
488 Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Textiles, para 61. 
212 
 
from the EC-Turkish CU.
489
 In other words, the quantitative restrictions imposed by 
Turkey on Indian textiles and clothing products in that case were considered as not 
necessary for the formation of the EU-Turkey customs union.
490
 Therefore Article 
XXIV was not available as a defence to justify the quantitative restrictions in that 
instance. 
Pursuant to the above rulings, the “necessity test” interpreted in the Turkey – 
Textiles case presents two primary features: 
1) The Member State using the Article XXIV as defence has a burden of proof to 
the effect that the measure at issue is “necessary” upon the formation of the RTA;  
2) The sole standard to meet “necessary” addressed here is that there are no 
“least trade restrictive alternatives” available for the constitution of the RTA. 
These features imply great legal uncertainty due to the member’s inability to 
determine in advance which alternative method would be considered “least trade 
restrictive”. In the meantime, the RTA members may be called upon to adjust the 
level of their enforcement measure for an alternative that might not be as effective to 
achieve the objective they pursue. As Trachtman asserted, in Turkey – Textiles, “the 
Appellate Body did not address the fact that such rules of origin would require 
administration, and would prevent the formation of the kind of CU that the EC and 
Turkey wished: one that would not require border controls on goods, consistent with 
the principle of ‘free-circulation’”.
491
 
In addition, the approach of the Appellate Body in Turkey – Textiles seems to 
decline to balance the integration benefits against the detriments to the third-party, 
although the Appellate Body’s language, based on Article XXIV:4 and Article 
XXIV:5(b) seems to call for this type of balancing. That would be counter to the 
ruling evolved from Article XXIV:5(a) that the evaluation of the trade measures and 
policies of a CU focuses on the net effect of the barriers on third parties; any single 
barriers of trade being raised may not be an issue under Article XXIV:5(a) and the 
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rules of origin benefiting only Turkish exports would have been an exception to the principle of free circulation 
within the customs union and would have required the maintenance of customs and border checks within the 
customs union designed to ensure that Turkey would not become a transit point of goods in circumvention of the 
Community’s quota system arising from Turkey’s adoption of the Community’s rates of tariffs, etc.” 
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1994 Understanding. In the event that new barriers are raised due to the formation of 
a CU, such new barriers should be permitted, providing that the overall level of the 
barriers of such a RTA is still lower than that before the constitution of the CU, 
because it is very likely that the effect of the new barrier will be evened out by other 
trade measures and policies.  
Despite the Turkey – Textiles and US – Line Pipe cases, the WTO adjudicating 
bodies shed no light on the necessity test in the context of GATT Article XXIV. 
Therefore, the issue requires substantial improvement. 
 
4.5.3 “Necessity test” in Other GATT/WTO Provisions 
Necessity tests are not new in the GATT/WTO. Apart from the obligations to 
liberalize trade, in accord with the GATT/WTO, Member States have sufficient 
regulatory autonomy to derogate from their obligations for legitimate policy goals. 
For instance, WTO Members are allowed to establish domestic technical standards to 
protect the environment; to set up sanitary/phytosanitary measures to protect human, 
animal and plant life or health; or to take certain measures to secure compliance with 
laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the GATT/WTO. Nevertheless, 
those regulations/enforced measures can pose trade barriers if applied in 
protectionism manner or constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail. Necessity tests 
thus establish the WTO-consistency of a measure based on whether the measure is 
“necessary” to achieve certain policy objectives. These tests reflect the balance in 
WTO agreements between two important goals: preserving the freedom of Members 
to set and achieve regulatory objectives through measures of their own choosing, and 
discouraging Members from adopting or maintaining measures that unduly restrict 
trade. Necessity tests typically achieve this balance by requiring that measures, 
which restrict trade in some way (including by violating obligations of an agreement) 
are permissible only if they are “necessary” to achieve the Member’s legitimate 
policy objective.
492
 In so doing, the necessity tests confirm the right of Members to 
regulate and pursue their policy objectives. 
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Except for GATT Article XXIV discussed in this paper, WTO Agreements 
contain a number of provisions, which in whole or in part are commonly referred to 
as “necessity tests”. Notably, these include Article XX and XI of the GATT; GATS 
Article XIV and VI:4, paragraph 2(d) of Article XII and paragraph 5(e) of the Annex 
on Telecommunications; Articles 2.2 and 2.5 of the TBT Agreement; Article 2.2 and 
5.6 of the SPS Agreement; Article 3.2, 8.1 and 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement; and 
Article 23.2 of the Agreement on Government Procurement.  
In order to seek appropriate interpretation of the necessity test in the context of 
GATT Article XXIV, the following paragraphs attempt to investigate the analysis of 
the necessity test in some other areas of GATT/WTO, especially GATT Article XX(b) 
and (d) which have been frequently reviewed by WTO panels. Although the tests in 
other provisions of GATT/WTO law would not certainly be applicable to Article 
XXIV, there are some interesting similarities and they are worthy of consideration. 
The term “necessary” was first interpreted in GATT years by the panel in US – 
Section 337, when it applied GATT Article XX(d). Article XX(d) allows measures to 
be GATT inconsistent if they are necessary to secure compliance with a Member’s 
laws and regulations which conform with GATT disciplines. According to the panel, 
“necessary” means that no alternative measure exists, which the country “could 
reasonably be expected to employ” and “which is not inconsistent with other GATT 
provisions” or “which entails least degree of inconsistency with other GATT 
provisions”.
493
 This interpretation was followed by the panels Thailand – 
Cigarettes
494
 and US – Gasoline
495
 where the tribunals construed “necessary” as it is 
embodied in paragraph b) of GATT Article XX, a provision which allows Members 
to use otherwise GATT inconsistent measures to pursue their health policies. The 
Appellate Body in EC – Tariff Preference established that the kinds of measures 
listed in Article XX are “exceptions” to the general GATT rules, and that the burden 
of proof is therefore on the party invoking a specific Article XX sub-paragraph to 
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show that the measure is justified under that provision.
496
  
Such “least inconsistent measure principle” incurred numerous criticisms on the 
legal uncertainty and onerous burden of proof on the responding party it may 
induce.
497
 Since there was no explicit standard on the term “reasonably available”, 
the challenged measure was very easily to be rendered into failure. That was the case 
in US – Section 337 and Thailand – Cigarettes, in both of which the panel considered 
that reasonable alternatives were available to the responding party. 
Especially, it was criticised of lacking of sensitivity to domestic legislators’ aims. 
Put differently, the tests “impinge too heavily upon Member’s regulatory autonomy 
to pursue legitimate non-economic values”.
498
 In US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body 
considered individual instead of the collective emission standards for foreign refiners 
to be “reasonably available”, although compliance controls for such standards would 
render these measures more difficult for the US administration.
499
 In Thailand – 
Cigarettes, in employment of the hypothetical regulatory measure, the panel and the 
Appellate Body failed to examine whether the achievement of the government’s 
object was feasible or efficient. Various alternative measures were judged to be 
“reasonably available” to Thailand without considering the difficulty that could be 
encountered in applying them.
500
 The controversy over this dispute was fuelled by 
the fact that Thailand, as a developing country, could not easily implement some of 
the suggested measures for lack of the requisite institutions and resources.
501
 
With the advent of the WTO, the necessity analysis was significantly evolved. 
“The focus shifted from the goals of the measure relative to WTO-consistency/trade 
restrictiveness, to the relationship between the measure and the end sought. The 
recent necessity cases, Korea – Beef and EC – Asbestos represent a significant and 
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radical shift involving the balancing of domestic regulations against trade obligations, 
sometimes finding in favour of the former. This current interpretative approach not 
only established substantive guidelines, but also results in the proportionality test 
being allowed to the necessity analysis.”
502
  
First of all, the Appellate Body provided important clarification on the meaning 
of “necessary”. In Korea – Beef, it recognized that “necessary” can have a range of 
meanings various from “indispensable” to “making contribution to”, and it 
considered that, in the context of Article XX(d), the meaning is closer to 
“indispensable”. Measures that are actually indispensable, it said, are clearly 




Secondly, the Appellate Body set out a number of factors that influence whether 
a measure at issue is “necessary”, besides the difficulty of implementation. In Korea 
– Beef, it held that, the necessity analysis involves in every case a process of 
weighing and balancing a series of factors, which prominently include “the 
contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or 
regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected by 




Thus, to determine the “necessity” of a challenged measure, the panels or 
Appellate Body will examine:  
i) how important the policy objectives the challenged measure intends to protect. 
According to the Appellate Body’s analyses in EC – Asbestos, the Korea – Beef 
interpretation laid down an important rule that, “the more vital or more important the 
common interests or values pursued, the easier it would be accept as “necessary” 
measure designed to achieve those ends”
505
. In US – Gambling, the Appellate Body 
stated that the weighing and balancing process inherent in the necessity analysis 
“begins with an assessment of the ‘relative importance’ of the interests or values 
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furthered by the challenged measure”.
506
 And, in any circumstance, participants do 
not dispute that it is within the authority of a WTO Member to set the public health 
or environmental objectives it seeks to achieve
507
, as well as the level of protection 
that it wants to obtain, through the measure or the policy it chooses to adopt.
508
 
ii) the extent to which the measure contributes to the realization of the end 




iii) the extent to which the compliance measure produces restrictive effects on 
international commerce, that is, the restrictive effects on imported goods. A measure 
with a relatively slight impact upon imported products might more easily be 




When determining whether an alternative measure is considered “reasonably 
available”, the factors listed above are also relevant. The Appellate Body indicated in 
EC – Asbestos that, one aspect of the weighing and balancing process comprehended 
in the determination of whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure is reasonably 
available is the extent to which the alternative measure “contributes to the realization 
of the end pursued”.
511
 In other words, in order to qualify as an alternative, a measure 
proposed by the complaining Member must be not only less trade restrictive than the 
measure at issue, but should also “preserve for the responding Member its right to 
achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the objective pursued”.
512
 
In EC – Asbestos, this “contributive” assessment applies also with an evaluation 
of the importance of the common interests or values at stake. The objective pursued 
by the measure in EC – Asbestos is the preservation of human life and health though 
the elimination, or the reduction, of the well-known, and life-threatening, health risks 
posed by the asbestos fibres. The value pursued is “both vital and important in the 
highest degree.”
513
 The Appellate Body then asked whether there is an alternative 
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measure that would achieve the same end and that is less restrictive of trade than 
prohibition. In the view of the Appellate Body, France could not reasonably be 
expected to employ any alternative measure if that measure would involve a 
continuation of the very risk that the challenged measure sought to “halt”. Such 
alternative measure would, in effect, prevent France from achieving its chosen level 
of health protection. According to the Appellate Body’s analysis in EC – Asbestos, 
the more vital or more important the common interests or values pursued, the more 
effective the alternative measures must be.
514
 However, an alternative measure did 
not cease to be “reasonably” available simply because the alternative measure 
involved administrative difficulties for a Member. 
515
 
In Brazil – Tyres, the Appellate Body further established a requirement that such 
a contribution could be quantified, which was not mentioned in previous cases
516
. It 
stated that: “a contribution exists when there is a genuine relationship of ends and 
means between the objective pursued and the measure at issue.”
517
 In other words, 
the challenged measure must bring about a material contribution to the achievement 
of its objective. In addition, a measure of which the contribution is not immediately 
observable, may also be justified under Article XX(b). Some policy goals can be 
tackled only with a comprehensive policy comprising a multiplicity of interacting 
measures, and the results obtained from certain actions can only be evaluated with 
the benefit of time.
518
 Thus, the demonstration of contribution could consist of 
quantitative projections in the future, or qualitative reasoning based on a set of 
hypotheses that are tested and supported by sufficient evidence. 
In conclusion, in order to determine whether a measure is “necessary” within the 
meaning of Article XX of the GATT 1994, a panel must assess all the relevant factors, 
particularly the extent of the contribution to the achievement of a measure’s objective 
and its trade restrictiveness, in the light of the importance of the interests or values at 
                                                     
514 Ibid, para 172 (quote Appellate Body Report, Korea-Beef, para.162). 
515 See Panel Report, United States – Gasoline, paras 6.26 and 6.28. 
516 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Beef, paras 163 and 164; Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 172; 
Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para 306; WTO Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic - 
Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (“Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of 
Cigarettes”) WT/DS302/AB/R, dated 25 April 2005, para 70. 
517 WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (“Brazil – Tyres”), 
WT/DS332/AB/R, dated 3 December 2007, para 145. 
518 Ibid, para 151. In this respect, the Appellate Body noted that, in US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body stated, in 
the context of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994, that, “in the field of conservation of exhaustible natural resources, 
a substantial period of time, perhaps years, may have to elapse before the effects attributable to implementation of a 
given measure may be observable.” (Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p 21, DSR 1996:I, 3, at 20) 
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stake. If this analysis yields a preliminary conclusion that the measure is necessary, 
this result must be confirmed by comparing the measure with its possible alternatives, 
which may be less trade restrictive while providing an equivalent contribution to the 
achievement of the objective pursued.  
The recent necessity test also significantly relaxed the burden of proof on the 
responding party. In US – Gambling, the Appellate Body further clarified that “it is 
not the responding party’s burden to show, in the first instance, that there are no 
reasonably available alternatives to achieve its objectives”, that is “a responding 
party need not identify the universe of less trade-restrictive alternative measures and 
then show that none of those measures achieves the desired objective”.
519
 Rather, “it 
is for a responding party to make a prima facie case that its measure is ‘necessary’ by 
putting forward evidence and arguments that enable a panel to assess the challenged 
measure in the light of the relevant factors to be ‘weighed and balanced’ in a given 
case”.
520
 In doing so, the Appellate Body noted, the responding party “may ... point 
out why alternative measures would not achieve the same objectives as the 
challenged measure, but it is under no obligation to do so in order to establish, in the 
first instance, that its measure is ‘necessary’”.
521
 However, if the complaining party 
“raise a WTO-consistent alternative measure that, in its view, the responding party 
should have taken, the responding party will be required to demonstrate why its 
challenged measure nevertheless remains ‘necessary’ in the light of that alternative or, 
in other words, why the proposed alternative is not, in fact, ‘reasonably 
available’”.
522
 Finally, if a responding party “demonstrates that the alternative is not 
‘reasonably available’, in the light of the interests or values being pursued and the 
party’s desired level of protection, it follows that the challenged measure must be 
‘necessary’ within the terms of Article XIV(a) of the GATS”
523
  
In brief, the responding party only needs to establish a prima facie case that the 
challenged measure is “necessary” to achieve the desired legitimate policy objective. 
That is to say, the responding party is not obliged to demonstrate that they have 
sought for alternative measures and explain why those alternative measures would 
                                                     
519 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para 309.   
520 Ibid, para. 310. 
521 Ibid, para 310. 




not achieve the same objectives as the challenged measure. Once the prima facie case 
is established by the responding party, the onus actually will shift to the complaint to 
illustrate certain alternative measures, which are less trade restrictive and reasonably 
available to achieve the same end.  
 
4.5.4 Further Improve the “Necessity Test” in the Context of GATT 
Article XXIV 
In contrast with the “necessity test” currently developed in the context of Article 
XXIV, the correspondent examination under other GATT provisions is evidently 
more fully-fledged. Especially, it provides quite a number of additional factors that 
are critical in determining how much favour should be given to a measure adopted in 
RTAs that is otherwise WTO-inconsistent. In the author’s opinion, the GATT Article 
XXIV “necessity test” should inevitably include a weighing and balancing process 
taking account of the factors listed below:   
i) the meaning of “necessary” in the context of Article XXIV;  
ii) the level of the importance of the interests and values pursued by RTA 
members under Article XXIV against their obligation to conform with other 
WTO provisions; 
iii) the trade restrictive effects of the challenged measure on imported goods 
from third-countries;  
iv) the burden of proof that should be adopted in the “necessity test” under 
Article XXIV; and 
v) the contribution that would be possibly made by the challenged measure and 
the alternative measures held by the complaining Member. 
First of all, the WTO adjudicating bodies need to clarify the exact meaning of 
“necessary” in the context of GATT Article XXIV.  
As noted previously, the Appellate Body in Korea – Beef recognized that 
“necessary” can have a range of meanings varying from “indispensable” to “making 
contribution to”. Measures that are actually indispensable, it said, are clearly 
“necessary”. In addition, though, measures that are not “indispensable” (e.g. “making 
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contribution to”) may nevertheless be “necessary”.
524
 According to an ordinary 
understanding of this interpretation, the more “indispensible” a measure is, the 
stronger proof should be made by the defendant that, without such measure, 
realization of the legitimate objective pursued would be prevented. Therefore, in the 
range of meanings varying from “indispensable” to “making contribution to”, it is 
essential to determine to which end “necessary” in context of Article XXIV is close 
to.  
As discussed in section 4.3.2.1 The Appellate Body in Turkey – Textiles stated 




“Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between 
the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union...; 
Provided that...” 
The Appellate Body hence focused on the phrase “shall not prevent” found in the 
chapeau, and considered the chapeau implies that “Article XXIV can justify the 
adoption of a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions only 
if the measure is introduced upon the formation of a customs union, and only to the 
extent that the formation of the customs union would be prevented if the introduction 
of the measure were not allowed”. 
526
 
The italicized terms in the above interpretation clearly eliminate the possibility 
that a measure which is simply “making contribution to” the formation of a RTA 
would be recognized as “necessary” in the context of Article XXIV. The “necessary” 
in Article XXIV is rather closer to the “indispensable” end of the range. Therefore, a 
WTO Member who is seeking to adopt a measure which is inconsistent with certain 
other WTO provisions under the cover of GATT Article XXIV might need to make a 
strong case that such measure is introduced because it is “indispensible” to the 
formation of the relevant RTA. 
Secondly, to examine the “necessity” of a WTO-inconsistent measure under 
GATT Article XXIV, WTO adjudicating bodies need to evaluate the importance of 
the interest and values pursued by WTO Members under GATT Article XXIV against 
                                                     
524 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Beef, paras 159-164. 
525 Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Textiles, paras 43. 
526 Ibid, para 46 (emphases added). 
222 
 
their obligation to conform with other WTO provisions, especially in the 
circumstance that a regional measure/policy derogates from other WTO provisions 
and distorts (or has potential to distort) the trade with third-countries. 
As aforementioned, in the context of GATT Article XX, the importance of the 
policy objective the challenged measure intends to protect is one of the prominent 
factors to be considered in the “necessity test”. Since “necessity test” is an 
instrument to balance the WTO Members’ right to achieve their legitimate policy 
objective against their obligation to comply with WTO general rules, the importance 
of the policy objective the challenged measure intends to protect should be 
universally considered in “necessity test” indicated in any GATT provisions, 
including Article XXIV. Compared with the protection of environment, human or 
animal’s life and health addressed under GATT Article XX, however, the importance 
of the interests and values pursued by WTO Members to constitute a RTA (i.e. 
eliminate trade barriers and other regulations of commerce on substantially all intra-
regional trade) is surely not at the highest degree. In this sense, perhaps no much 
favour would be given to a regional measure which is inconsistent with certain other 
GATT provisions.  
Thirdly, the Article XXIV “necessity test” should evaluate the trade restrictive 
effects of the challenged measure on imported goods from third-countries. As the 
Appellate Body stated in Korea – Beef, a measure with a relatively slight impact 
upon imported products might more easily be considered as “necessary” than a 
measure with intense or broader restrictive effects.
527
 Although this ruling was made 
under GATT Article XX(d), there is no reason to reject such consideration in the 
context of Article XXIV. 
It should be noted that in the case involving the constitution of a CU, an 
evaluation of the trade restrictive effects of the challenged measure on imported 
goods from third-countries should be assessed along with the net effect of the impact 
on the trade with third-countries. Such an evaluation is actually an inherent 
requirement contained in Article XXIV:5 (a), which provides that: 
“with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation 
of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the 
                                                     
527 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Beef, para 163.  
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institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect of trade with 
contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whole 
higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and 
regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the 
formation of such union or the adoption of such interim agreement, as the case 
may be;” (emphases added) 
In doing so, such evaluation must be processed in line with the 1994 
Understanding paragraph 2, which provides detailed guidelines to evaluate the 
general incidence of the duties and other regulations of commerce applicable before 
and after the formation of a CU.
528
 If the overall level of the barriers of such CU is 
lower than or equal to that before the constitution of the CU, a trade distortive 
measure raised due to the formation of CU should be permitted. 
Fourth, the burden of proof should be further clarified in the Article XXIV 
“necessity test”.  
Pursuant to the rules on burden of proof established in the WTO,  
(a) it is for the complaining party to establish the violation it alleges; 
(b) it is for the party invoking an exception or an affirmative defence to prove 
that the conditions contained therein are met; and 
(c) it is for the party asserting a fact to prove it.
529
 
In the Article XXIV “necessity test”, the burden of proof is obviously on the 
RTA members to show that the challenged measure is “necessary” for the purpose of 
constitution of a RTA. Nevertheless, it will induce too onerous responsibility on the 
responding parties to ask them to demonstrate that they have sought for alternative 
measures and explain why those alternative measures would not achieve the same 
objectives as the challenged measure.
530
 Therefore, it is more reasonable to require 
the defending party to establish a prima facie case that the challenged measure is 
“necessary” to achieve the desired legitimate policy objective. Once the prima facie 
case is established by the defending party, the complaint should bear the onus to 
                                                     
528 See section 4.3.3.1 2) of this thesis. 
529 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, para 9.57 (quote Panel Report on Argentina – Footwear (EC), paras. 6.34 - 
6.40). 
530 In Turkey-Textiles, Turkey and EU was questioned by the Panel that whether they had spent any effort to look 
at alternative means of securing the same effect other than adopting the contested measure. See Panel Report, 
Turkey – Textiles, para 4.1. The burden of proof was not further mentioned and clarified by the Appellate Body. 
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illustrate the existence of certain alternative measures, which are less trade restrictive 
and reasonably available to achieve the same end.  
Finally, the Article XXIV “necessity test” should evaluate and compare the 
contribution that would possibly be made by the challenged measure and the 
alternative measures held by the complaining Member. Such evaluation has two 
significant functions: 
i) to ensure those regulations/enforced measures will not be applied in 
protectionism manner or constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail; 
ii) to secure the realization of the legitimate objectives the respondent is 
pursuing, in case alternatives held by the complaint are not effective.  
With regard to the evaluation of the contribution of the challenged measure, the 
Appellate Body in Brazil – Tyres laid down a very solid ruling that, the challenged 
measure must bring about a material contribution to the achievement of its objective; 
especially in the circumstances that the measure is not “indispensable” and has 
significant trade-restrictive effects, a measure which brings a marginal or 
insignificant contribution can nevertheless be considered necessary.
531
 Therefore, the 
greater a challenged measure may contribute to the realization of the end pursued, 
the more easily the measure should be sanctioned to be “necessary”.  
In the same vein, the availability of an alternative measure held by the complaint 
should also rely on how much contribution it would make to achieve the end pursued 
by the respondent. Nevertheless, in the Article XXIV “necessity test”, it might not be 
sensible to require the alternative measure to achieve the same end as the challenged 
measure. According to the Appellate Body’s analysis in Korea – Beef and EC – 
Asbestos, the more important vital or more important the common interests or values 
pursued, the more effective the alternative measures must be.
532
 Thus, in the case of 
pursuing regional trade integration, an alternative measure that materially contributes 
to the objectives should be considered as “reasonably available”. In the meantime, an 
alternative measure should not be rejected simply because the alternative measure 
involves administrative burdens for the respondent.  
                                                     
531 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Tyres, para 150. 




In sum, to judge the legality of a RTA-specific TRM under WTO, the WTO 
tribunal needs to first investigate whether such innovative TRM is consistent with the 
WTO basic rules. In the event that a RTA-specific TRM is not consistent with WTO 
basic rules, the next step is to examine whether Article XXIV can justify the adoption 
of such measure. The examination should be based on two key criteria set out in 
GATT Article XXIV:  
1) whether the RTA at issue is a FTA or CU defined in Article XXIV:8(a) and (b); 
2) Whether the challenged measure is introduced upon the formation of the RTA 
and whether it is necessary for the formation of the RTA.  
Take US – Line Pipe as an example, one of the main issues challenged by Korea 
is that the United States violated the MFN principle set forth in GATT Article XIX 
and Article 2.2 of SA by excluding Mexico and Canada from the line pipe measure. 
Korea asserted that the exemption of Mexico was particularly egregious in this case 
since this selective safeguard measure resulted in significant import increase from 
Mexico and Canada at the expense of the import reduction mainly from Korea that 
was the historically largest exporter.
533
 In response to this claim, the US quoted 
GATT Article XXIV as a defence to justify its selective safeguard measure. Hence, 
the legality of such a measure relies on whether it is permitted under GATT Article 
XXIV.  
In terms of the legal status of NAFTA, the US provided that duties on 97 per 
cent of the NAFTA-parties’ tariff lines would be eliminated within 10 years, whereas 
with respect to “other regulations of commerce” a reference to “the principles of 
national treatment, transparency, and a variety of other market access rules” was 
made.
534
 In absence of effective refutation by Korea, NAFTA should be considered 
as in conformity with Article XXIV:8(b) and therefore the US is entitled to seek 
Article XXIV as a defence to justify a measure that is otherwise WTO-inconsistent. 
With regard to condition 2), since the US introduced a measure that derogated 
from WTO SA and was complained by Korea that this measure has seriously 
detriment its trade profits, WTO tribunal is expected to examine the necessity of such 
                                                     
533 Panel Report, paras.7.127-7.130. Korea demonstrated that, Mexico was the second largest exporter to the US 
market during the ITC’s period of investigation; however, it became the largest exporter after the imposition of – 
indeed, exemption from – the safeguard measure, and Canada has increased its imports three-fold to become the 
number three supplier to the US market.  
534 Panel Report, US – Line Pipe, para 7.142. 
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a measure.  
According to the necessity test summarised previously, in this particular case, 
WTO tribunal should question and evaluate a number of issues listed below:  
i) What is the specific objective the US pursued by introducing a selective 
safeguard measure that is inconsistent with SA? 
ii) How much trade diversion has the selective measure caused on imported 
goods from Korea?  
iii) Is there any least trade distortive alternative measure could be adopted to 
achieve the interests that the US pursued? And  
iv) What contributions that would be possibly made by the challenged measure 
and the alternative measures held by the complaining Member?  
  In the end, the conclusion will depend on the contribution the measure has 
made to the objective that the US pursued versus the trade diversion it has incurred, 
and whether the measure at stake is indispensable to the formation of NAFTA or is 
replaceable by another least trade distortive measure.  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
Putting above analysis together, it is observed that: 
1. Recognizing RTAs could be effective instruments to promote the trade 
liberalization and foster the economic development of the multilateral trading system, 
GATT/WTO confers onto the Members which are parties to RTAs a special right to 
deviate from WTO MFN principle as necessary for the constitution of a customs 
union or free trade area. Nevertheless, WTO provisions regulating RTAs, i.e. GATT 
Article XXIV and the 1994 Understanding only spells out general principles on the 
scope and the effect of measures introduced on the constitution of RTAs. The 
vagueness of these provisions has become a source of disputes between RTA 
members and third countries, especially in TRM field. 
2. With regard to certain discriminatory treatment in safeguard measures, WTO 
panels have developed a “parallelism” principle in case law. However, such principle 
is found not to be fully consistent with GATT/WTO statutory requirements and, 
generally, it does not answer the question whether GATT Article XXIV can justify an 
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otherwise WTO-inconsistent TRM in RTAs. Therefore, the legal criteria of WTO-
consistent TRMs in RTAs must to be re-addressed. 
3. After analysing the relationship between GATT Article XXIV and other 
provisions in GATT/WTO, it was concluded that Article XXIV is a derogation not 
merely from the MFN principle, but also from all the provisions of the GATT 1994 
as well as the WTO’s agreements on TRMs. Thus, Article XXIV may be invoked as a 
defence where an RTA-specific measure is not consistent with WTO TRMs rules.  
4. Pursuant to the internal requirement laid down by Article XXIV:8, RTA 
members enjoy certain discretion on how to adopt TRMs internally. Nevertheless, 
since TRMs are not mandatorily requested to be eliminated in RTAs, adoption of 
these measures is subject to certain requirement laid down in the chapeau of Article 
XXIV:5, i.e., to establish RTAs, WTO Members can adopt a measure which is 
inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions only if the measure is introduced 
upon the formation of a customs union, and only to the extent that the formation of 
the customs union would be prevented if the introduction of the measure were not 
allowed.  
Hence, it submitted that, in a case where a RTA adopts a TRM which violates 
general GATT/WTO obligations, the defending Member has to demonstrate: i) the 
measure that violates general GATT/WTO obligations and is in force under an 
Article XXIV arrangement, was in place upon the formation of the RTA; ii) the RTA 
under which the measure is introduced is within the meaning of GATT Article XXIV; 
and iii) the measure in question is “necessary” to the formation of the RTA. 
5. Given the fact that the present necessity test interpreted by WTO tribunals in 
respect of GATT Article XXIV poses significant inadequacy, substantial 
improvement is expected in future practice, borrowing the ideas developed in the 








































Chapter 5 WTO’s Surveillance Mechanism on RTAs 
5.1 Introduction 
In previous chapter, the consistency test was introduced as a vehicle to examine 
whether trade remedy measures in a particular RTA conform to WTO regulations 
and agreements. In order to see how this test might be applied in practice, this 
chapter will look at the WTO surveillance mechanism through which TRMs in RTAs 
can be reviewed and brought onto the right track.  
There are two routes available to the Contracting Parties for reviewing the 
consistency of a RTA-specific TRM with the multilateral rules: First, the multilateral 
track: according to GATT Article XXIV:7, WTO Members have to notify RTAs they 
enter into to the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Arrangements (CRTA) (ad hoc 
Working Party in GATT era) and confront an assessment at political level (Track I); 
Second, the bilateral track: WTO Members may challenge the consistency of a TRM 
in a RTA with the multilateral rules through WTO dispute settlement proceedings 
(Track II).  
However, the legal examination of RTAs has a notoriously unsuccessful history. 
As briefly introduced in Chapter 1, the CRTA and its predecessor the GATT working 
parties have never been able to adopt final reports on their examinations. In terms of 
Track II review, RTA-related disputes have rarely been submitted to adjudicating 
bodies for review. As a result, RTAs have been left largely unchallenged. In the few 
cases that have been examined through the dispute settlement proceedings, WTO 
judicial bodies’ jurisdiction on reviewing RTA-related issues remains controversial, 
considering the political aspects of RTAs. Moreover, given the fact that both the 
political organ and the judicial organ are available to review RTAs, the interplay 
between these two tracks is unclear. It is evident that this status will hinder the 
examination of RTAs in the future.  
To find out a feasible platform to enforce the consistency test on TRMs in RTAs 
proposed in this thesis, this chapter examines the difficulties that have arisen from 
RTA reviewing procedures in the past. Through this analysis, some ideas are 
presented on the key questions surrounding the WTO’s surveillance of RTAs, for 
instance, whether the role of overseeing compatibility of TRMs in RTAs is best 
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performed by the political organs of the WTO or through dispute settlement, how the 
judicial organ should manage its jurisdiction with the purpose to examine TRMs in 
RTAs, and how to reconcile the recommendations and decisions of these two organs.  
5.2 Multilateral Review of RTAs  
Considering the discriminatory nature of regionalism and its potential distortive 
effect on the multilateral trading system, GATT Article XXIV inter alia provides a 
multilateral consistency assessment of certain notified RTAs. Paragraph 7(a) of 
GATT Article XXIV explicitly provides that: 
“Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, 
or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall 
promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available to 
them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them 
to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may 
deem appropriate.”  
With regard to the interim agreements leading to the establishment of a CU or 
FTA, GATT Article XXIV:7(b) provides as follows: 
“If … the CONTRACTING PARTIES finds that such agreement is not likely to 
result in the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area … the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall make recommendations to the parties to the 
agreement. The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the case may be, 
such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these 
recommendations.” 
Accordingly, the WTO’s surveillance of RTAs involves two intertwined tasks – 
gathering information about a given RTA and judging whether this RTA complies 
with the relevant legal criteria. Any WTO Member who attempts to constitute a RTA 
has an obligation to promptly notify the other Members. In the meantime, the 
GATT/WTO are mandated to consider and review the formation and modification of 
RTAs to ensure their compatibility with the GATT/WTO rules, on the basis of 
notifications by members of RTAs and additional information requested by WTO 
Members. Hence, RTAs notified under GATT XXIV are also submitted to an 
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“examination” of their legal consistency, where the substantive obligations will be 
tested.  
With regard to the result of the examination, this wording suggests that the 
Member States can make any recommendation it deems appropriate. Thus, it may 
even conclude that a notified RTA is inconsistent with the GATT. For interim 
agreements, the GATT/WTO can effectively turn down a proposed CU or FTA, 





5.2.1 GATT Practice  
In the GATT years, examination of RTAs was conducted in individual working 
parties. Based on GATT Article XXIV:7, a Working Party would be established 
upon notification of constitution of a RTA. Participation was open to all interested 
GATT contracting parties.
536
 Often, several working parties co-existed, each 
assessing different RTAs.  
The inefficiency of the Working Parties’ assessments was soon revealed. One, 
this fragmented approach has long been criticised for its lack of coherence and 
orderly discussions of systemic issues commonly found in RTAs
537
 Two, it was 
conducted by consensus mode – compatibility or incompatibility of a reviewed RTA 
or individual trade policy measure would not be concluded unless all Member States 
reach a unanimous opinion. Due to the disagreements on the interpretation of certain 
substantive provisions of the rules relating to RTAs, under the GATT working 
parties’ procedure, the examination of specific RTAs was frustrated. For example, in 
the 46 years of the GATT up to the end of 1994, a total of 98 agreements had been 
notified under Article XXIV, most of which were examined in individual working 
parties; however, consensus on the conformity of these agreements with GATT 
provisions was reached in only one case: the Czech-Slovak customs union.
538
 In the 
                                                     
535 M Matsushita, T J Schoenbaum and P C Mavroidis, World Trade Organization: law, practice, and policy 
(Oxford University Press 2006), p 560. 
536 Ibid, p 559. 
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538 J-A Crawford and S Laird, “Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO”, Credit research paper, Centre for 
Research in Economic Development and International Trade, University of Nottingham, May 2000, p 8. 
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end, their adopted report reflected divergent views on the consistency of the 
reviewed RTAs and became an inventory of future disputes. The legal status of all 
these agreements has therefore remained undetermined.
539
  By the same token, no 
conclusion was noted in respect of the legal consistency of the discriminatory TRMs 
in RTAs.   
 
5.2.2 WTO Practice 
To remedy this problem, in February 1996, the WTO General Council 
established the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) as a replacement 
of the GATT working parties.
540
 All WTO Members can participate in the CRTA.  




“(a) to carry out the examination of agreements in accordance with the 
procedures and terms of reference adopted by the Council for Trade in Goods, 
the Council for Trade in Services or the Committee on Trade and Development, 
as the case may be, and thereafter present its report to the relevant body for 
appropriate action; 
(b) to consider how the required reporting on the operation of such agreements 
should be carried out and make appropriate recommendations to the relevant 
body; 
(c) to develop, as appropriate, procedures to facilitate and improve the 
examination process; 
(d) to consider the systemic implications of such agreements and regional 
initiatives for the multilateral trading system …”
541
 
Accordingly, when examining a RTA notified under GATT Article XXIV:7, the 
CRTA has the mandate to examine the incidence and restrictiveness of all duties and 
regulations of commerce, in particular those governed by the provisions of the 
                                                     
539 Roessler, F, “The Relationship between Regional Integration Agreements and the Multilateral Trade Order”, 
in K Anderson and R Blackhurst (eds), Regional Integration and the Global Trading System (Harvester 
Wheatsheaf 1993) 311, at p 321. 
540 See Decision Establishing the CRTA, WT/L/127. 
541 Ibid. See also Guidelines on Procedures to Improve and Facilitate the Examination Process, WT/REG/W/15, 
dated 6 May 1997. 
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Agreements contained in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement.
542
 The CRTA can 
conduct its examination in light of the relevant provisions of the Agreements 
contained in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement; however, the conclusions of the 




The examination process of a RTA typically proceeded as follows: the 
notification of a RTA under GATT Article XXIV (to the Council for Trade in Goods) 
triggered the adoption of terms of reference for its examination in the CRTA. In 
order to facilitate the examination process, RTA parties were charged with preparing 
a summary of the RTA based on an advisory template agreed among WTO 
Members.
544
 During the CRTA meeting the parties would introduce the agreement 
and provide responses to Members’ oral questions. Outstanding questions were dealt 
with through an exchange of written questions and replies and an additional round of 
examination at a subsequent meeting of the CRTA would be scheduled until 
Members agreed that the factual examination was complete. In general, this process 
resulted in a minimum of two rounds of examination, with some agreements 
requiring multiple rounds. Once an examination was complete, the WTO Secretariat 
was charged with drafting an examination report.
545
 
Compared with the GATT working parties, the establishment of the CRTA as 
the single body responsible for the examination of agreements helped streamline the 
examination process and provided a forum for the discussion of cross-cutting system 
issues which are common to most, if not all, agreements. Therefore, it has 
contributed to greater expertise and a more coherent interpretation in the field of 
regional integration.  
                                                     
542 See, Meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods 20 February 1995, G/C/M/1, 27 March 1995, paras 7.1-7.12. 
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Nevertheless, the voting mode and the incentive structure of the CRTA 
examination remained intact – the CRTA decides by consensus.
546
 As a result, no 
conclusion has been made on the consistency of any of the notified RTAs because 
the CRTA was unable to reach consensus.
547
  
Legality of the discriminatory TRMs in RTAs was also undetermined. In the 
considerable debate on the interpretation of GATT Article XXIV, Members’ 
disagreement on TRMs issues is remarkable. Questions were frequently raised on 
whether RTA parties can take safeguard or anti-dumping action against each other 
under GATT Article XXIV:8’s reference to the elimination of “other restrictive 
regulations of commerce”.
548
 Some countries traditionally favoured the exemption of 
RTA parties from anti-dumping action, while others did not.
549
 The question 
concerning safeguards between RTA parties is even more pronounced. If safeguards 
are forbidden between RTA parties, then a member may exempt its RTA partner 




Since CRTA reports are adopted independently whether CRTA Members have 
unanimously concluded that a given RTA is consistent or inconsistent with the 
multilateral rules, reports that are adopted by consensus do not necessarily conclude 
on the consistency or the inconsistency of a RTA with the multilateral rules, which 
means “final reports can be inconclusive and yet adopted.”
551
  Eventually, the 
examination process in the CRTA ends with the “factual examination”.  
It is universally accepted in academic literature that: first of all, the dismal 
performance of the political review on RTAs is in large part due to the very limited 
                                                     
546 Where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue is to be referred to the appropriate 
higher body.  See Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements, WT/REG/1, adopted on 14 August 1996.  
547 Between its establishment in 1996 and the launch of the Doha Development Agenda in November 2001, the 
CRTA held thirty sessions of meetings and completed the examination of total of 69 RTAs, but none of them was 
determined consistent or inconsistent with the WTO rules (see J-A Crawford, “A New Transparency Mechanism 
for Regional Trade Agreements”, (2007) 11 Singapore Yearbook of International Law 133, p 135). By 2006, a 
total of 158 RTAs has been examined by the CRTA; however, no progress was made on the completion of the 
corresponding examination reports (see, Report (2006) of the Committee in Regional Trade Agreements to the 
General Council, WT/REG/17, 24 November 2006). Since the new Transparency Mechanism came into effect in 
2006, the legal examination of the RTAs was upheld (see details in Section 5.2.3 of this thesis).  
548 WT/REG/W/12, para. 5(b); WT/REG/W/16, para. 50(c). 
549 WT/REG/W/12, para. 20; WT/REG/M/15, para. 26; WT/REG/W/28. 
550 WT/REG/M/15, para. 40; WT/REG/M/14, para. 7; WT/REG/W/29, paras 8-11; WT/REG/M/15, para. 22. 
551 P C Mavroidis, “Do not Ask Too Many Questions: The Institutional Arrangements for Accommodating 
Regional Integration within the WTO”, in E K Choi and J C Hartigan (eds), Handbook of International Trade 
Volume II: Economic and Legal Analysis of Trade Policy Institutions (Blackwell Publishing 2005) 239, at p 245. 
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progress made by the WTO Members in resolving “systemic issues” (pertaining to 
the interpretation of some of the terms and benchmarks in the provisions) concerning 
WTO rules on RTAs.
552
 For instance, there has been no agreement among WTO 
Members as to the exact meaning and measurement of key terms as “substantially all 
the trade”, “other regulations of commerce”, and, with respect to the treatment of 
preferential rules of origin, “other restrictive regulations of commerce” and 
obligations during transitional periods.
553
 The quoted terms are of vital importance in 
judging the legality of the discriminatory TRMs in RTAs. 
Secondly, the reviewing procedure convened by the CRTA leaves much to be 
desired because of the mode of voting, namely, by consensus. Frieder Roessler, the 
former Director of the GATT’s Legal Service and a prominent participant in such 
reviews, has pointed out that, countries entrusted with enforcing the legal test have 
no incentive to do so and sometimes have an incentive not to do so,
 554
  especially 
because the RTA parties are also the voters.  
Information gathering is another problem. Members in RTAs became 
increasingly reluctant to supply detailed information on their agreements, which 
could be used as ammunition by other compliance with WTO rules.
555
 A number of 
RTAs are not even notified, and WTO Member often have little, or incomplete, 
information on notified RTAs. This situation added more difficulties to reviewing the 
RTAs at the political level. 
Therefore, it is safe to anticipate that, unless the interpretations on the 
substantive legal criteria on RTAs are clarified or the consensus voting mode is 
changed (for example, by majority-voting mode), the CRTA examinations are 
unlikely to spell out a definitive conclusion on the legal status of the overwhelming 
majority of RTAs, or to make a clear judgment on those controversial trade policy 
measures like TRMs in RTAs.  
 
                                                     
552 See P De Lombaerde (ed), Multilateralism, Regionalism and Bilateralism in Trade and Investment: 2006 
World Report on Regional Integration, (Springer 2007), p 10. 
553 Ibid. Systemic issues with regard to GATS include the interpretation of “substantial sectoral coverage” and 
“absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination”. 
554 F Roessler, “The Relationship between Regional Integration Agreements and the Multilateral Trade Order”, in 
K Anderson and R Blackhurst (eds), Regional Integration and the Global Trading System (Harvester Wheatsheaf 
1993) 311.  
555 See WTO Negotiation Group on Rules, Compendium of Issues Related on Regional Trade Agreements – 
Background Note by the Secretariat, TN/RL/W/8/Rev.1, 1 August 2002, p.8. 
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5.2.3 Renegotiation on the Multilateral Review of RTAs 
The formidable increase in RTA activity in the last 15-20 years exacerbated the 
need for the multilateral trading system to strengthen RTA surveillance given that 
these RTAs undermine the MFN principle. In 2001, when WTO members gathered 
at the Doha Ministerial Conference to launch negotiations in the area of WTO rules, 
they agreed to start negotiations on new disciplines applying to RTAs, taking 
developmental aspects into account.
556   
The negotiating mandate on RTAs was assigned to the Negotiating Group on 
Rules (NGR). Potential issues for negotiation were rapidly identified: on 1 August 
2002, the WTO Secretariat produced a checklist defining the universe of problematic 
issues, which served as a basis for the negotiations.
557
 Parallel negotiations took 
place between 2001 and 2003, covering two aspects of RTAs:  “systemic” or “legal” 
issues of more substantive nature, and issues of “procedural” nature.  
As the scope of the “systemic” or “legal” issues under consideration is wide and 
complex, little progress has been made in the negotiation. Hence, the substantive 
components of legal test contained in GATT Article XXIV and the 1994 
Understanding for qualifying a RTA were neither changed nor clarified.  
From 2003 to 2006, there was shift in the attention of members from the difficult 
discussions on systemic issues to procedural issues.
558
 In July 2006, Members 
reached a formal agreement on a Draft Decision on a Transparency Mechanism for 
Regional Trade Agreements (“Transparency Mechanism”). The Decision was applied 




Comprising nine sections and one annex, the new Transparency Mechanism 
mainly provides: 
                                                     
556 WTO Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, para.29 “We also agree to negotiations aimed at 
clarifying and improving disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying to regional 
trade agreements. The negotiations shall take into account the developmental aspects of regional trade 
agreements.” 
557 See WTO Negotiation Group on Rules, Compendium of Issues Related on Regional Trade Agreements – 
Background Note by the Secretariat, TN/RL/W/8/Rev.1, 1 August 2002. 
558 J-A Crawford, “A New Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements” (2007) 11 Singapore 
Yearbook of International Law 133, at p136. 
559 See, WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements – Draft 
Decision, Annex to Negotiating Group on Rules – Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee, 




- a procedure for the early announcement of RTAs (paragraphs 1 and 2);  
- a timeframe for notification (paragraphs 3 and 4);  
- the spectrum of information to be submitted by the parties (Annex);  
- the WTO Secretariat’s factual presentation on the main features of the 
notified RTAs (paragraph 10);  
- consideration on the notified RTAs (paragraph 6); 
- streamlined procedures for RTAs’ subsequent notification and reporting 
(paragraphs 14 to 17). 
The context of the Transparency Mechanism shows that the key objective of it is 
to optimise the flow of accurate and complete information on the making and 
implementation of all RTAs and to make that information available to all Members.   
On the other hand, it also implies that the WTO Members attempt to delink the 
information provision of RTAs from the legal examination. Unlike the procedure of 
the CRTA in earlier years, under the Transparency Mechanism, the notification and 
information provision of a RTA will not trigger consistency examination 
immediately. It only gives arise to a “consideration” by the CRTA,
560
 which consists 
of an exchange of questions and replies between interested members and the parties. 
When the WTO Secretariat prepares the factual presentation, paragraph 9 of the TM 
provides that the WTO Secretariat “shall refrain from any value judgment”. 
Paragraph 10 further made it clear that the “factual presentation” shall not be used as 
a basis for dispute settlement procedure.   
It was commented by Crawford and Lim that, “[i]t does so by removing the need 
for a consistency assessment, thereby avoiding deadlock over questions concerning 
substantive disciplines”,
561
 and there is a “tacit understanding [among the WTO 




Therefore, the Transparency Mechanism does not provide a radical remedy to 
the potential difficulties in the consistency examination of RTAs by the CRTA; on 
the contrary, it lays up the consistency examination. Although GATT Article 
                                                     
560 Same approach is applied by the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) for those RTAs notified under 
the Enabling Clause. 
561 J-A Crawford and C L Lim, “Cast Light and Evil Will Go Away: The Transparency Mechanism for 
Regulating Regional Trade Agreements Three Years After” (2011) 45 (2) Journal of World Trade 375, at p 383. 
562 Ibid, at p 386. 
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XXIV:7 is still there, requiring that agreements notified under GATT Article XXIV 
be subjected to a multilateral “examination” and consistency assessment, the 
assessment may not be re-commenced until the substantive criteria against which 
compliance has to be measured are finally crystallized.  
In these circumstances, a legal challenge to a RTA, including TRMs issues, 
against somewhat imprecise GATT Article XXIV, is more likely to be settled in the 
context of the judicial process. The question will then be whether the panels and the 
Appellate Body are capable of taking on such a difficult task.   
 
5.3 Dispute Settlement and the Review of RTAs 
5.3.1 GATT Practice 
In the GATT years, the dispute settlement generally operates in following 
way:
563
 first, the disputing parties are given opportunities for consultation. When this 
does not result in agreement, the complaining party can ask the GATT Council (the 
GATT Contracting Parties) to establish a “panel” for undertaking an examination of 
the dispute.
564
 Advocacy proceeds both orally and in writing, and sometimes 
Contracting Parties that are not disputants will be given an opportunity to give their 
views about the subject. The Panel deliberate in secret, and finally produces a report 
which is transmitted to the GATT Councils for adoption or approval.  
Therefore, the decision on the establishment of a panel, the decision on the 
adoption of the panel report and the decision to authorize the suspension of 
concessions were to be taken by the GATT Councils. And, all this operates by 
                                                     
563 The content is derived from J H Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law 
and Economic Relations (Cambridge University Press: 2000), pp 122-123. The GATT dispute settlement 
procedures is largely set out in Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement, and 
Surveillance (GATT Doc. L/4907, LT/TR/U/1, Nov. 28, 1979), further modified and elaborated by actions 
through the 1980s and particularly at the Uruguay Round mid-term review in Montreal in December of 1988 
(Decision of 12 April 1989 on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, BISD 
36S/61).  
564 A panel will usually consist of three (sometimes five) individuals acting in their own capacity, and in recent 
years those individuals have included non-government specialists, such as academicians, retired diplomats, or 
retired GATT secretariat officials. . The parties must agree on the composition of the panel, although if an 





 The responding party could thus delay or block any of these decisions 
and thus paralyse or frustrate the operation of the dispute settlement system.  
As a consequence, during the GATT years (1947-1994), three panels were 
established to examine claims relating to the consistency of a RTA with the 
multilateral rules.
566




5.3.2 WTO Practice 
With the advent of the WTO, drastic changes were noticed in the new dispute 
settlement mechanism, which allows the WTO judicial body to draw conclusions on 
RTA-related disputes.  
First of all, an independent, judicial-type institution was established: the General 
Council of the WTO convenes as DSB to administer the rules and procedures of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding [hereafter: DSU].
568
 The adjudication of 
disputes is entrusted to panels at the first instant level and the Appellate Body at the 
appellate level. Secondly, it operates in a negative consensus mode. Panels will be 
established if a potential complaint so wishes.
569
 Adoption of the report and 
authorization of countermeasures come into effect automatically, unless the DSB 
decides by consensus to reject them.
570
 Hence, the new mechanism eliminated the 
possibility that the establishment of the panel or of its report being adopted or of an 
eventual request for countermeasures be blocked by the other party (who, indeed, has 
an incentive to behave in a non-cooperative manner). Disputes submitted to the WTO 
                                                     
565 In J H Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations 
(Cambridge University Press 2000), pp 122-123, it was explained that:  
“Although the GATT provides for a majority vote in decisions of the Contracting Parties, with “one nation, 
one vote”, the GATT Contracting Parties for some years have endeavoured to avoid strict voting and to 
adopt decisions by ‘consensus,’ which generally means extensive negotiation for a text to which all parties 
can agree. It is the idea of consensus that has been carried over into the dispute settlement procedure, such 
that it is deemed necessary to have a consensus decision of the Council to adopt a panel report.” 
566 The first, after a request by Canada in 1974 in connection with the accession to the European Community of 
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (GATT Doc. C/W/250) was not activated because the parties to the 
dispute reached an agreement (GATT Doc. C/W/259). The second led to an unadopted panel report in EC-Tariff 
Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products from Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region (hereinafter the 
EC – Citrus), GATT Doc. L5776. The third report is on EEC – Import Regime of Bananas (hereinafter the EEC – 
Bananas), DS38/R, dated 11 February 1994, which also remains unadopted.  
567 Ibid. 
568 Article IV:2 of the WTO Agreement and Article 2.1 of the DSU. 
569 DSU, Article 6.1. 
570 DSU, Article 16 and 22. 
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In the meantime, the extent of the judicial review of WTO panels was clarified. 
In the 1994 Understanding, paragraph 12 explicitly provides that: 
“The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and 
applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be involved with respect 
to any matters arising from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV 
relating to customs unions, free-trade areas or interim agreements leading to the 
formation of a customs union or free-trade area.” 
Therefore, WTO judicial bodies are officially granted a large review power 
which extends to any matter arising from the application of Article XXIV GATT. 
Although GATT practice as noticed supra suggests that panels are competent to 
adjudicate RTA-related claims, this is the first time in GATT/WTO history that such 
an acknowledgement is made explicitly and it takes place in an era where there is no 
consensus-hurdle to establish panels.
572
 
Since the establishment of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, although 
only two cases cited to GATT Article XXIV have been reviewed through the panel’s 
proceedings, both went on conclusion and were accepted by the disputants
573
. Such a 
result was neither achieved by the GATT working parties nor the CRTA. Thus, 
dispute settlement proceeding is the only feasible way to handle the RTA-related 
issues in the current regime. 
  
                                                     
571 P C Mavroidis, “Do not Ask Too Many Questions: The Institutional Arrangements for Accommodating 
Regional Integration within the WTO”, in E K Choi and J C Hartigan (eds), Handbook of International Trade 
Volume II: Economic and Legal Analysis of Trade Policy Institutions (Blackwell Publishing 2005) 239, at p 266. 
572 Ibid, at p 267. 
573 Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey – Textiles) (DS34) and Canada – 
Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Canada - Autos) (DS139) (see 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A9#selected_agreement). In 
Section 4.4 of this thesis, it was mentioned that, to date, there are also five cases were reviewed by the WTO 
panels regarding safeguard measures involves RTAs notified under GATT Article XXIV. However, the panels 
and the Appellate body shied away from making examinations on those RTAs. Meanwhile, the interpretation of 
the legal requirements under GATT Article XXIV in those cases is very limited. 
241 
 
5.3.3 Academic Debates Concerning WTO Panels’ Jurisdiction over 
RTAs 
Despite the initial success of the bilateral review, a few questions have been 
raised regarding WTO panels’ jurisdiction on RTA-related disputes.  
First of all, protests have been raised as to whether Track II should be available 
at all – in other word, whether TRMs in RTAs are justiciable, taking account of the 
highly political context surrounding regional integration.  
In India – Quantitative Restrictions, India argued that the question of whether a 
restriction can be justified on balance of payments grounds is inherently political and 
this is why such issues have been entrusted to Committees on Balance of Payment 
and not to panels.
574
 Similar argument could be raised that the consistency of a RTA 
with the WTO is one of a political nature, and hence not justiciable.  
In this regard, Matsushita et al., provided a strong argument which counters the 
above view: the only genuinely political question in respect of a RTA is the rationale 
for choosing the regional route; however, it is not put into question at all by GATT 
Article XXIV. What is questioned by the WTO contract is the conditions under 
which a RTA can legitimately be formed.
575
  
On the other hand, the wording of the 1994 Understanding “[a]ny matter relating 
to the application of Article XXIV GATT” reflects the willingness of negotiators to 
affirm their intention to see WTO panels deal with RTA-related issues. Therefore, it 
is quite clear that RTA-related issues are justiciable before the WTO judicial organ.  
Indeed, since the adoption of the 1994 Understanding, it is universally accepted 
that WTO judicial bodies are competent to examine individual trade measures of 
RTAs. Thus, there is little doubt that WTO panels can review TRMs in RTAs.  
Controversies, however, exist on the question of whether an overall assessment 
on the compatibility of RTAs is appropriate to be conducted by the WTO judicial 
body. A typical view supporting the negative answer is that the term “[a]ny matter 
relating to the application of Article XXIV GATT” in paragraph 12 of the 1994 
Understanding only refers to individual trade measures adopted upon the formation 
                                                     
574 Appellate Body Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agriculture, Textiles and Industrial 
Products (“India – Quantitative Restrictions”), WT/DS90/AB/R, dated 23 August 1999.  
575 M Matsushita, T J Schoenbaum and P C Mavroidis, World Trade Organization: law, practice, and policy 
(Oxford University Press 2006), p 556. 
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of RTAs, not the overall compatibility of the RTAs themselves. According to 
Roessler, “[t]he ‘ordinary meaning’ of the term ‘application’ is ‘a specific use or 
purpose for which something is put’ and ‘applicability in a particular case.’”
576
 Thus, 
he “suggests that panels can only make findings on specific measures imposed.”
577
 
This issue is well worth discussion because it is particularly relevant to the review of 
TRMs in RTAs. 
As identified in Chapter 4, since GATT Article XXIV is an exception to other 
WTO provisions, WTO Members are logically requested to first show consistency of 
their RTA with WTO rules before they can invoke GATT Article XXIV as a defence 
to justify discriminatory TRMs applied in RTA. That is to say, assessment of the 
overall consistency of a RTA is a pre-requisite to the examination of an individual 
TRM imposed by such a RTA. 
Due to the fact that the WTO political organ has been unable to make 
conclusions on the legal status of the notified RTAs, WTO panels had to (and, very 
likely, will continue to) make their own judgment on the overall consistency of a 
RTA before entering into examination of the individual measures adopted by such 
RTA.  However, whether WTO panels are competent to carry out this task remains 
contentious. Hence, in order to see whether the consistency test proposed in Chapter 
4 can be effectively conducted by WTO panels, it is necessary to clarify whether 
WTO panels have jurisdiction on the overall consistency of RTAs.  
In the GATT years, this issue was addressed in two cases, where the GATT 
panels held different positions.  
The first case is EC – Citrus, in which the EEC invoked GATT Article XXIV as 
a defence to justify its tariff preferences granted to citrus products imported from 
certain Mediterranean countries. The panel held that it could examine individual 
measures but not the overall consistency of a RTA with the multilateral rules. The 
relevant passage of the report reads: 
“The Panel noted that at the time of the examination of the agreements entered 
into by the European Community with certain Mediterranean countries, there 
                                                     
576 F Roessler, “The Institutional Balance between the Judicial and the Political Organs of the WTO”, in M 
Bronckers and R Quick (eds), New Directions in International Economic Law, Essays in Honour of John H. 




was no consensus among contracting parties as to the conformity of the 
agreement with Article XXIV:5 … The agreements had not been disapproved, 
nor had they been approved. The Panel found therefore that the question of 
conformity of the agreements with the requirements of Article XXIV and their 
legal status remained open.”
578
 
In 1993, the EEC – Bananas panel adopted a different logic. In EEC – Bananas, 
the European Community granted tariff preferences for bananas to certain African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries which violated GATT Article I:1. To justify 
this measure, The EEC claimed that such tariff preferences, which were granted 
under the Lomé Convention, were justified by Article XXIV and that this 
Convention could only be examined by the political organ.  
The panel responded to this claim as follows:  
“The Panel could not accept that tariff preferences inconsistent with Article I:1 
would, by notification of the preferential agreement and invocation of Article 
XXIV against the objections of other contracting parties, escape any 
examination by a panel established under Article XXIII. If this view were 
endorsed a mere communication of a contracting party invoking Article XXIV 
could deprive all other contracting parties of their procedural rights under 
Article XXIII:2 and therefore also of the effective protection of their substantive 
rights, in particular those under Article I. The Panel concluded therefore that a 
panel, faced with the invocation of Article XXIV, first had to examine whether 




The panel successively found that the one-way preferential arrangements 
concluded under the Lomé Convention are per se inconsistent with GATT Article 
XXIV
580
. Hence, it went on to conclude that the Lomé Convention did not 
correspond to the type of agreements which GATT Article XXIV covers; obligations 
to liberalize must be assumed by all participants.
581
 
                                                     
578 Panel Report, EC – Citrus, L/5776, dated 11 February 1985 (unadopted), at para.4.6 and at para.4.10. 
579 Panel Report, EEC – Bananas, paras 158-59. 
580 Ibid., para 159. 
581 Ibid., para 164. 
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Although the panel’s reasoning in EEC – Bananas is pretty sound, since the 
reports of both cases remain unadopted, the legal value of these reports is minimal.  
When the same issue arose in the WTO era, the panels and Appellate Body’s 
position was once again split. 
In Turkey – Textiles, the panel declined to examine the overall consistency of the 
EU-Turkey customs union, of which a certain measure was challenged as violating 
other WTO provisions on quantitative restrictions. The panel provided its reason in 
relevant part of the report that: 
“[W]e understand from the wording of paragraph 12 of the WTO Understanding 
on Article XXIV, that panels have jurisdiction to examine ‘any matters “arising 
from” the application of these provisions of Article XXIV,’ For us, this confirms 
that a panel can examine the WTO compatibility of one or several measures 
‘arising from’ Article XXIV types of agreement …. Thus, we consider that a 
panel can assess the WTO compatibility of any specific measure adopted by 
WTO Members … on the occasion of the formation of a customs union …. As 
to whether panels also have the jurisdiction to assess the overall WTO 
compatibility of a customs union, we recall that the Appellate Body stated that 
the ‘measures’ … all of which could potentially be examined by panels, before, 
during or after … CRTA examination, if the requirements laid down in the DSU 
are met. However, it is arguable that a customs union (or a free-trade area) as a 




The panel therefore, simply assumed the EU-Turkey CU is consistent with 
GATT Article XXIV and focused on examining whether the individual measures 
adopted by the EU-Turkey CU could be justified under GATT Article XXIV. 
The case was appealed, and the Appellate Body adopted a different stance. 
According to the Appellate Body, the Article XXIV GATT defence holds only if two 
conditions are met: 
“First, the party claiming the benefit of this defence must demonstrate that the 
measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully 
                                                     
582 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, paras 9.50, 9.51 and 9.53. 
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meets the requirements of sub-paragraph 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV. And 
second, that party must demonstrate that the formation of that customs union 
would be prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue …. 
We would expect a panel, when examining such a measure, to require a party to 
establish that both of these conditions have been fulfilled.”
583
 
This obiter dictum clearly indicates that: one, examination on the legality of a 
trade measure in a RTA is based on a strict pre-examination on whether the accused 
RTA is compatible with GATT Article XXIV; two, WTO panels are entirely 
competent to examine the overall consistency of a RTA. 
Most recently, in US – Line Pipe the United States argued that, since it is a 
member of NAFTA, it was entitled to treat imports from NAFTA different than 
imports from non-NAFTA sources when imposing a safeguard measure. The panel 
first addressed the issue of burden of proof: 
“As the party seeking to rely on an Article XXIV defence... the onus is on the 
United States to demonstrate compliance with these conditions.”
584
 
The same report addressed the issue of the quantum of proof that the party 
carrying the burden of proof has to provide in order to establish a prima facie case of 
consistency of a RTA with the multilateral rules. Paragraph 7.144 of the report reads 
in this respect: 
“In our view, the information provided by the United States in these proceedings, 
the information submitted by the NAFTA parties to the Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements (“CRTA”) (which the United States has incorporated into its 
submissions to the Panel by reference), and the absence of effective refutation 
by Korea, establishes a prima facie case that NAFTA is in conformity with 
Article XXIV:5(b) and (c), and with Article XXIV:8(b).” 
The information provided by the United States in the proceedings is reflected in 
paragraph 7.142 of the report and essentially is exhausted in a statement that duties 
on 97 per cent of the NAFTA-parties’ tariff lines will be eliminated within 10 years, 
whereas with respect to “other regulations of commerce” a reference to “the 
                                                     
583 Appellate Body report, Turkey – Textiles, paras.58-59 (emphasis added). 
584 Panel Report, US – Line Pipe, para 7.142. 
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principles of national treatment, transparency, and a variety of other market access 
rules” is made.  
Apparently, the above cases presented three different approaches on how to 
handle the assessment of the overall consistency of the RTA at issue when examining 
an individual measure adopted by such a RTA. 
The approach adopted by the Turkey – Textiles panel requires a panel to refrain 
from making judgment on the overall consistency of the RTA at stake. Based on an 
assumption that the RTA is consistent with GATT Article XXIV, the panel focuses 
on examining the individual measures adopted by such a RTA. This approach is 
obviously inappropriate. Examination of the overall compatibility of the accused 
RTA is an indispensable pre-requisite to the examination of the concrete trade policy 
measures adopted by the RTA even it is not questioned by the disputants, because it 
essentially prevents other forms of trade union to abuse the rights under GATT 
Article XXIV – the EEC-Bananas case has already demonstrated that this could 
happen. 
The approach adopted by the Turkey – Textiles Appellate Body requires a panel 
to make strict examination of whether the accused RTA is compatible with GATT 
Article XXIV before examining the legality of an individual measure in such a RTA. 
Although it is quite ideal to determine the overall consistency of the RTA at stake 
before questioning the legality of the individual measures imposed by such a RTA, 
this is the approach that received most opposition in the academic literature. Many 
scholars advise the WTO judicial organ to restrain from making comprehensive 
assessment on the overall consistency of RTAs. 
First of all, Devuyst and Serdarevic, in a recent research paper, asserted that the 
WTO in fact is only a “partial” constitutional supervisor of RTAs. RTAs often have 
broader goals going well beyond trade policy; the WTO, however, is largely 
confined to trade law and policy that is far from the comprehensive legal structure 
that reflects the variety of issues covered by RTAs.
585
 Thus, in their view, “[W]hile 
the WTO is the appropriate forum for the assessment of the trade policy measures of 
                                                     
585 Y Devuyst and A Serdarevic, “The World Trade Organization and Regional Trade Agreements: Bridging the 
Constitutional Credibility Gap” (2007) 18 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 1, at p 56. 
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Second, the vague nature of WTO provisions on RTAs is the most significant 
factor that restrains WTO panels from formulating a convincing judgment on overall 
assessment of RTAs. As Devuyst and Serdarevic explain, “in the literature on 
compliance with international legal norms, the substantive characteristics of treaties 
are among the most important predicting factors affecting effective implementation. 
Duties of a general and imprecise nature that leave a large margin of interpretation 
are much less likely to be correctly implemented than precise obligations that are 
tested on their simplicity in implementation.”
587
 Since the WTO’s current rules on 
RTAs are characterized by a general lack of precision, it is inappropriate to make the 




Third, there is a need to preserve the WTO’s institutional balance between 
political and judicial bodies. Roessler has proposed that, for reasons having to do 
with the institutional balance of the WTO, a limited judicial review by WTO 
adjudicating bodies is the most appropriate one.
589
 According to Roessler, the 
framers of the WTO negotiated a complex institutional structure “under which 
separate judicial and political bodies” were created.
590
 He made a distinction between: 
- The WTO’s legislative branch: the membership of the WTO acting 
collectively under the amendment and other rule-making provisions; 
- The WTO’s executive branch: the political organs of the WTO taking 
decisions within the framework of the existing law, including the Committee 
on Regional Trade Agreements and the Committee on Balance-of-Payments 
Restrictions; and 
- The WTO’s judicial branch: the Panels, arbitrators and the Appellate Body.591 
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He therefore asserted that “[j]ust as modern states, the WTO must ensure that its 
judicial organs exercise their powers with due regard to the jurisdiction assigned to 
the other parts of its institutional structure”.
592
 As a judicial branch, WTO panels 
evidently cannot replace the legislative branch.  
Fourth, considering the onerous administrative burden and the time constrain 
that WTO panels have to adhere to, the CRTA is the more appropriate forum to 
review overall consistency of notified RTAs. On this score, Devuyst and Serdarevic 
advanced that “it is doubtful whether Panels are technically equipped to make an 
overall assessment of the compatibility of RTAs with the WTO disciplines.”
593
 In 
their opinion,“[I]n view of the paralysis of the CRTA, it is unlikely that Panels – 
when examining the overall compatibility of the RTA – will be able to base their 
rulings on clear decisions adopted by the members. Panels would thus need to rule on 
the overall compatibility of RTAs in line with their own assessment. It is entirely 
unclear how Panels would approach such a daunting task as their rulings would go 
well beyond the interpretation of a WTO rule in a precise case.”
594
 
Moreover, there is a problem of the political acceptability of dispute settlement 
rulings on the legality of RTAs, especially in view of the vague substantive criteria. 
It is entirely unclear what consequences would be of a WTO dispute settlement 
ruling that effectively declares an RTA incompatible with the WTO laws.
595
 
It should be admitted that above reasons make sufficient sense that a 
comprehensive overall assessment on the compatibility of RTAs should be 
exclusively assigned to the WTO political organ. Although WTO panels so far have 
not yet made any comprehensive review of the overall legality of a RTA, they are 
suggested to avoid doing so.  
In contrast, the approach adopted by the US – Line Pipe panel is rather practical. 
It requires a panel to conduct a prima facie examination on the overall consistency of 
the RTA with GATT Article XXIV; if a positive conclusion is made, the panel can 
further examine the legality of an individual measure in a RTA. The prima facie 
overall compatibility requirement laid down by the US – Line Pipe panel is 
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fundamentally different from a comprehensive assessment on the overall 
compatibility of RTAs. In common understanding, establishment of a prima facie 
case on the overall compatibility of an accused RTA is not conclusive or irrefutable, 
therefore, it does not prejudice the CRTA to make its own judgment on a later 
occasion.  
It is worth noting that, even in an extreme case where a WTO Member wishes a 
panel to make a comprehensive review on the overall compatibility of a RTA, there 
is little reason for panels to reject such a claim in accord with the current legal 
regime.  
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding [hereafter: the 
“DSU”], the WTO dispute settlement mechanism applies to all the multilateral 
agreements, subject to special or additional provisions contained therein. Because 
there are no such special or additional rules and procedures applicable to the 
assessment of the overall compatibility of RTAs in the DSU or in Article XXIV, 
such assessment logically falls into the purview of WTO judicial bodies. Prohibiting 
Members recourse to the dispute settlement procedure will deprive the complaining 
party’s rights under the DSU, given the fact that the political organ (GATT working 
parties and the CRTA) has never made any definitive conclusion in past decades.
596
  
On the other hand, as Bartels observed,  
“… unlike most ‘ordinary’ courts and tribunals, panels and the Appellate Body 
are extremely limited in their ability to manage cases that are inappropriate for 
resolution in dispute settlement proceedings. They have no power to declare 
cases ‘inadmissible’, they are unable to suspend proceedings while a relevant 
decision is taken in another forum, and they are unable to declare that the law 
which they are bound to apply is incapable of determination.”
597
   
Therefore, WTO panels have inherent difficulties to decline to give decisions on 
issues, no matter if it is political sensitive, or, of which the substantive law is unclear. 
Bring together, in the current regime, WTO panels have authority to review the 
overall compatibility of RTAs, not only to prima facie extent but also to a 
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comprehensive extent. However, given the reasons submitted by their opponents 
cited previously, it is suggested WTO negotiators either exclusively assign the 
comprehensive overall assessment on RTAs’ compatibility to the political organ, or 
enlarge the power of WTO panels so that they would have the authority to decline to 




5.4 Interplay between Tracks I and II  
 
Since the WTO panels and the CRTA both have authority to review trade policy 
measures in RTAs, problems may arise in the interplay between the two organs. For 
example, should one organ take into account the decision made by the other when 
determining relevant subject matters; what happens if a RTA is simultaneously 
assessed before the panel and the CRTA; what happens if a RTA (or trade measure 
applied upon the RTA) was sanctioned as consistent/inconsistent with Article XXIV 
but later received a reverse judgment in the CRTA, etc. 
 
5.4.1 CRTA Decision Followed by Dispute Settlement Proceedings 
As to the legal significance of the CRTA reports, Matsushita et al. asserted that, 
if the CRTA by consensus concludes on the consistency/inconsistency of the notified 
RTA (or a trade measure imposed upon the RTA) with the multilateral rules, there is 




To support this view, they quoted the panel report on India – Quantitative 
Restrictions which dealt with a similar issue (i.e., to what extent a panel dealing with 
an issue where the Balance of Payments Committee has already decided) in 
paragraph 5.94: 
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“… we see no reason to assume that the panel would not appropriately take 
those conclusions into account. If the nature of the conclusions were binding … 
a panel should respect them.”
600
 
They then suggested that the same reasoning should apply to panels dealing with 
RTA-related issues.  
It deserves pointing out here that, with regard to the interplay between the 
political organ and the judicial organ review on BOP matters, paragraph 13 of the 
BOP Understanding clearly provides that “[w]henever the General Council has made 
specific recommendations, the rights and obligations of Members shall be assessed in 
the light of such recommendations”. Thus, if a recommendation was given out by the 
BOP Committee and adopted by the General Council, WTO panels would have to 
take those recommendations into account in successive cases. To the contrary, 
similar provision is not available with regard to RTAs. That is to say, there is no 
legal compulsion for a panel to follow a CRTA decision.  
However, since the CRTA report is an expression of all relevant WTO 
Members’ willingness, there is little reason not to take the CRTA’s decisions or 
recommendations into account, especially on those issues where discretion is 
exercised (e.g., the overall WTO compatibility of a RTA, or whether a 
discriminatory TRM imposed by a WTO Member is “necessary” to the formation of 
its RTA).   
But if the CRTA has not issued its report at the time the dispute was submitted 
to the panel, should the panel stop short of making findings based on its own 
discretion? The answer should be negative. In common understanding, absence of a 
determination by the CRTA on the legal status of a RTA (or a trade measure 
introduced upon a RTA) simply means that the CRTA neither determined such RTA 
(or the trade measure) is compatible with the WTO, nor determined it is incompatible 
with the WTO. Since WTO judicial bodies are also competent to review RTA-related 
disputes, they should not be bound from making their own findings without receiving 
any guidance from the CRTA. If the panels refrain from doing so, they would risk 
depriving WTO Members’ rights under the DSU, given the fact that the political 
organ has never made any definitive conclusion in past decades.  
                                                     
600 Panel Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions, WT/DS90/R, dated 6 April 1999.  
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Therefore, in US – Line Pipe, the Panel explicitly stated that: 
“Concerning Article XXVIII:8(b), we do not consider the fact that the CRTA 
has not yet issued a final decision that NAFTA is in compliance with Article 
XXIV:8 is sufficient to rebut the prima facie case established by the United 
States. Korea’s argument is based on the premise that a regional trade 
arrangement is presumed inconsistent with Article XXIV until the CRTA makes 
a determination to the contrary. We see no basis for such a premise in the 




5.4.2 Dispute Settlement Proceedings Followed by CRTA Decision 
Indeed, due to the time constraint that the panels have to adhere to and the 
absence of such constraint in the CRTA review, WTO panels had made (and, very 
likely, will continue to make) their findings without receiving any guidance from the 
political organ. So, do the panel’s findings prejudge future action by the CRTA? 
What happens if a RTA (or trade measures applied upon the RTA) was sanctioned as 
consistent/inconsistent with Article XXIV but later received a reverse judgment in 
the CRTA?  
As to the first question, the answer seems to be no. The Appellate Body has on 
several occasions stated that the reports of the panels and Appellate Body, even 
adopted, are not binding precedents for other disputes between the same parties on 
other matters or different parties on the same matter, even though the same questions 
of WTO law might arise, because the definitive interpretations of the provisions of 
the WTO agreements shall only be made by the Ministerial Conference and the 
General Council.  
The legal status of a panel report was initially addressed by the Appellate Body 
in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II: 
“We do not believe that the CONTRACTING PARTIES, in deciding to adopt a 
panel report, intended that their decision would constitute a definitive 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of GATT 1947.  Nor do we believe that 
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this is contemplated under GATT 1994…. Adopted panel reports are an 
important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered by subsequent 
panels.  They create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, 
therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.  
However, they are not binding…”
602 
 
In US – Shrimp the Appellate Body quoted above statement and added that “this 
reasoning applies to adopted Appellate Body reports as well”.
603
  
In US — Stainless Steel (Mexico)
604
, the Appellate Body further clarified that 
“[i]t is well settled that Appellate Body reports are not binding, except with respect 
to resolving the particular dispute between the parties”;
605
 “[w]hile Appellate Body 
reports adopted by the DSB shall be accepted unconditionally by the parties to the 
dispute, it is the exclusive authority of the Ministerial Conference and the General 
Council to adopt, pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, interpretations 
that are binding upon the WTO membership.”
606
 
As a consequence, WTO Members can at any time (e.g., through a WTO 
Committee) adopt an interpretation of the term which may be different or contradict 
to the panels’ finding in previous proceedings. However, since such interpretation 
cannot be applied retroactively, what panels dealing previously with the issue ended 




5.4.3 Simultaneous Consideration 
In exceptional circumstances, it is also possible that a RTA is reviewed 
simultaneously before the CRTA and the panels. The question would then arise as to 
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whether the reviewing proceedings of one organ should be or could be suspended 
whilst an issue is being discussed before another organ. To answer this question, this 
section analyses whether the CRTA or the WTO panels have obligation or power to 
suspend their proceedings.  
On the CRTA side, no legal text indicates that it bears obligation to suspend its 
proceeding whilst the same issue is being examined by WTO judicial bodies. 
However, since it is a political organ that operates by consensus-mode among all 
WTO Members, if all participants unanimously agreed to wait for the conclusion to 
be made by the panels and the Appellate Body, nothing should prevent them from 
doing so. 
Then, how about the WTO judicial bodies? Do WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body have either obligation or power to suspend a dispute settlement proceeding? 
This issue is barely examined in existing literature, except for a paper presented by L. 
Bartels that discusses it at length.
608
  
In the first place, he mentions the “judicial comity” followed by the arbitral 
tribunal in MOX Plant Arbitration (UK/Ireland). It was noticed that, in these 
proceedings, the arbitrators ordered the suspension of proceedings for five months, 
so that various issues material to the questions of jurisdiction could be decided in a 
more appropriate forum (the European Court of Justice). The original text of the 
Order provided: 
“bearing in mind considerations of mutual respect and comity which should 
prevail between judicial institutions both of which may be called upon to 
determine rights and obligations as between two States, the Tribunal considers 
that it would be inappropriate for it to proceed further with hearing the Parties 
on the merits of the dispute in the absence of a resolution of the problems 
referred to. Moreover, a procedure that might result in two conflicting decisions 
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The Tribunal made its Order based on a provision in its Rules of Procedure 
which stated as follows: 
“Subject to these Rules, the Arbitral Tribunal may conduct the proceedings in 
such manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the Parties are treated 
with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each Party is given a full 
opportunity to be heard and to present its case.”
610
 
Thus, it is important to know whether the rules of procedure (i.e. the DSU), 
authorize WTO panels to suspend their proceedings. In all provisions of the DSU, 
only Article 12.12 grants panels the express power to suspend proceedings at the 
request of the complaining party. It states, relevantly, as follows: 
“The panel may suspend its work at any time at the request of the complaining 
party for a period not to exceed 12 months … If the work of the panel has been 
suspended for more than 12 months, the authority for the establishment of the 
panel shall lapse.” 
Obviously, Article 12.12 DSU allows the complaining party to request 
suspension of panel proceedings. However, this is a right bestowed upon the 
complaint, and not an obligation to behave in this way assuming certain 
contingencies (e.g., discussions of the issue before a WTO Committee) have been 
met.
611
 Put differently, according to Article 12.12 DSU, a panel has no power to 
suspend proceedings on its own motion or at the request of the defendant.  
In Bartels work, he also examined the possibility for WTO panels to suspend 
their proceedings under their Working Procedure. Pursuant to DSU Article 12 and 
Article 17, the panels and the Appellate body should adopt certain working 
procedures at the initial stage of the dispute settlement proceedings, which cover 
arrangements on information provision, communication between the disputants and 
the panels, and the proposed timetable for the panel and Appellate Body’s work. The 
pattern of the Working Procedures for the panel is provided in Appendix 3 of the 
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Although the working procedures are modelled in these documents, the panel 
and the Appellate Body enjoy certain flexibility to adopt different procedures in 
particular cases. Notably, Article 16(1) of the Appellate Body’s Working Procedures 
provides that: 
“In the interests of fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct of an appeal, 
where a procedural question arises that is not covered by these Rules, a division 
may adopt an appropriate procedure for the purposes of that appeal only, 




In this regard, Bartels pointed out that the Appellate Body has adopted a 
generous interpretation of its own powers and the powers of a panel to adopt 
Working Procedures in a number of cases.
614
 However, he noted, on all occasions, 
the Appellate Body also held that, the procedural rules adopted either by itself or by 
the panels must comply with the substantive provisions of the DSU. Therefore, he 
concluded that “[e]ven if panels and the Appellate Body have the power to suspend 
proceedings under their Working Procedures, any suspension that would take 




In brief, pursuant to relevant provisions of the WTO panels’ procedure, a WTO 
panel has an obligation and authorization to suspend dispute settlement proceedings 
at the request of the complaining party for maximum 12 months. However, generally, 
neither a panel nor the Appellate Body has authority to suspend the proceeding on its 
own motion or at the request of the defendant. In particular cases, the panel and the 
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Appellate Body may be able to temporarily suspend proceedings under the working 
procedures they adopted in particular case; this suspension will not take long and 
exceed the time limits set up by the DSU.  
In the author’s view, given the fact that the CRTA has never made a conclusion 
on RTA examinations in history, suspension of dispute settlement proceedings is 
very unlikely to obtain any definitive response from the CRTA and therefore, the 
suspension will impair the complaining party’s rights under the DSU.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The above observations and analysis show that, throughout the GATT years and 
the WTO, the Member States sought to determine the compliance of RTAs with the 
relevant rules (i.e., consistency assessment) but with very little success.  
In the political review procedures, long-standing differences of interpretation of 
some of the key elements of the legal texts pertaining to RTAs, coupled with the 
consensus decision mode impeded the GATT working parties and the WTO CRTA 
from developing definitive results on RTAs examination. Although a lot of effort has 
been devoted to improve the substantive and procedural criteria on RTA in recent 
decades, the result remains unsatisfactory. The latest concluded Transparency 
Mechanism further implies that, formal consistency examinations on RTAs tend to 
be laid up at political level in the near future. Therefore, legal challenge to a RTA, 
including TRM issues, against the somewhat imprecise GATT Article XXIV is more 
likely to be settled in the context of a judicial process.  
Since the establishment of the WTO dispute settlement regime, a negative 
consensus decision mode has replaced the consensus mode in the GATT era. 
Therefore, WTO panels were able to make conclusions on RTA-related disputes 
brought in front of them. Nevertheless, the panels and the Appellate Body 
consistently took different positions on their jurisdiction in the review of RTA-
related cases, taking account of the institutional balance between the WTO’s political 
organ and judicial organ. The issue also became very contentious in academia. The 
major questions refer to whether WTO panels have jurisdiction to review specific 
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trade measures adopted in RTAs and whether they have jurisdiction to review the 
overall compatibility of a RTA with the WTO rules.  
After analysing the relevant provisions on RTAs, the reasoning provided by 
WTO panels in relevant cases and the prevailing literature addressed this issue, it is 
concluded that, examination of the legality of an individual measure in a RTA should 
be based on an examination on the overall consistency of the RTA with GATT 
Article XXIV. In the current regime, WTO panels have authority to review both 
specific trade measures in RTAs and the overall compatibility of RTAs. However, 
for the sake of institutional balance, they are suggested to refrain from making 
judgment on the latter issues. Alternatively, a prima facie examination on the overall 
consistency of the RTA with GATT Article XXIV can be conducted by the WTO 
panels. 
In terms of the interplay between Track I and Track II, the finding is:  
Firstly, since the report of the panels and the Appellate Body only binds the 
specific disputants on specific subject matters and the definitive interpretations of the 
provisions of the WTO agreements shall only be made by the Ministerial Conference 
and the General Council, the WTO panel’s finding will not prejudge future action by 
the CRTA. WTO Members can at any time through the CRTA adopt an 
interpretation of the term which may be different or contradict to the panels’ finding 
in previous proceedings.  
Secondly, there is no legal compulsion for the WTO panel to follow a CRTA 
decision. But since the CRTA report is an expression of all WTO Members’ 
willingness, WTO panels are expected to take the CRTA’s decisions or 
recommendations into account, especially on those issues where discretion is needed. 
In the exceptional circumstance that a RTA is reviewed simultaneously before 
the CRTA and the panels, the CRTA may suspend its proceeding, waiting for the 
result from the dispute settlement if the participants agree unanimously, although it 
has no obligation to do so. However, WTO panels are only entitled to make 
suspensions at the request of the complaint and limited to a 12 months’ time-span. In 
particular cases, the Appellate Body can suspend its proceedings under Working 






This thesis has discussed TRMs adopted in existing RTAs, based on a 
comparative study with their counterparts in the WTO legal system. It observed that, 
given the WTO’s inadequate and ambiguous disciplines on RTAs, adoption of TRMs 
in RTAs has significantly deviated from WTO basic rules, and this trend is likely to 
be further enhanced in the future. The main concern of such incoherence is that rule 
diversification on TRMs lies in the creation of another method to wield a 
discriminatory authority which is structured to favour inefficient RTA parties at the 
expense of more efficient third countries. In addition, it also undermines the 
transparency and predictability standards of the international trading system 
presented by the WTO. 
To address this problem, this thesis discussed four key issues as follows and 
provided academic opinions and suggestions respectively: 
1) What is the relationship between RTAs and the WTO? Should RTA trade 
policies be compliant with WTO rules? 
2) What are the TRMs and what are the differences between TRMs in RTAs and 
the WTO? 
3) Whether TRMs in RTAs can deviate from WTO general rules, given the 
exceptional status of a RTA in WTO; what are the legal conditions they must 
adhere to? and  
4) How to enforce the WTO-consistency test on RTA-specific TRMs and bring 
them back onto the right track?  
In this thesis, RTAs and the WTO are recognized as two different arrangements 
to liberalized trade. Hence, to discuss the corresponding trade a policy in RTAs and 
the WTO, the first issue was dealt with is: what is the relationship between RTAs and 
the WTO?  
For this purpose, Chapter 1 introduced the background of the multilateral trading 
system and the regional trade agreements. It took historical and theoretical 
perspectives to assess the roles and functions of the multilateral trading system and 
RTAs. After comparing the advantages and disadvantages of each arrangement, it 
260 
 
proposed that for a healthy and sustainable international trade environment, RTAs 
should complement to the WTO, not an alternative. Consequently, it considered the 
recent proliferation of RTAs and their trend to develop complex networks of non-
MFN trade relations. It argued that this situation not only challenges the dominance 
of the WTO but also creates more and more confusion on the WTO-RTA relationship. 
To ensure a positive interplay between the WTO and RTAs, clear disciplines under 
the multilateral trade framework regarding the RTAs are indispensable. 
Chapter 2 examined GATT/WTO regulations on TRMs, and also reviewed the 
controversial academic views over the rationale and function of anti-dumping, 
countervailing duty measures and safeguards in international trade. It observed that, 
preferential TRMs in RTAs, in the first place, root on the extraordinary features of 
TRMs as well as the ambiguities existing in WTO TRM rules. The controversial 
economic rationale of TRMs, frequent usage of those measures in recent years in a 
protectionism manner and the vague criteria on application of TRMs are potential 
reasons that RTAs altered the corresponding rules for intra-regional trade. Therefore, 
current trade remedy rules in the WTO regime need to be further strengthened. 
In chapter 3, TRMs in RTAs, summarized in a bunch of strategic approaches, 
were introduced through comparative method against WTO regulations. It mainly 
revealed the deviations of TRMs in RTAs from the WTO rules and presented the 
influence of those innovative measures on regional trade and imports from third-
countries.  
It observed that, use of special TRMs as distinguished from the WTO regime has 
become a predominant feature of existing RTAs. By all appearances, those measures 
aim to reduce the potential arbitrary use of these instruments between RTA members 
and thus become ultimately positive in promoting intra-regional trade flow; however, 
they actually more or less divert trade opportunities from third-countries. Although 
actual trade diversion has not substantially materialized on the basis of emerging 
preferential application of trade remedy rules, a future risk seems much more real 
when major exporting countries with keen interests for trade remedy systems are 
engaging actively in RTA negotiations. It can be claimed that, such phenomenon 
should not be overlooked and a positive solution must be located in the WTO legal 
framework.     
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Since WTO provisions regulating RTAs, i.e. GATT Article XXIV and the 1994 
Understanding, have never clearly addressed the trade remedy issues, Chapter 4 
clarified the ambiguous legal criteria of WTO-consistent TRMs in regional trade 
agreements and provided a methodology through which a RTA-specific TRM could 
be tested against WTO’s criteria. 
In the first place, section 4.2 criticised the “parallelism” principle, a 
methodology which was adopted by the WTO adjudicating body to assess 
discriminatory global safeguard measures in previous dispute settlements. It 
proposed that such a principle is not found fully consistent with the GATT/WTO 
statutory requirement and, generally, it does not answer the question whether GATT 
Article XXIV can justify an otherwise WTO-inconsistent TRM in RTAs. 
Accordingly, section 4.3 and 4.4 re-addressed the legal criteria of WTO-
consistent TRMs in RTAs in two tiers: 1) whether TRMs in RTAs are allowed to 
deviate from the WTO general rules on TRMs, given the exceptional status of RTA in 
the GATT/WTO; and 2) in what conditions and to what extent they are allowed to 
deviate.  
With regard to the first question, section 4.3 analysed the relationship between 
GATT Article XXIV and other provisions in GATT/WTO. It concluded that, Article 
XXIV is a derogation not merely from the MFN principle, but also from all the 
provisions of the GATT 1994 as well as the WTO’s agreements on TRMs. Thus, 
Article XXIV may be invoked as a defence where an RTA-specific measure is not 
consistent with WTO TRMs rules.  
In terms of the second question, section 4.4 looked into the substantive 
requirements for an acceptable RTA prescribed in GATT Article XXIV. It argued that 
pursuant to the internal requirement laid down by Article XXIV:8, RTA members 
enjoy certain discretion on how to adopt TRMs internally. Nevertheless, since TRMs 
are not mandatorily requested to be eliminated in RTAs, adoption of these measures 
is subject to certain requirement laid down in the chapeau of Article XXIV:5, i.e.,  to 
establish RTAs, WTO Members can adopt a measure which is inconsistent with 
certain other GATT provisions only if the measure is introduced upon the formation 
of a customs union, and only to the extent that the formation of the customs union 
would be prevented if the introduction of the measure were not allowed.  
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Thus, it submitted that, in a case where a RTA adopts a TRM which violates 
general GATT/WTO obligations, the defending Member has to demonstrate:  
i) the measure that violates general GATT/WTO obligations and is in force 
under an Article XXIV arrangement, was in place upon the formation of the 
RTA; 
ii) the RTA under which the measure is introduced is within the meaning of 
GATT Article XXIV; and 
iii) the measure in question is “necessary” to the formation of the RTA. 
Due to the brevity of the present necessity test interpreted by WTO tribunals in 
respect of GATT Article XXIV, section 4.5 further explored potential improvement 
that could be employed in future practice.  
Based on analysis of the necessity test under other GATT provisions, it proposed 
that, GATT Article XXIV “necessity test” should inevitably include a weighing and 
balancing process taking account of the factors listed below:   
i) the meaning of “necessary” in the context of Article XXIV;  
ii) the level of the importance of the interests and values pursued by RTA 
members under Article XXIV against their obligation to conform with other 
WTO provisions; 
iii) the trade restrictive effects of the challenged measure on imported goods 
from third-countries;  
iv) the burden of proof that should be adopted in the “necessity test” under 
Article XXIV; and 
v) the contribution that would possibly be made by the challenged measure and 
the alternative measures held by the complaining Member. 
Finally, Chapter 5 of this thesis examined the WTO surveillance mechanism on 
RTAs, with the purpose to locate a feasible platform to enforce the proposed 
consistency test on TRMs in RTAs proposed in this thesis. The discussion focused on 
the roles and jurisdictions of WTO CRTA and the dispute settlement panels on RTA 
examination, and the interplay between these two organs.   
First, it examined whether the role of overseeing compatibility of TRMs in RTAs 
is best performed by the political organs of the WTO (i.e. the CRTA) or through 
dispute settlement. It argued that, because of long-standing differences of 
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interpretation of some of the key elements of the legal texts pertaining to RTAs, legal 
examination of RTAs is not appropriate to be conducted by the CRTA, which 
operates by consensus mode. Legal challenge to a RTA, including TRM issues, is 
more likely to be settled in the context of a judicial process.  
Secondly, it discussed how the judicial organ should manage its jurisdiction 
when examining TRMs in RTAs, taking account of the institutional balance between 
the political organ and the judicial organ. It argued that, examination of the legality 
of an individual measure in a RTA should be based on an examination on the overall 
consistency of the RTA with GATT Article XXIV. In the current regime, WTO panels 
have authority to review both specific trade measures in RTAs and the overall 
compatibility of RTAs. However, for the sake of institutional balance, they are 
suggested to refrain from making judgment on the latter issues. Alternatively, a 
prima facie examination on the overall consistency of the RTA with GATT Article 
XXIV can be conducted by WTO panels. 
Thirdly, it clarified the interplay between the recommendations and decisions 
issued by these two organs. It submitted that: 1) if decisions or recommendations on 
RTA issues have been made by the CRTA at an earlier point in time, there is no legal 
compulsion for the panels to follow. However, the WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body are expected to take such decisions or recommendations into account; 2) if the 
WTO panels or the Appellate Body make findings on particular RTAs, the CRTA 
may also take it into consideration. However, such findings will not prejudge future 
action by the CRTA; and 3) if a RTA is reviewed simultaneously before the CRTA 
and the panels, the CRTA may suspend its proceedings waiting for the result from the 
dispute settlement if the participants agree unanimously. In dispute settlement 
proceedings, the WTO panels and the Appellate Body are only entitled to make 
suspensions at the request of the complaint, and within the specific time-span 
prescribed in the DSU.  
To be noted, due to the limited length of the thesis, this research did not include 
all RTAs that are established or under negotiation pursuant to the WTO law, 
especially the RTAs notified under the Enabling Clause (i.e., the 1979 Decision on 
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries, which refers to preferential trade arrangements in trade in 
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goods between developing country Members) and the non-generalized preferential 
schemes (for example, non-reciprocal preferential agreements involving developing 
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RTA Name Members Type Date of notification Date of entry into force Status 
Australia - Chile   FTA 03-Mar-09 06-Mar-09 In Force 
Australia - New Zealand (ANZCERTA)   FTA 14-Apr-83 01-Jan-83 In Force 
Canada - Chile   FTA 30-Jul-97 05-Jul-97 In Force 
Canada - Colombia   FTA 07-Oct-11 15-Aug-11 In Force 
Canada - Costa Rica   FTA 13-Jan-03 01-Nov-02 In Force 
Canada - Israel   FTA 15-Jan-97 01-Jan-97 In Force 
Canada - Peru   FTA 31-Jul-09 01-Aug-09 In Force 
Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (CARICOM) 
Antigua and Barbuda; Bahamas; 
Barbados; Belize; Dominica; Grenada; 
Guyana; Haiti; Jamaica; Montserrat; 
Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; 
Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago 
CU 14-Oct-74 01-Aug-73 In Force 
Central American Common Market 
(CACM) 
Costa Rica; El Salvador; Guatemala; 
Honduras; Nicaragua 
CU 24-Feb-61 04-Jun-61 In Force 
Chile - China   FTA 20-Jun-07 01-Oct-06 In Force 
Chile - Colombia   FTA 14-Aug-09 08-May-09 In Force 
Chile - Japan   FTA 24-Aug-07 03-Sep-07 In Force 
Chile - Mexico   FTA 27-Feb-01 01-Aug-99 In Force 
China - Costa Rica   FTA 27-Feb-12 01-Aug-11 In Force 
China - Hong Kong, China   FTA 27-Dec-03 29-Jun-03 In Force 
                                                     
 RTAs selected in this research in this form include FTAs and CUs notified under GATT Article XXIV by June 2012. The factual information and legal text of these agreements are available in 
WTO RTA database at http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx 
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China - Macao, China   FTA 27-Dec-03 17-Oct-03 In Force 
China - New Zealand   FTA 21-Apr-09 01-Oct-08 In Force 
China - Singapore   FTA 02-Mar-09 01-Jan-09 In Force 
Colombia - Mexico   FTA 13-Sep-10 01-Jan-95 In Force 
Costa Rica - Mexico   FTA 17-Jul-06 01-Jan-95 In Force 
Dominican Republic - Central America 
Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; El 
Salvador; Guatemala; Honduras; 
Nicaragua 
FTA 06-Jan-12 04-Oct-01 In Force 
Dominican Republic - Central America 
- United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR) 
Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; El 
Salvador; Guatemala; Honduras; 
Nicaragua; United States 
FTA 17-Mar-06 01-Mar-06 In Force 
EFTA - Albania   FTA 07-Feb-11 01-Nov-10 In Force 
EFTA - Canada   FTA 04-Aug-09 01-Jul-09 In Force 
EFTA - Chile   FTA 03-Dec-04 01-Dec-04 In Force 
EFTA - Colombia   FTA 14-Sep-11 01-Jul-11 In Force 
EFTA - Croatia   FTA 14-Jan-02 01-Jan-02 In Force 
EFTA - Egypt   FTA 17-Jul-07 01-Aug-07 In Force 
EFTA - Israel   FTA 30-Nov-92 01-Jan-93 In Force 
EFTA - Jordan   FTA 17-Jan-02 01-Jan-02 In Force 
EFTA - Korea, Republic of   FTA 23-Aug-06 01-Sep-06 In Force 
EFTA - Lebanon   FTA 22-Dec-06 01-Jan-07 In Force 
EFTA - Mexico   FTA 25-Jul-01 01-Jul-01 In Force 
EFTA - Morocco   FTA 20-Jan-00 01-Dec-99 In Force 
EFTA - Peru   FTA 30-Jun-11 01-Jul-11 In Force 
EFTA - Singapore   FTA 14-Jan-03 01-Jan-03 In Force 
EFTA - Tunisia   FTA 03-Jun-05 01-Jun-05 In Force 
EFTA - Turkey   FTA 06-Mar-92 01-Apr-92 In Force 
Egypt - Turkey   FTA 05-Oct-07 01-Mar-07 In Force 
EU - Albania   FTA 07-Mar-07 01-Dec-06 In Force 
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EU - Algeria   FTA 24-Jul-06 01-Sep-05 In Force 
EU - Andorra   CU 23-Feb-98 01-Jul-91 In Force 
EU - Cameroon   FTA 24-Sep-09 01-Oct-09 In Force 
EU - Chile   FTA 03-Feb-04 01-Feb-03 In Force 
EU - Croatia   FTA 17-Dec-02 01-Mar-02 In Force 
EU - Egypt   FTA 03-Sep-04 01-Jun-04 In Force 
EU - Iceland   FTA 24-Nov-72 01-Apr-73 In Force 
EU - Israel   FTA 20-Sep-00 01-Jun-00 In Force 
EU - Jordan   FTA 17-Dec-02 01-May-02 In Force 
EU - Korea, Republic of   FTA 07-Jul-11 01-Jul-11 In Force 
EU - Lebanon   FTA 26-May-03 01-Mar-03 In Force 
EU - Mexico   FTA 25-Jul-00 01-Jul-00 In Force 
EU - Montenegro   FTA 16-Jan-08 01-Jan-08 In Force 
EU - Morocco   FTA 13-Oct-00 01-Mar-00 In Force 
EU - Norway   FTA 13-Jul-73 01-Jul-73 In Force 
EU-Columbia-Peru   FTA NA NA Pending 
EU - South Africa   FTA 02-Nov-00 01-Jan-00 In Force 
EU - Syria   FTA 15-Jul-77 01-Jul-77 In Force 
EU - Tunisia   FTA 15-Jan-99 01-Mar-98 In Force 
EU - Turkey   CU 22-Dec-95 01-Jan-96 In Force 
European Economic Area (EEA)   FTA 13-Sep-96 01-Jan-94 In Force 
European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) 
Iceland; Lichtenstein; Norway; 
Switzerland  
FTA 14-Nov-59 03-May-60 In Force 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
Bahrain; Kuwait; Oman; Qatar; Saudi 
Arabia; United Arab Emirates 
CU NA 01-Jan-03 In Force 
Hong Kong, China - New Zealand   FTA 03-Jan-11 01-Jan-11 In Force 
India - Japan   FTA 14-Sep-11 01-Aug-11 In Force 
India - Singapore   FTA 03-May-07 01-Aug-05 In Force 
Israel - Mexico   FTA 22-Feb-01 01-Jul-00 In Force 
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Japan - Brunei Darussalam   FTA 31-Jul-08 31-Jul-08 In Force 
Japan - Malaysia   FTA 12-Jul-06 13-Jul-06 In Force 
Japan - Mexico   FTA 31-Mar-05 01-Apr-05 In Force 
Japan - Peru   FTA 24-Feb-12 01-Mar-12 In Force 
Japan - Philippines   FTA 11-Dec-08 11-Dec-08 In Force 
Japan - Singapore   FTA 08-Nov-02 30-Nov-02 In Force 
Japan - Switzerland   FTA 01-Sep-09 01-Sep-09 In Force 
Japan - Thailand   FTA 25-Oct-07 01-Nov-07 In Force 
Jordan - Singapore   FTA 07-Jul-06 22-Aug-05 In Force 
Korea, Republic of - Chile   FTA 08-Apr-04 01-Apr-04 In Force 
Korea, Republic of - India   FTA 
 
01-Jan-10 In Force 
Korea, Republic of - Singapore   FTA 21-Feb-06 02-Mar-06 In Force 
Korea, Republic of - US   FTA 15-Mar-12 15-Mar-12 In Force 
New Zealand - Malaysia   FTA 07-Feb-12 01-Aug-10 In Force 
New Zealand - Singapore   FTA 04-Sep-01 01-Jan-01 In Force 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
Canada; Mexico; United States FTA 29-Jan-93 01-Jan-94 In Force 
Peru - Chile   FTA 29-Nov-11 01-Mar-09 In Force 
Peru - China   FTA 03-Mar-10 01-Mar-10 In Force 
Peru - Korea, Republic of   FTA 09-Aug-11 01-Aug-11 In Force 
Peru - Mexico   FTA 22-Feb-12 01-Feb-12 In Force 
Peru - Singapore   FTA 30-Jul-09 01-Aug-09 In Force 
Singapore - Australia   FTA 25-Sep-03 28-Jul-03 In Force 
Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) 
Argentina; Brazil; Paraguay; Uruguay CU 17-Feb-91 29-Nov-91 In Force 
Thailand - Australia   FTA 27-Dec-04 01-Jan-05 In Force 
Thailand - New Zealand   FTA 01-Dec-05 01-Jul-05 In Force 
Turkey - Albania   FTA 09-May-08 01-May-08 In Force 
Turkey - Chile   FTA 25-Feb-11 01-Mar-11 In Force 
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Turkey - Croatia   FTA 02-Sep-03 01-Jul-03 In Force 
Turkey - Georgia   FTA 18-Feb-09 01-Nov-08 In Force 
Turkey - Israel   FTA 16-Apr-98 01-May-97 In Force 
Turkey - Jordan   FTA 07-Mar-11 01-Mar-11 In Force 
Turkey - Montenegro   FTA 12-Mar-10 01-Mar-10 In Force 
Turkey - Morocco   FTA 10-Feb-06 01-Jan-06 In Force 
Turkey - Syria   FTA 15-Feb-07 01-Jan-07 In Force 
Turkey - Tunisia   FTA 01-Sep-05 01-Jul-05 In Force 
US - Australia   FTA 22-Dec-04 01-Jan-05 In Force 
US - Chile   FTA 16-Dec-03 01-Jan-04 In Force 
US - Colombia   FTA 08-May-12 15-May-12 In Force 
US - Israel   FTA 13-Sep-85 19-Aug-85 In Force 
US - Jordan   FTA 15-Jan-02 17-Dec-01 In Force 
US - Morocco   FTA 30-Dec-05 01-Jan-06 In Force 
US - Peru   FTA 03-Feb-09 01-Feb-09 In Force 
US - Singapore   FTA 17-Dec-03 01-Jan-04 In Force 
 
